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Any Questions?
Polarity as a Window into the Structure of Questions
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the peculiar behavior of negative polarity items in ques-
tions and argues that a unified account of their distribution across declarative and inter-
rogative constructions is feasible. These items are acceptable in questions, despite the fact
that questions do not prima facie share anything in common with the other environments
in which NPIs surface. Specifically, given current analyses of questions there is no way to
argue that questions give rise to downward-entailing inferences, which is what otherwise
unifies all other NPI licensing environments.
In Chapter 2 I argue for a new semantics of questions wherein strength of exhaustivity
is encoded not in different answer-hood operators (cf. Heim 1994), but rather in terms
of the presence/absence of a null only that adjoins at the level of the question nucleus,
building on an observation by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) that question strength appears
to be the determining factor in whether or not a question allows NPIs.
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the distribution of NPIs in constituent questions and
shows how the analysis put forward in Chapter 2 can account for an array of facts, namely
their distribution both in the question nucleus, and in the restrictor of the wh-phrase. Fur-
ther predictions related to NPIs that had not been discussed before are examined, such
as how their scope relative to adjunct wh-phrases affects their acceptability, as well as the
distributional differences between weak and strong NPIs.
iii
In Chapters 4 and 5we turn to non-wh questions, namely alternate and polar questions.
In Chapter 4 I argue that alternate questions can and should be given an analysis akin to
that of wh-questions based on both old and new empirical evidence that the distribution of
NPIs is sensitive to the same set of restrictions. In Chapter 5 I argue, contrary to previous
analyses, that the acceptability of NPIs is not a function of strength, but rather of how polar
questions are interpreted, namely as speech act conditionals.
Lastly, Chapter 6 focuses on complex questions and puts forward an analysis of these
questions that sets the stage for an arguably unified semantics of all types of questions.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation investigates how the distribution of negative polarity items can inform
our understanding of the underlying semantic representation of questions. The overarching
goal of this thesis is to argue that the distribution of negative polarity items in questions
is governed by the same logical properties that govern their distribution in declarative
constructions. Building on an observation due to Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) that strength
of exhaustivity in questions correlates with the acceptability of negative polarity items,
I propose a revision of the semantics of questions that can explain this link in already
familiar terms from the literature of negative polarity, namely the availability of a local
downward entailing environment. In Chapter 2 I argue for a new theory of questions that
takes strength of exhaustivity to be encoded internal to the question nucleus rather than
in different answer-hood operators. This switch, while conceptually a simple move, has
consequences that are far-reaching, both for the distribution of NPIs in questions and the
semantics of questions in general, which I discuss in Chapters 3-6.
My proposal builds most directly on two traditions: the Karttunen/Hamblin theory of
questions, and recent alternative based analyses of polarity phenomena (from Krifka (1995)
and Lahiri (1998) to Chierchia (2006, 2012)). Let us briefly indulge in some background on
the semantics of questions and negative polarity items.
1
1.1 Layout of the problem
The observation that negative polarity items (henceforth NPIs) are acceptable in questions
is not new. In fact, it dates back to Klima (1964) who noted that interrogative sentences
should be analyzed on par with negative sentences as constituting the prototypical en-
vironments able to support NPIs. Much advancement has been made since then in the
analysis of NPIs on the one hand, and interrogatives on the other. However, while our un-
derstanding of these two phenomena has become much more thorough, no account to date
has been able to provide a satisfying analysis that can deal with the occurrence of NPIs in
questions.
The currently dominating analysis of NPIs on the market is one which accounts for
their distribution en masse by stating that, for one reason or another, NPIs are sensitive to
the ability of their environment to support entailment reversals; more crudely, that NPIs
are licensed in Downward Entailing (DE) contexts. While this approach has been able to
unify, for the most part, the environments capable of sustaining NPIs, to date it has proved
unable to bring interrogative sentences under the umbrella of possible NPI licensors since
questions can be shown not to support the kinds of entailments claimed to be required
by NPIs. The goal of any semantics theory for NPI should, however, be able to provide a
unifying account for why we see NPIs surviving in run of the mill DE contexts such as in
(1) as well as in interrogatives, as in (2).
(1) a. I don’t think anyone came to the party.
b. I doubt that she’s ever been to Paris.
(2) a. Did you eat anything?
b. Were you ever in Paris?
c. Who cooked anything?
d. Who has ever visited Paris? Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007, ex. 1)
The first issue that needs to be addressed then is why NPIs are acceptable in questions
given that they do not give rise to DE environments, as has convincingly been argued in
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Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007). Given the ultimate goal of unification, an approach to NPIs
that analyzes them as being licensed in DE contexts would have to be re-evaluated since this
approach can not only not account for the data in (2), but would in fact make the opposite
predictions, lumping interrogatives with positive declaratives as non-DE environments.
The data in (2) shows that both Yes/No questions and wh-questions constitute good
licensors of NPIs. However, it has recently been pointed out by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007)
that this is not necessarily true of embedded questions where we observe an asymmetry
between these two types of questions. The authors show that while NPIs are acceptable
across the board in embedded Yes/No questions, as in (3), the same cannot be said of
embedded wh-questions, as shown by their varying acceptability in (4).
(3) a. I wonder whether anyone came to the party yesterday.
b. I wonder whether Mary ever visited Paris.
c. I asked her whether she ate anything weird last night.
d. I know whether she ever had a roommate in college.
(4) a. I wonder who will bring anything for the party tonight.
b. I know what countries Mary has ever been to.
c. *It surprised me who sold anything at the yard sale.
d. *It surprised us what cities Mary ever visited.
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) propose to attribute the varying acceptability of NPIs in (4)
to the nature of the embedding predicate, and more specifically to the types of readings
these embedding predicates can support: “strong exhaustive” for (4a-b) versus “weakly
exhaustive” readings for (4c-d).
The goals of a complete account of NPIs in questions should thus be two-fold. On the
one hand it should offer a convincing story that can explain why NPIs, given their other-
wise strong affinity to DE-ness, can survive in un-embedded interrogatives (both Yes/No
and wh), while on the other hand it would need to make sure this analysis can be extended
to accommodate for the ability of strong but not weakly exhaustive readings of embedded
wh interrogatives to license NPIs.
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Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) observe that the acceptability of NPIs in the nucleus of
an embedded question is sensitive to: (i) the nature of the embedding predicate (know,
surprise), and (ii) the type of question (yes/no versus wh). This can be shown more clearly
with the following data.
(5) Know
a. Claire knows whether Frank has any books on Negative Polarity.
b. Claire knows which students have any books on Negative Polarity.
(6) Surprise
a. *It surprised Bill whether the students have ever been to Paris.
b. *It surprised Bill which students had ever been to Paris.
We can see that NPIs are acceptable in embedded Yes/No questions (the (a) examples) as
long as the predicate can otherwise embed this type of question, know can, but surprise
cannot. It’s worth noting that the ungrammaticality of (6a) cannot be attributed to the
presence of the NPI ever, since predicates belonging to the surprise class are generally bad
polar-question embedders. While this inability is not directly relevant to the issue at hand,
we will return to it in a later chapter. As for embedded wh questions (the (b) examples),
the authors note that predicates differ in their ability to license NPIs. To substantiate this
claim they show that predicates such as wonder and ask always allow NPIs to surface in
their nucleus, regardless of which type of question they embed, while predicates such as
surprise, realize never do.
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) attribute the varying acceptability of NPIs in embedded
wh questions to the type of readings the embedding predicates support. Previous liter-
ature (cf. Heim 1994 and Beck and Rullmann 1999) has argued that wh-questions, when
embedded, can give rise to either strongly or weakly exhaustive readings, depending on
the predicates that embed them. The proposal made in Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007 is that
NPIs are licensed in questions only if their hosting environment is strongly exhaustive.
NPIs are therefore always acceptable in polar questions because these questions only allow
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for a strongly exhaustive reading. As for the behavior of NPIs in wh-questions embedded
under wonder, know, surprise predicates, the authors attribute the varying acceptability to
the fact that these verbs differ with respect to the type of exhaustivity they can admit.
The authors propose to encode the strength of meaning (i.e. weak versus strong) into
the semantics of the question-embedding predicates. They don’t, however, show how the
semantics of a strongly exhaustive predicate should allow NPIs to survive in its scope. In
fact, they claim that strong/weak exhaustivity in questions cannot be connected to the li-
censing requirements of NPIs and thus a multi-layered account must be provided in order
to account for these indefinites’ need to be in entailment-reversal environments in indica-
tives and strongly exhaustive environments in interrogatives. One point of departure when
trying to unify these two sets of environments would be to look at the relationship be-
tween indicatives and interrogatives, specifically the behavior of NPIs in indicatives and
interrogatives embedded under the same verb. For the sake of this argument, we assume
that predicates able to embed both indicatives and interrogatives have a common semantic
core. What is interesting to note is that while question-embedding know can license NPIs,
proposition-embedding know cannot, (7).
(7) a. Mary knows who brought anything to the party.
b. *Mary knows that John brought anything to the party.
On the other hand, proposition-embedding surprise can license NPIs, while its question-
embedding counterpart cannot, shown in (8).
(8) a. She was surprised that Mary brought anything to the party.
b. *She was surprised who brought anything to the party.
So it’s clear that whatever semantics we give to the question-embedding predicates will
have to differ enough from the semantics we give to their proposition-embedding coun-
terparts if we want to capture the varying availability of NPI licensing by appealing to
a difference in the semantics of the embedding predicates. Such an approach would first
have to provide support for the following two somewhat controversial assumptions:
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(9) a. Proposition-embedding verbs and question-embedding verbs have a common
semantic core and one can derived from the other (or both from some other
abstract form)
b. The strength of exhaustivity in embedded questions resides within the seman-
tics of the embedding predicate
It’s clear though that even if we follow Guerzoni and Sharvit’s suggestion, we have yet
to see an obvious relationship between the strength of the question and the survival of
NPIs, assuming that a unified semantics for the licensing environments of NPIs can be
sustained. Furthermore, how the strong exhaustivity encoded in the embedding predicates
should carry over compositionally to direct questions remains a mystery.
At this point we are faced with the following questions.
(10) Why can Y/N and wh-questions always license NPIs?
(11) Why can Y/N questions always license NPIs, regardless of whether or not they are
embedded?
(12) Why should the strength of the question matter when it comes to NPI licensing?
a. What is it about being a strongly exhaustive question that allows for NPIs to
survive in their scope?
b. How are weakly exhaustive questions different, compositionally, from strongly
exhaustive questions, and how can we relate this to the licensing of NPIs?
In order to answer the first question, one might be tempted to ask whether questions, more
generally, can give rise to DE inferences, and attribute the licensing of NPIs to this factor.
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) show that questions cannot be regarded as DE due to the fact
that they don’t support entailment reversals. We see in (13b) that a negative quantifier like
no creates a DE context by allowing inferences from sets to subsets.
(13) a. A student has a car. ⇒ A student has a mode of transportation.
b. No student has a car.⇒ No student has a red car.
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On the other hand, talking about the ability of a question to give rise to a DE environment
is not as easy as with indicatives since establishing what it would mean for a question to
entail another question is a difficult task in and of itself. One intuitive way of thinking about
this, adopted by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), is to assume that a question entails another
whenever asking the first question automatically leads to asking the second question. In
this sense it’s then clear that questions are not automatically DE, since in asking whether
John has a car I am by no means necessarily interested in whether or not he has a specific
kind of car.
(14) Does John have a car? #⇒ Does John have a red car?
Given that questions cannot be shown to be DE1, if we want to maintain a uniform anal-
ysis of NPI licensing we need to either (i) loosen the requirements from DE to something
that can include questions and still exclude positive declaratives, or (ii) consider an alto-
gether different approach to NPIs that does not rely on the DE character of the context, but
instead derives this apparent requirement from independently-motivated attributes of the
indefinite. Independent of this issue, an alternative-based semantics for NPIs and polarity-
sensitive items more generally has been proposed in the literature and this account makes
appeal to the lexical semantics of these items and the method through which they compose
with other elements in a structure to derive their sensitivity to DE-ness. The advantage
to distancing ourselves from a purely DE-licensing approach is that we might be able to
find different avenues for relating the licensing of NPIs to the strength of questions beyond
mere speculation.
1.2 An exhaustification-based approach to the polarity system
For the remainder of this paper, I adopt an analysis of polarity-sensitive items that takes
their restricted distribution to be a product of the interaction between the lexical semantics
of these items and the contexts in which they occur, following in large part the work in
Chierchia (2006, 2012), Fa˘la˘us¸ (2010) and Gajewski (2011). Before delving into the realm
1Without a better understanding of entailment between questions we cannot make the stronger claim that
they are in fact not DE.
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of polarity-sensitive items, however, let’s first consider the case of scalar implicatures, a
phenomenon closely related to the matter at hand.
The main insight that I will adopt for this analysis is that scalar implicatures (henceforth
SIs), should be viewed as a form of exhaustification of the assertion, an approach rigorously
defended in Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2012). The authors argue that SIs come about as a
result of active alternatives and the way the grammar chooses to use up these alternatives,
via covert alternative-sensitive operators that must apply at some point in the derivation
in order to ‘exhaust’ the active alternatives. One such operators is Exh, which has basically
the same contribution as only. The only difference between overt only and Exh is that Exh
asserts rather than presupposes that its prejacent is true.
(15) Exh(p) = p ∧ ∀q∈A lt(p) [p #⊆q→ ¬q]
(the assertion p is true and any alternative q not entailed by p is false)
Consider the examples below, where the relevant alternatives are brought about by
association with focus (Rooth, 1992):
(16) John talked to [a few]F of the students.
a. Alternatives: {John talked to a few of the students, John talked to many of the
students, John talked to most of the students, John talked to all of the students}
b. Exh(John talked to [a few]F of the students) = John talked to a few of the
students and he didn’t talk to many/most/all of the students.
In (16), exhaustification proceeds via O and in doing so all non-entailed alternatives are
eliminated. That is, it negates all statements which, upon replacing the focused element
with its alternatives, entail the assertion.
Focus is not a prerequisite for active alternatives, however. Scalar items, which are
lexically endowed with alternatives, are also prone to this type of semantic enrichment.
Relevant examples include the elements of a Horn-scale:<one, two, . . .>, <or, and>, <some,
many, all>, <few, no>, <sometimes, often, always>. If the context is such that the alternatives
are relevant, then theywill be activate and thus will have to be factored into the meaning via
an exhaustification operator. Take for example (17) where we see that the scalar elements
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one and or have the potential to give rise to enriched meanings. These scalar implicatures
(! will henceforth be used to indicate an implicature) come about by exhaustification of
their respective alternatives, two, three, . . . and and, which we assume are relevant in the
context of these utterances.
(17) a. I talked to two boys yesterday.
! I didn’t talk to three or more boys.
b. I talked to Mary or John yesterday.
! I didn’t talk to both of them.
Beyond scalar alternatives, scalar items are also optionally endowed with sub-domain
alternatives. Fox (2007) convincingly argues for their presence based on the free choice
effects observed with disjunction in the scope of possibility modals. That is, aside from the
scalar alternative of the disjunction, the conjunction, we also have to take into account its
sub-domain alternatives, that is, the individual disjuncts. Deriving the implicature in (18)
would not be possible without also having access to the sub-domain alternatives. I refer the
reader to Fox 2007 for the details of how these alternatives are exhaustified so as to derive
this implicature.
(18) You can eat ice cream or cake.! You can eat ice cream and you can eat cake.
a. "[eat ice cream ∨ eat cake]! "eat ice cream ∧ "eat cake
b. Scalar-alt: "[eat ice cream ∧ eat cake]
c. Sub-Domain-alt: "eat ice cream, "eat cake
What we saw in this section is that we can derive SIs in a purely compositional way by
looking at the interaction between alternatives and the method by which they get factored
into meaning. We saw above two sources of alternative activation: focus, on the one hand,
and the lexical semantics of the scalar item, on the other. In the above cases, the alterna-
tives, whatever their source, are only optionally available, which is supported by the fact
that these SIs are cancelable. This optionality is precisely the dimension along which NPIs,
and PSIs more generally, differ from their regular indefinite counterparts - NPIs must obli-
gatorily activate alternatives. This analysis of NPIs, pursued by Krifka (1995) and further
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advanced by Chierchia (2006) and Chierchia (2012), takes their distribution to be a prod-
uct of the alternatives they activate and the way the grammar takes these alternatives into
account.
Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2012), among others, assume that NPIs are minimally
different from regular indefinites in that they obligatorily activate alternatives, which, like
all instances of active alternatives, need to be factored into the meaning of the utterance.
NPIs are commonly split into two main classes, the any type and minimizers like sleep
a wink. The differences among them can be classified based on the type of alternatives
they activate and the method in which these alternatives get factored into meaning. The
remainder of this section deals with each type of NPI in turn. Consider the following
dialogue, and in particular B’s response which contains the NPI any.
(19) A: Did Mary read books during her summer vacation?
B: No, Mary didn’t read any books.
In using an NPI in her response, B conveys the meaning that Mary didn’t read any of
the books in the domain of discourse. In a sense, this response brings into discussion the
existence of all types of books (books about cats, logic, cooking, etc.) and asserts that none
of them are such that Mary read them. These ‘types’ of books are precisely the sub-domain
alternatives claimed to always be active when an NPI like any is used.2 I take NPIs to be
existential indefinites that obligatorily activate smaller domain alternatives. Schematically,
the alternatives can be represented as in (20), with D containing three books, and its six
sub-domains containing one or two books each.3
(20) a. any book = λP. ∃x∈D [book(x) ∧ P(x)]
b. any bookA lt = {λP. ∃x∈D’ [book(x) ∧ P(x)]: D’⊆D}
c.
{a, b, c}
{a, b} {b, c} {a, c}
{a} {b} {c}
2NPIs also have a scalar alternative, the conjunction of the disjuncts. However, in the scope of negation this
alternative will always be weaker, and thus its role in the derivation negligible.
3I use a, b, c as shorthand for the sub-domain alternatives, that is, the books in D.
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Recall the discussion on SIs where it was argued that activating alternatives means hav-
ing to incorporate them into the meaning. NPIs like any do so via the covert operator Exh.
Syntactically, one can think of NPIs as involving a form of agreement with this operator:
NPIs bear the feature [+d] which must be checked by an operator carrying the same feature,
an exhaustifying operator is. Doing so allows us to encode the need to exhaustify alterna-
tives in the syntax. Semantically, NPIs must occur in a DE environment in order to satisfy
the requirements of the exhaustification operator. This operator targets the alternatives and
eliminates them just as long as they are stronger than (entail) the assertion; otherwise ex-
haustification by Exh is vacuous and simply returns the original assertion. Observe that in
the scope of sentential negation the alternatives are all entailed by the assertion, since not
reading any book whatsoever entails not reading a specific kind of book. Thus (21) turns
out to be interpreted as a plain negative existential statement.
(21) Mary didn’t read any book.
a. Assertion: ¬∃x∈D[book(x) ∧ read(Mary,x)]
b. Alternatives: {¬∃x∈D′[book(x) ∧ read(Mary,x)]: D′⊂D}
c. Exh(Mary didn’t read any book) = Mary didn’t read any book
In fact, all environments that license inferences from sets to subsets will allow NPIs to
appear in their scope since the alternatives (the subsets) are entailed by the assertion (su-
perset), hence the general description of NPI licensors as DE operators.
In UE contexts, the alternatives are stronger than the assertion; entailments hold from
subsets to supersets since reading a book about cats entails reading any book whatso-
ever. Since the alternatives entail the assertion, exhaustification by Exh requires them to
be negated. Negating these stronger alternatives amounts to saying that for any possible
book, Mary didn’t read it, which is in clear contradiction with the assertion which says
that Mary read a book. So while the syntactic requirement of NPIs is met, that is, the [+d]
feature is checked by Exh, the semantic requirement is not, rendering NPIs in UE contexts
ungrammatical.
One can see then how these distributional restrictions can be explained straightfor-
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wardly as soon as a compositional semantics of NPIs is adopted. Essentially, what such an
alternative-based account says is that NPIs are low elements on a scale and, unlike regu-
lar indefinites, obligatorily activate alternatives. Their need to be in negative contexts falls
out automatically once we look at the interaction between the types of alternatives being
activated and the way they are factored into meaning. For the purposes of this overview I
assumed that the different types of PSIs are specified for which exhaustifier is invoked, that
is, they carry either a [+dE] or a [+dO] feature, which dictates which exhaustifying operator
they can enter into a checking relation with.4 While this choice can be thought of as a form
of agreement, the hope is to have a more principled analysis in the end.5
Yet another dimension along which NPIs vary is determined by the strength of the
operator. Take the NPIs ever and in weeks and observe that in weeks is acceptable in a subset
of the environments that can support ever.
(22) a. Nobody has ever been to New York.
b. Nobody has been to New York in weeks.
(23) a. Few people have ever been to New York.
b. *Few people have been to New York in weeks.
Gajewski (2011), following Chierchia 2004, accounts for this variation in terms of whether
or not the non-truth conditional meaning (presupposition or implicature) of the negative
element is taken into account in the exhaustification of the NPI. The basic idea is simple and
I encourage the interested reader to refer to these works for the details of the implementa-
tion. What distinguishes in weeks from ever is that exhaustifying the former requires us to
take into account the non-truth conditional aspects of meaning as well, that is, to include
any implicatures and presuppositions that the assertion gives rise to. Once we consider
the enriched meaning of the assertion, in weeks will no longer be in a downward entailing
4I would like to thank to Hedde Zeijlstra (p.c.) for this suggestion.
5Chierchia (2012) proposes an ‘optimal fit’ principle that would take Exh as the default exhaustifier unless
the alternatives being acted upon are linearly orderedwith respect to entailment, as is the case with minimizers.
As we will see later, however, we still need to maintain that some indefinites, and in particular PPIs, can only
appeal to exhaustification via E, regardless of the shape of their alternatives.
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context in (23b) since few gives rise to the implicature but some, and the exhaustification of
the NPI will no longer be able to proceed consistently since the alternatives are stronger
and yet not excludable without arriving at a contradiction.
(24) Few people have been to New York in weeks.! Few people have been to New York
in weeks but some people have been to New York in weeks.
On the other hand, the enriched meaning of (22) is equivalent to the assertion since nobody,
unlike few, occupies the strong endpoint of its scale and therefore does not introduce an
implicature. To reiterate, the difference between ever and in weeks is that the latter, but not
former, is exhaustified with respect to the enriched meaning of the assertion. In the case of
sentential negation, negative quantifiers and without, the enriched meaning will be equiva-
lent to the assertion since no implicatures are available, thus both types of NPIs will be ac-
ceptable in their scope. In the scope of few and other implicature/presupposition-carrying
elements, however, only weak NPIs like ever can survive since their exhaustification pro-
ceeds only with respect to the truth conditional meaning; strong NPIs like in weeks are
sensitive to the presence of implicatures and presuppositions and cannot survive in such
environments.
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Chapter 2
Constituent questions
2.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to argue for a unified account of the distribution of negative
polarity items (henceforth NPIs) in constituent questions, which has posed a problem for
both the semantics of questions and theories of NPIs. These items are acceptable in ques-
tions, despite the fact that questions do not prima facie share anything in common with the
other environments in which NPIs surface. Specifically, there is no way to argue that ques-
tions give rise to downward-entailing inferences, which is what otherwise unifies all other
NPI environments. Building on an observation by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) that the
distribution of NPIs is even more constrained than initially thought, namely that NPIs are
acceptable only in questions that receive a strongly exhaustive interpretation, I maintain,
with others, that current theories of questions are not fine-grained enough to account for
the systematic behavior of NPIs in questions on the one hand, and declaratives on the other.
I will argue that this calls for a re-evaluation of the semantics of questions, particularly with
respect to how we can encode the ambiguity in strength they exhibit in embedded contexts,
and I will show that via a conceptually minimal switch in the semantics of questions we
can not only explain why the distribution of NPIs should correlate with the strength of the
question, but we can also do so in a manner that allows us to maintain a unified account
for the behavior of NPIs in both declarative and interrogative contexts.
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2.1.1 The problem of NPIs at a glance
Negative polarity items can be found in a number of contexts, as shown below for ever, a
prototypical NPI.
(1) a. Negation
(i) I don’t think that Mary ever liked pizza.
(ii) *I think that Mary ever liked pizza.
b. Negative Quantifiers
(i) Few/no/at most 10 people have ever heard of linguistics.
(ii) *Many/most people have ever heard of linguistics.
c. Left argument of every
(i) Everyone who has ever taken a math class passed the admission test.
(ii) *Everyone who has taken a math class ever passed the admission test.
d. Antecedent of conditionals
(i) If she ever wants to visit us, she should give us a call.
(ii) *If she wants to visit us, she should ever give us a call.
e. Scope of only
(i) Only Johnf has ever failed this class.
(ii) *Johnf has ever failed this class.
f. Questions
(i) Who has ever failed this class?
(ii) *John has ever failed this class.
What unifies (most of) these environments is the fact that they can be shown to give rise
to downward entailing inferences. Consider, for example, the case of every. In (2) we can
see that the left but not right argument of every allows for inferences from sets to subsets,
i.e. downward entailing inferences. In (2a) we can infer from the fact that everyone who
took a math passed the test that everyone who took a calculus class passed it. Note that
the inference does not go the other way around as well. That is, if (2a-ii) is true it does not
automatically follow that (2a-i) is true as well. Once we turn to the right argument of every,
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namely its nuclear scope, the directionality of the inference is switched in that given a set,
we can only infer that something holds true of a superset of that set.
(2) a. left argument of every: set⇒ subset
(i) Everyone [who has taken a math class] [passed the test].
a ⇓ #⇑
(ii) Everyone [who has taken a calculus class] [passed the test].
b. right argument of every: subset⇒ set
(i) Everyone [who passed the test] [has taken a math class].
a #⇓ ⇑
(ii) Everyone [who passed the test] [has taken a calculus class].
The same pattern of deduction can be argued to hold for every environment in the ex-
amples in (1), with one main exception: questions. Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) claim that
when it comes to the distribution of NPIs in questions, downward entailing-ness cannot be
a factor. What would it mean to define a notion of entailment between questions? We could
define it in terms of whether asking one question automatically leads to asking another
question. If that were the case, we would expect there to be an inference from (3a) to (3b).
(3) a. Who passed a math class?
b. Who passed a calculus class?
However, asking (3a) does not lead to asking (3b). Guerzoni and Sharvit argue that even if
one did find a semantics for questions according to which they can be shown to give rise
to downward-entailing inferences, it would still not be enough to understand why NPIs
are good in them because not all types of question license NPIs. NPIs are acceptable across
the board in direct questions (modulo some intervention facts which will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3):
(4) a. Who will bring anything to eat for this party?
b. Which one of you has ever vacationed in Iceland?
c. Did she read any relevant articles?
However, once we turn to embedded questions, we observe a contrast:
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(5) a. Mary knows which boys brought her any gifts.
b. John wonders who has ever been Paris.
c. Chris asked me who took any linguistics classes.
d. Jenny discovered who has ever participated in that competition.
(6) a. *It surprised Mary which boys brought her any gifts.
b. *It amazed her which girls had ever participated in a dance competition.
c. *Jay was disappointed by who sold any antique books.
d. *Will was annoyed at which guys had ever dated his girlfriend.
The split correlates with an independently noted ambiguity in questions, namely that ques-
tions can receive either a weakly or strongly exhaustive reading, depending on the pred-
icate that embeds them (c.f. Heim 1994, Beck and Rullmann 1999, a.o.). The questions in
(5) receive a strongly exhaustive (se) interpretation while those in (6) a weakly exhaustive
(we) interpretation. In a nutshell, different strength amounts to different answers to the
same question, and predicates differ with respect to which answer to the embedded ques-
tion they make reference to. For Mary to know who brought her gifts, she needs to know
for every boy who brought her gifts that he did, and for every boy who didn’t bring her
gifts, that he didn’t. The same holds true of all other predicates in (5). Turning not to the
examples in (6), we see that for Mary to be surprised by who brought her gifts, she must be
surprised by the boys that brought her gifts (i.e. someone she didn’t expect to bring gifts
ended up bringing gifts); she can’t be surprised by someone who didn’t. Here too it can be
shown that the same inference holds for all other predicates in (6).
The conclusion drawn by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) is that NPIs are only acceptable
in questions that receive a strongly exhaustive (se) reading, summarized below:
(7) ! the predicates in (5) embed se questions→ NPIs are acceptable
! the predicates in (6) embed we questions→ NPIs are not acceptable
! root questions are always se→ NPIs are acceptable
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This immediately raises the question of how we can account for the correlation between the
strength of the question and the distribution of NPIs and, more specifically, what it is about
being interpreted as strongly exhaustive that makes a question license NPIs. Guerzoni and
Sharvit claim that there is no way to account for this correlation, that is, that se questions
are ‘no more DE’ than we questions, and conclude that we must appeal to a “multi-layered
approach in which both entailment reversal and strength of exhaustivity of the hosting
linguistic environment must play a crucial role” (Guerzoni and Sharvit, 2007, p. 5). I will
argue that we can actually maintain a uniform analysis of the distribution of NPIs in both
declaratives and questions by re-evaluating the semantics of embedded questions, namely
what governs this weak/strong split. In order to so, however, we first need to understand
what this difference in strength is, and how it has been previously analyzed.
2.1.2 The semantics of embedded constituent questions
For the remainder of this work we will assume that questions denote sets of possible an-
swers, the Hamblin-Karttunen approach, rather than partitions, the Groenendijk-Stokhof
approach. What that means is that a question such as (8a) will be analyzed as denoting the
set of possible answers, a set of propositions.
(8) a. Which guests ate cake?
b. {Bill ate cake, Mary ate cake, Bill and Mary ate cake}
c. λp〈s,t〉.∃x∈[[guests]]
w0 & p=λw. x atew cake
I follow Karttunen (1977) and take wh-phrases to be existential quantifiers with essentially
the same semantics as a regular existential quantifier like someone. The only difference
between the two is that who is additionally endowed with a [+wh] feature.
(9) a. [[who]] = λP〈e,t〉.∃x [person(x) ∧ P(x)] 〈et, t〉
a.’ [[which]] = λP〈e,t〉.λQ〈e,t〉. ∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)]
b. [[someone]] = λP〈e,t〉.∃x [person(x) ∧ P(x)] 〈et, t〉
b.’ [[some]] = λP〈e,t〉.λQ〈e,t〉. ∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)]
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In order to compositionally derive the set in (8b-c) we need to assume that questions,
unlike declaratives, additionally contain a semantically non-vacuous morpheme in the head
position of the CP. I will refer to this morpheme simply as C. There have been different
proposals for how this head combines with its sister to ultimately give us the set of possible
answers, but what they all agree on is that syntactically, it carries a [wh] feature which
drives the movement of the wh-phrase(s) to its specifier position, while semantically it
denotes the relation of identity in (10).
(10) [[C]] = λq〈s,t〉. (p = q) 〈st, t〉
Following Sauerland (1998) (but see also von Stechow 1996), I take the unbound proposi-
tional variable introduced by C to be bound higher up in the structure, above the level of
the moved wh-phrased, schematically represented as in (11).
(11)
λp
who
λx
C
λq.(p=q)
IPx
This move by itself is not optimal as it does not represent a seamless translation of the
syntactic logical form into the semantic form of representation, given that we generally
assume that lambda abstractors like λp in (11) are introduced as a result of movement. In
order to avoid appealing to such special composition rules, I follow Fox (2012) in assuming
that the interrogative head is actually a complex head, consisting of two elements: Cint
and an operator that needs to undergo movement. Under this view, the meaning of Cint is
provided in (12), taking as its first argument a propositional variable bound by a lambda
abstractor.
(12) [[Cint]] = λp〈s,t〉.λq〈s,t〉. p = q 〈st, stt〉
One possible way to implement this, that is, to get the variable p and the abstraction over
it, is either by assuming movement of a semantically vacuous element which leaves a trace
of type 〈s, t〉, or via movement of an operator which takes question denotations as its
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argument. Assuming that there is such an operator, which we can simply refer to as Op
for now, it will be base-generated as a sister of C, creating the complex head in (13). I will
henceforth use C to refer to the object in (12).
(13)
C〈st,stt〉 Op
who atew cake
Given that we are taking Op to be a question-level operator, its type will be 〈〈st, t〉 , α〉
(leaving α as un unspecified type for now), meaning that if left in situ, it would give rise to
a type mismatch as C wants a sister of type 〈s, t〉. In order to rectify this type mismatch, Op
moves out of the complex head leaving behind a trace of type 〈s, t〉 and abstracting over it,
as in (14).
(14)
Op
λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p〈s,t〉 who atew cake
Putting all the pieces together, and assuming that the [wh] feature on the C head triggers
the movement of the wh-phrase to its Spec position, we derive the structure in (15).
(15)
Op
λp ∃x[person(x) & p=λw.x atew cake]
who
λx p=λw.x atew cake
C
λp〈s,t〉.λq〈s,t〉.p=q
p〈s,t〉
λw
tx
atew cake
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Having established what the underlying structure of a question is, we can now turn to
embedded questions and give some content to this Op. The idea most commonly endorsed
is that a question-embedding predicate takes as its argument the answer to the embedded
question and Op operates on the denotation of a question to return that answer. Now,
depending on the predicate embedding it, an embedded question may receive one of two
possible readings: a weakly exhaustive (we) reading or a strongly exhaustive (se) reading.1
The we answer corresponds to the proposition that denotes the conjunction of all the true
members in the question denotation. So for someone to know (16) on its we reading, they
need to know for every x such that x ate cake that x ate cake. Assuming that Bill is the
only one who ate cake, this would amount to the propositional knowledge in (16b).2,3 On
the other hand, the se answer to (16) is the proposition that the conjunction of the true
members is the complete answer, namely the proposition Bill and nobody else ate cake. To
know the se answer to Who ate cake? is to know for every x who ate cake that x ate cake,
and furthermore to know for every x who didn’t eat cake that x didn’t eat cake.
(16) Who ate cake?
a. {Bill ate cake, Mary ate cake, Bill and Mary ate cake}
b. John knows who ate cake. ∼we John knows that Bill ate cake.
c. John knows who ate cake. ∼se John knows that Bill and nobody else ate cake.
Proponents of this way of approaching embedded wh–questions advocate that strength
should be represented by means of two answer-hood operators (cf. Heim (1994)) that com-
bine with the Hamblin set, the set of possible answers, and deliver the two answers above.
In the system outlined above, that would mean that Op plays the role of the answer-hood
operator, and furthermore, that question embedding predicates sub-categorize for one of
these two operators, as in (17):
1We will, for the time being, ignore mention-some readings and return to them in a later chapter.
2Note that I’m making the crucial assumption that know can embed both we and se readings, despite much
debate in the literature with respect to this issue; see in particular George 2011 who advocates that know is
exclusively se.
3From this point on I will use bolding as a way to indicate which propositions are assumed to hold true in
the actual world, with bold indicating true and non-bold indicating false propositions.
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(17) a.
surprise we answer
ans.we Hamblin set
b.
know se answer
ans.se Hamblin set
Taking Q to be the extension of the derived set of propositions, as in (18), the two types of
answers can be defined as in (18b-c):
(18) [[Q]] = λp〈s,t〉.∃x [x∈[[person]]
w0 ∧ p = λw. x atew cake]
a. [[ans.we]] = λQ.λw.λw’. ∀p∈Q [p(w)=1 → p(w’)=1]
b. [[ans.se]] = λQ.λw.λw’. ∀p∈Q [p(w) = p(w’)]
The role of these ans operators is to take a set of propositions and return a function from
worlds to the proposition that constitutes the true, and possibly complete, answer given
that set. For example, given a set of propositions Q and a world w0, the two possible
answers to that question in the world of evaluation, w0, will be the proposition in (19) and
(20) respectively:
(19) [[ans.we]](Q)(w0) = λw. ∀p∈{p: ∃x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x atew cake}
[[ans.se]](Q)(w0) = λw. [p(w0)=1→ p(w)=1]
! the set of worlds such that the people who ate cake in w0 also ate cake in those worlds
(20) [[ans.se]](Q)(w0) = λw. ∀p∈{p: ∃x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x atew cake}
[[ans.se]](Q)(w0) = λw. [p(w0)=p(w)]
[[ans.se]](Q)(w0) = λw. ∀p∈{p: ∃x [x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x atew cake]}
[[ans.se]](Q)(w0) = λw. [p(w0)→p(w) ∧ p(w)→p(w0)]
! the set of worlds which agree with w0 in terms of the people who ate cake
! the set of worlds such that the people who ate cake in w0 also ate cake in those worlds
and furthermore, the people who ate cake in those worlds also ate cake in w0
One way to test whether the distinction between (19) and (20) is made in the grammar is
by seeing whether there are predicates that can only select for one these answers. Consider
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the case of question-embedding surprise and the following sentence.
(21) Jeremy was surprised by who came to the party.
The idea is that there are situations in which (21) would be judged as false if Jeremy is
surprised by the strongly exhaustive answer to the question who came to the party. Such
examples involve cases where Jeremy’s expectations are at odds only with the we answer,
and not with the se answer. Consider the situation in (22):
(22) Mary Suzy Ann
party goers yes yes no
Jeremy’s expectations yes yes yes
In this situation Jeremy expected all those who showed up, Mary and Suzy, to show up
but furthermore expected someone else, Ann, to show up even though she ended up not
coming to the party. In such a situation the complete answer to who came to the party would
be that Mary and Suzy and nobody else showed up, which would be surprising to Jeremy
given that he expected Mary and Suzy and Ann to show up. And yet (21) is judged as false,
suggesting that appealing to the se answer in this case gives us the wrong result. On the
other hand, if we look at the we answer, namely the proposition that Mary and Suzy showed
up, we can see that the sentence in (21) is correctly judged as false given that Jeremy’s
expectations regarding the we answer conform with the facts, hence his lack of surprise
that who came. Such cases have been taken by Heim (1994), following Berman 1991, to
indicate that strong exhaustivity is too strong in certain cases and thus that a notion of
weak exhaustivity needs to be appealed to.
2.1.3 Motivating a new semantics of questions
The fact that question strength is a real distinction made by grammar can also be seen
when we look at the behavior of NPIs in embedded interrogatives. Guerzoni and Sharvit
(2007) observe that the acceptability of NPIs in the nucleus of an embedded question is
sensitive to the nature of the embedding predicate. Specifically, it appears to be the case
that only questions that receive a strongly exhaustive reading allow NPIs in their scope.
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Take, for example, the contrast in (23) and (24). The predicates in (23) have been argued
to embed only we readings of questions while those in (24) to embed se readings. The
same argumentation as above can be used to show that the predicates in (23) cannot make
reference to se interpretations.
(23) we questions
a. *It surprised Mary which boys brought her any gifts.
b. *Ben realized which students had ever been to Paris.
c. *It amazed her which girls had ever participated in a dance competition.
d. *Jay was disappointed by who sold any antique books.
e. *Will was annoyed at which guys had ever dated his girlfriend.
(24) se questions
a. Mary wants to know which boys brought her any gifts.
b. John wonders who has ever been Paris.
c. Chris asked me who took any linguistics classes.
d. Jason found out who stole anything from the safe.
e. Jenny discovered who stole anything from her home.
The problem with the current, or for that matter, any other previous analyses of questions
is that they have no way to account for the correlation between the strength of a question
and the acceptability of an NPI in that question, suggesting that we need to amend our
analysis of embedded questions.
Another area that has proven to be problematic for a theory of questions that takes them
to denote the we/se answer, namely a proposition, concerns the semantics of question-
embedding predicates. Spector and Egre´ (2007, 2012), as well as George (2011), discuss
cases where it appears to be necessary for a question-embedding predicate to make refer-
ence not only to the true answer to the embedded question, but also other possible answers,
suggesting that if we want to maintain a purely compositional account of embedded ques-
tions, something needs to change.
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2.1.4 A glance at the new proposal
The crux of my proposal is that strength should be encoded at the level of the question,
rather than in the answer-hood operator. More specifically, in order to derive the two types
of readings, I claim that instead of having two answer-hood operators apply to the same
set of propositions, schematically represented in (25)
(25) a.
surprise we answer
ans.we Hamblin set
b.
know se answer
ans.se Hamblin set
We actually have the difference be derived internal to the question, giving us two distinct
sets of propositions, as in (26):
(26) a.
surprise we answer set
b.
know se answer set
I depart from previous analyses in two main respects. First, I propose, following George
(2011), that question-embedding predicates take as arguments sets of propositions, as in
(26), rather than just propositions, as in (25). This switch, I will show, allows for more nu-
anced readings of question-embedding constructions. Second, I claim that not all questions
are created equal in that some may denote a we set of propositions, basically the Hamblin
set in (27), while others a se set of propositions, as in (28).
(27) The we answer set is the Hamblin set, as before, the set of possible answers
Qw = {Bill ate cake, Mary ate cake, Mary and Bill ate cake}
(28) The se answer set, what I will call the Qs, is the set of propositions in (29):
Qs = {Mary and nobody else ate cake, Bill and nobody else ate cake, Mary and Bill
and nobody else ate cake}
Notice that the se answer set is simply the set of all possible se answers. While my ap-
proach will ultimately yield the same interpretation for se questions, I will depart from
previous proposals in terms of the compositional steps that derive this set. Specifically, I
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will argue for a more nuanced underlying representation of se questions which will allow
us to understand why NPIs behave the way they do in these types of questions. The idea,
in a nutshell, will be that globally, se questions denote sets of propositions that create non-
monotonic environments, but that at some level underlyingly, a Strawson-DE environment
is created. It is crucially the existence of this local Strawson-DE level that allows NPIs to
be licensed. I will argue that assuming a more complex underlying representation of ques-
tions allows us to account for a number of phenomena related to the distribution of NPIs
while leaving intact those already well understood phenomena.
2.2 Moving the ambiguity to the question nucleus
As discussed in the previous section, the weak/strong exhaustivity distinction is often
encoded at the level of the ans operator. In this section I propose a new way to think
about this distinction which takes the difference to be encoded at the level of the question
nucleus. That is, instead of talking about the weak and strong answer, we can talk about
the weak answer set and the strong answer set. We already know what the weak answer set
is, namely the Hamblin set. The question now is what the strong answer set is, and how we
can derive it without making reference to ans.se. Recall what ans.se delivers for a question
such as Who ate cake?: the true proposition of the form x and nobody else ate cake, where x is
an element in the domain of the wh-phrase. The strong answer set should thus consist of
all possible propositions of this form. Observe, furthermore, that we can think about each
such proposition as the conjunction of two components: that x ate cake and that nobody who’s
not x ate cake. Notice that the second of these components creates an environment that is
downward entailing, and this is going to turn out to be the crucial piece when reasoning
about the acceptability of NPIs. Latching onto that insight, I propose that at some level in
the derivation of a se question these two components are, in a sense, separate enough that
the DE component is the only component that is relevant when it comes to the licensing of
the NPI.
Observe that a proposition like (29) is itself decomposable into these components, with
the only difference being that (29a) is presupposed rather than asserted.
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(29) Only Bill ate cake.
a. Bill ate cake.
b. Nobody who’s not Bill ate cake.
von Fintel 1999 refers to environments where the assertive component is DE but the pre-
supposition non-DE, such as those created by only, as Strawson downward monotonic and
claims that such environments are capable of supporting NPIs, see (30a).4 Crucially, NPIs
are not acceptable when they occur in the scope of the enriched version in (30b), that is,
when the presupposition becomes part of the assertive component.
(30) a. Only Bill ate anything.
b. *Bill and nobody other than him ate anything.
The task we are faced with is the following. We want se questions to denote sets of propo-
sitions of the form in (30b), and yet we want NPIs to behave as if they occurred in propo-
sitions of the form in (30a).
2.2.1 Covert only
As discussed above, it seems that thinking about the se answer set in terms of sets of
exhaustified propositions is almost in line with our intuitions about what it means to be a
possible se answer. I propose that we can arrive at such a set by assuming that se questions
contain, in their underlying representation, a silent only which adjoins to the question
nucleus, right below the question operator.5 Taking only to be an IP-level operator that
associates with the trace of the wh-phrase gives us the LF in (31).6
4For the remainder of this section I will continue talking in these abstract terms when discussing the
licensing of NPIs.
5One could have imagined a much more straightforward way of deriving this, which would have been by
adjoining an exhaust operator to the Hamblin denotation (c.f. Mene´ndez-Benito 2010), as in (i). This is no more
different than what we generally encounter in theories of grammar that appeal to the existence of alternatives
and assume that these alternatives end up being exhaustified with respect to each other.
(i) Exh(Q) = {λw. p(w) ∧ ∀q (q∈Q ∧ q(w))→ (p⊆q) | p∈Q}
While this derives the final se answer set, the problem is that exhaust operators are non-monotonic operators
and that would not get us any closer to understanding why NPIs are licensed in these environments.
6Another option could have been to take only to be an adnominal operator, but see the Appendix to Chapter
3 for why this approach turns out not to be feasible.
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(31) Who ate cake?
a. λp. ∃x [x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = only x ate cake]
b.
λp
who
λx
C p
only
λw
t[f]
atew cake
Following Rooth (1992), I take only to be a two place operator which takes a contextual
variable and a proposition p, its prejacent; this variable, henceforth referred to as A lt(p),
represents a contextually determined set of alternatives which is obtained by replacing
the trace of the wh-phrase with an alternative provided by the domain of the wh-phrase,
illustrated in (32) for the question in (31):
(32) A lt(λw. g(1) ate cake) = {λw. x atew cake | x∈[[person]]}
The denotation of only is generally assumed to be that in (33): a function from a proposition
p and a set of alternatives, to the negation of all alternatives not entailed by p.
(33) [[only]](A lt(p))(p) = λw. ∀q∈A lt(p) [p #⊆q→ q(w)=0 ] equivalently
[[only]](A lt(p))(p) = λw. ∀q∈A lt(p) [q(w)=1 → p⊆q]
We know, however, that only also contributes a presupposition, the nature of which we turn
to next.
2.2.2 The presupposition of covert only
What presupposition overt only contributes has been highly debated in the literature (cf.
Horn 1996, Geurts and van der Sandt 2004, Ippolito 2008, among many others). The main
two contenders are the prejacent presupposition and the existential presupposition. One
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claim is that only presupposes its prejacent, as in (34).7
(34) [[only]](A lt(p))(p) = λw: p(w)=1. ∀q∈A lt(p) [q(w)=1 → p⊆q]
Under this account, a strongly exhaustive question will have the denotation in (35), namely
a set of partial propositions that have a presupposition that x ate cake, where x is a person
or group of people, and asserts that everybody who’s not x did not eat cake.
(35) λp. ∃x[personw0(x) ∧ p = λw: x atew cake.
λp. ∃x[personw0(x) ∧ p =∀a∈A lt(x) [(a atew cake)→ (x atew cake) ⊆ (a atew cake)]]
So a potential answer toWho ate cake? would be Only Bill ate cake, which, under the analysis
provided above, would amount to asserting that nobody other than Bill ate cake. Under
the assumption that presuppositions are definedness conditions, such an answer would
only be defined if the presupposition that Bill ate cake is part of the common ground.
However, as pointed out to me by Veneeta Dayal as well as an anonymous reviewer, it
seems highly unlikely that one would seek information about something that is already
part of the common ground. That is, given the semantics of se questions we are currently
entertaining, namely (35), the question should be rendered un-askable since the answer, or
at least a part of it, is assumed to be part of the common ground.
Another option that has been entertained for the presupposition of only is to relax the
presupposition to be that of mere existence, as in (36).
(36) [[only]](A lt(p))(p) = λw: ∃r∈A lt(p) r(w)=1. ∀q∈A lt(p) [q(w)=1 → p⊆q]
In the case at hand, it would result in having a se question denote the set of partial propo-
sitions in (37).
(37) λp. ∃x[personw0(x) ∧ p = λw: ∃y (y atew cake).
λp. ∃x[personw0(x) ∧ p =∀a∈A lt(x) [(a atew cake)→ (x atew cake) ⊆ (a atew cake)]]
7Here and throughout I adopt the notation in Heim and Kratzer (1998) to represent partial functions.
λφ: ψ. χ stands for “the function that maps φ to χ is defined only if ψ”.
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With this presupposition, a possible answer would presuppose that someone ate cake and
for a person or group of people x, it would assert that everybody who is not a part of
x did not eat cake. Basically, every proposition would presuppose that someone ate cake,
and assert, for every x in the domain of the wh-phrase, that everyone other than x did not
eat cake. As far as the presupposition is concerned, this seems like a better approximation
of what these questions denote since what is now part of the common ground is merely
the fact that there is someone who satisfies the scope of the question, a presupposition we
would want to be present regardless of the strength of the question.
A good way to keep track of what predictions we are making is by comparing the
outcome of this account with the outcome of an ans.se account. Consider the question
Who saw Mary? and suppose that Bill and John saw Mary and nobody else did. Under the
weak presupposition version of covert only, i.e. that in (36), the answer would be (38a),
while the answer under the ans.se analysis would be as in (38b).
(38) Who saw Mary?
a. asserts: Nobody who’s not John and Bill saw Mary.
presupposes: Somebody saw Mary.
b. asserts: John and Bill saw Mary and nobody else saw Mary.
The proposition denoted by the answer in (38a) is weaker, i.e. strictly entailed by the propo-
sition denoted by the answer in (38b). To see this, all we need to do is find a situation in
which (38a) is true and (38b) is false. One such case would come about if the facts were
as follows: Bill saw Mary but John didn’t see Mary. Such a situation would be consistent
with (38a) but not with (38b). What this means for the meaning of questions is that even
if in the actual world the facts were as in (39a), for someone to know the answer to this
question, under the truth conditions in (38a), it would suffice for her to know either of
(39b-d) for (39) to count as appropriate. And yet this is clearly too weak since for someone
to know a question, be it in the weak or strong sense, they need to, at a minimum, know
for each person who saw Mary that that person saw Mary, a requirement that (38a) does
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not impose.8
(39) She knows who saw Mary.
a. facts: Bill and John saw Mary.
b. She knows that Bill saw Mary.
c. She knows that John saw Mary.
d. She knows that Bill and John saw Mary.
It would appear then that we have hit a wall with this approach. On one hand we
want se questions to denote propositions of the form only x saw Mary to account for the
acceptability of NPIs, while on the other hand we saw that assuming a presuppositional
semantics for only would give rise either to un-askable questions, or to very weak truth
conditions. One suggestion might be to take this covert only to be presuppositional-less,
that is, to make everything be part of its assertive component. That, however, would result
in propositions of the form in (40a) or (40b), neither of which allows NPIs in its scope.9
(40) a. John and Bill saw Mary and nobody else saw Mary.
b. Somebody saw Mary and nobody other than John and Bill saw Mary.
Let’s, instead, go back to the original idea that only presupposes its prejacent and re-
evaluate the intuition that this presupposition is part of the common ground. Specifically,
we need to ask ourselves if/how these presuppositions project out of questions. Is it really
the case that when we’re dealing with sets of partial propositions, each of which has a
different presupposition, every single presupposition projects? If the way questions project
presuppositions is by having the presupposition of each member of the question be accom-
modated into the common ground, then we would run into a much bigger problem than
the fact that the question presupposes the answer. Having every presupposition associated
with only in the denotation of a question like Who saw Mary? project would amount to
presupposing that for every x in the domain of the wh-phrase, x saw Mary, which is clearly
8I’d like to thank Danny Fox for helping me see the issue with adopting such an account.
9This would more or less be the same as the analysis proposed by George (2011), with the only difference
being that he takes wh-phrases to denote abstracts. Also similar to this would be an account that takes the
distinction between we and se to be due to the presence of a silent exhaustifier, the same exhaustifier that
delivers scalar implicatures. (cf. Mene´ndez-Benito 2010, Klinedinst and Rothschild 2011).
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wrong. What I want to argue for here is that in these cases presuppositions need to be
locally accommodated. We will see in the following section that what this amounts to is
saying that se questions are locally Strawson-DE (i.e. good for NPI licensing but bad for
questioning purposes) but globally non-monotonic (i.e. good for questioning purposes but
bad for NPI licensing).
One question that arises is whether this need to accommodate is a specific rule for
questions or a more general rule that calls for local accommodation whenever global ac-
commodation would give rise to a clash with the pragmatics of the discourse. If this were
a specific rule for questions we would predict that a question such as (41a) would actually
be interpreted as in (41b), which is not the case.
(41) a. Who talked to his father?
b. Who has a father and talked to him?
The second option is thus not only appealing conceptually but also empirically better. The
idea is that only gives rise to a defective question and this calls for a targeted form of local
accommodation, to be explicated below.
2.2.3 Local accommodation
In this section we will fine-tune the account of se questions presented in the previous
section so as deal with the issues related to NPI licensing and presupposition projection.
Recall the LF I proposed for these questions:
(42) λp [who [λ1 [CP [C p] [IP2 only [IP1 λw [g(1)[f] [saww Mary ]]]]]]]]
And assume, once again, that the contribution of only is as in (43):
(43) [[only]](A lt(p))(p) = λw: p(w)=1. ∀q∈A lt(p) [q(w)=1 → p⊆q]
What this means is that at the level of the question nucleus, at the IP2 level, we will have
an object of the form in (44), namely a partial proposition.
(44) λw: g(1) saww Mary. ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) (a saww M)→ (g(1) saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
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This partial proposition creates a Strawson-DE environment (UE presupposition & DE
assertion), meaning that if we were to replace Mary with anybody, we would be able to
show that at this level, the NPI is licensed given that it is part of a context whose assertive
component is DE. I will go over the details of this account in Section 3, but for now it
suffices to note that the analysis would be the same as for why NPIs can survive under
overt only, a Strawson-DE operator (c.f. von Fintel (1999))
Turning next to the projection-related issues we discussed above, I claim that we can
appeal to the notion of local accommodation in order to avoid them. Informally, accom-
modation amounts to reinterpreting the sentence in such a way that renders the presuppo-
sition part of the assertion. This move is motivated by the assumption that all utterances
should express propositions that have a 0 or 1 truth-value in each world of the context set
(Stalnaker, 1978). The problem, however, is that presuppositional sentences are not felici-
tous, i.e. do not have a truth-value, in all contexts by virtue of the fact that their presup-
positions are not always part of the context set.10 This can be achieved via the assertion
operator A (Beaver and Krahmer, 2001), an operator that can be merged at any scope po-
sition. When applied to a partial proposition, φp, this operator returns a total proposition
that represents the conjunction of the proposition with its presupposition, p, as in (45).
(45) [[A]](φp) = φp ∧ p
Before delving into the analysis, let’s consider what the contribution of A is in run of the
mill contexts such as (46) and (47) adopted from Romoli (2012). Since the first sentence
in (46) is presuppositional, it needs to be reinterpreted so as to meet the felicity condition
mentioned above.11 One way to do so is like in (46a), by merging the A operator globally.
Doing so will give us the meaning in (46b), which is in line with our understanding of
what this first sentence means.12
10Hence the reason why The king of France is bold is considered to be false. Accommodating the presupposition
that there is a king of France amounts to asserting the conjunction that There is a king of France and he is bald. Given
that the first conjunct of this reinterpreted sentence is false, the entire sentence ends up being false.
11Although there are also cases where one of the speakers may choose to object to the presupposition, as in
the Hey, wait a minute! cases.
12Recall that negation is a hole for presuppositions, meaning that a negated sentence has the same presup-
positions as its positive counterpart.
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(46) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesnt want to show off.
a. A [¬[John drives his Ferrari to school]]
b. John has a Ferrari and doesn’t drive it to school.
Looking at (47), we see that global accommodation, as in (46), would give rise to a meaning
that is in contradiction with the continuation. In order to avoid such contradictions, we
have the option of locally merging A below negation, as in (47a), which yields a meaning
compatible with the continuation.
(47) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesn’t have one.
a. ¬[A [John drives his Ferrari to school]]
b. It’s not true that [John has a Ferrari and drives it to school]
Returning now to the concern raised in the previous section, I propose that the A oper-
ator is merged right above the question nucleus and before the level of question-formation,
as in (48). In (48a-f) I provide the denotations at each relevant node.
(48) [CP3 λp [CP2 who [λ1 [CP1 [C p] [IP3 A [IP2 only [IP1 λw [g(1)[f] [saww Mary ]]]]]]]]]
a. [[IP1]] = λw. g(1) saww Mary
b. [[IP2]] = λw: g(1) saww Mary.
[[IP2]] = λw: ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) (a saww M)→ (g(1) saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
c. [[IP3]] = λw. g(1) saww Mary ∧
[[IP2]] = λw: ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) (a saww M)→ (g(1) saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
d. [[CP1]] = p = λw. g(1) saww Mary ∧
[[IP1]] = λw: ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) (a saww M)→ (g(1) saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
e. [[CP2]] = ∃x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x saww Mary ∧
[[IP2]] = λw: ∀a∈A lt(x) (a saww M)→ (x saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
f. [[CP3]] = λp. ∃x∈[[person]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x saww Mary ∧
[[IP3]] = λw: ∀a∈A lt(x) (a saww M)→ (x saww M) ⊆ (a saww M)
Assuming that the presupposition associated with only is locally accommodated gets us
around the issue of how the presupposition of only projects out of questions since at the
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level of question formation there no longer is such a presupposition given that the IP
is reinterpreted as asserting said presupposition. What this means is that globally, the
question denotes a set of total propositions of the form in (49).
(49) {x1 and nobody other than x1 saw Mary, x2 and nobody other than x2 saw Mary, x3
and nobody other than x3 saw Mary, . . . }
Crucially, by this point the A operator will have turned the Strawson-DE environment
at the IP2 level into a non-monotonic environment. If the licensing of NPIs were to be
checked globally, they would turn out not to be licensed in se questions given the non-DE
character of the overall environment. However, we know that NPI licensing can be checked
with respect to a local environment since they can be felicitous even in globally non-DE
environments such as (50) as long as there is an embedded level that creates a downward
entailing context.
(50) [IP2 Mary doubts that [IP1 John didn’t talk to anybody]]
a. IP1 is DE
b. IP2 is non-DE
It’s thus crucial that the presupposition become part of the assertive component at a
separate stage in the derivation so as to maintain a level in the derivation where NPIs are
still licensed. If we changed the meaning of covert only so as to assert the prejacent, we
would no longer be able to account for the acceptability of NPIs since there would be no
level in the underlying representation that is DE with respect to the NPI. This will all be
formalized in Chapter 3 when we return to the behavior of NPIs in questions. Lastly, note
that it might turn out to be the case that we need to assume A operates selectively on
the presupposition induced by only so as not to wipe-out all of the presuppositions in the
question nucleus. That this is independently needed was observed by Romoli (2011). If this
does indeed turn out to be case, one possible way to implement it would be to claim that
A operators can be co-indexed with specific presuppositional triggers.
A possible issue with the architecture of this account is that it seems to over generate to
non-interrogative cases. Note specifically that accommodating (via A) the presupposition
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of this silent only gives us essentially the same result as if we had applied the regular silent
exhaustifier we appeal to when deriving scalar implicatures (cf. Chierchia et al. 2012). This
operator, generally referred to as Exh, takes as its argument a proposition and returns the
conjunction of that proposition will the negation of all its weaker alternatives.
(51) Exh [Some students finished their homework] =
Some but not all students finished their homework.
Given that Exh = A+only, and I crucially argued that we need the separation between A
and only in the underlying representation of questions so as to account for the acceptability
of NPIs, one might wonder why this option is not also available in the case of regular
declaratives, as in (52), given that the end result is the same.
(52) A [only [Some students finished their homework] =
Some but not all students finished their homework.
If the representation in (52) were possible, then we would wrongly predict NPIs to be
licensed in overtly non-DE contexts such as (53):
(53) *Some students finished any homework.
It stands to reason then that the A+only ‘bundle’ should only be available in questions.
There are a few reasons why this looks like the correct conclusion. One is that we need
to constrain the distribution of this covert presuppositional only operator. In other words,
it cannot be unleashed every which way, because then we would end having propositions
presupposing themselves without any overt indication. For example, if only adjoined to
(53), this proposition would end up being presupposed rather than asserted. We generally
take it for granted that when an interlocutor asserts a proposition, he doesn’t take it to
be part of the common ground but in fact indicates that it should be included into the
common ground, namely that his assertion is a signal that the proposition is meant as an
update.13 A general rule of thumb is that only lexically visible triggers, such as overt only,
13I mentioned earlier in the discussion that the reason why A turns out to be necessary in the context of
interrogatives is due to the fact that in its absence, we would run into a clash with the pragmatics of the
discourse as the question would end up presupposition (the conjunction of) its answer(s) . Clearly the same
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can bring about presuppositions. In order to implement this compositionally, I propose
to take covert only to be a question-specific exhaustifier, a dedicated exhaustifier, no more
different than what had previously been assumed to be true of ans.se. One could consider
an implementation wherein null only bears a [wh] feature such that it can only enter into
an agree relation with other wh-elements.
2.2.4 Taking stock
In this section I have offered a proposal for dealing with strength in questions which en-
codes the ambiguity between we and se questions at the level of the question nucleus,
namely before the question-forming operator is merged. To reiterate, I claimed that the LFs
for the we and se readings of questions are as in (54a) and (54b), respectively.
(54) a. λp [who [λ1 [ [C p] [λw [g(1) [saww Mary ]]]]]]
b. λp [who [λ1 [ [C p] [A [only [λw [g(1)[f] [saww Mary ]]]]]]]]
Doing so, I’ve argued, allows us to finally understand why NPIs are acceptable only
in questions that receive a se reading, as observed by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007). As
I’ve shown in the beginning of this chapter, encoding strength via the ans operator, a
longstanding tradition in the semantics of questions starting with Heim 1994, leaves the
behavior of NPIs unexplained as there is no way to unify their pattern of acceptability
in interrogatives with their acceptability in declaratives, an area for which we have an
arguably coherent grasp of their behavior. I am putting off a formal account of NPIs in
questions under this new analysis until Chapter 3 where I will focus exclusively on their
behavior, both in the nucleus and restrictor of wh-phrases.
An initial consequence of this proposal is that removing the ambiguity from the answer-
hood operators into the question nucleus basically renders these operators obsolete given
the semantics we offered for them at the beginning of this chapter. Let’s recall what the
proposed semantics of these operators were, as adapted from Heim 1994:
(55) a. [[ans.we]] = λQ.λw.λw’. ∀p∈Q [p(w)=1 → p(w’)=1]
cannot be true in the case of (53) since nothing about the presupposition clashes with the pragmatics of the
discourse.
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b. [[ans.se]] = λQ.λw.λw’. ∀p∈Q [p(w) = p(w’)]
Their role is two fold. First, they tell us what an answer to a question is supposed to be,
depending on the reading we’re interested in. Second, they pick out the true such answer in
a given world. The first of these can be achieved, as I’ve shown, at the level of the question
nucleus. It’s their second role, that of picking out the true answer given a set of possible
answers, that we have yet no way of retrieving. We could, at this point, claim that it’s
only ans.se which has been rendered obsolete, and continue maintaining that all questions
involve ans.we, which, depending on which LF it merges with, would deliver either the
we or se answer to a question. In a sense, the story could easily just end here. We’ve set
out to account for the correlation between the acceptability of NPIs in a question and the
strength of the question and we have shown how that can be achieved. But there are still
a number of facts we have ignored up to this point that seem to indicate that ans.we, as
defined in (55a), is both too weak and too strong. To these issues we turn next.
2.3 What about the ans operator?
2.3.1 ans.we is too weak
Another topic that comes up in the literature on questions is that of uniqueness, also dis-
cussed under the term maximality, which deals with the issue that comes up when we
compare the questions in (56) in terms of the types of answers they allow for.
(56) a. Who does John like?
b. Which women does John like?
c. Which woman does John like?
The observation, dating back to Srivastav 1991 and later developed in Dayal 1996, is that
while (56a) allows for either response in (57), a question with a plural which phrase like
(56b) will allow as an answer only a plurality of women, while a question with a singular
which phrase, like (56c), will only accept an answer that names a single woman, namely
(57b).
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(57) a. John likes Mary and Suzy.
b. John likes Mary.
Dayal (1996) proposes to account for these nuances by taking the choice of wh-phrase to dic-
tate what types of propositions can comprise the answer set. Namely, she takes monomor-
phemic wh-phrases, like who in (56), to range over atomic and sum individuals, similarly to
plural which phrases, while restricting singular which phrases to ranging exclusively over
atomic individuals. That is, the Hamblin set associated with (56a-b) will be as in (58a),
while that associated with (56c) will be as in (58b).
(58) a. {John likes Mary, John likes Suzy, John likes Ann, John likes Mary and Suzy,
John likes Mary and Ann, John likes Suzy and Ann, John likes Mary and Suzy
and Ann}
b. {John likes Mary, John likes Suzy, John likes Ann}
This move by itself is not enough to account for the observation above. The issue is that,
given the answerhood operator we have assumed, there is no way to restrict how many
propositions in the Hamblin set can hold true, meaning that in a situation in which John
likes Mary and Suzy, applying the ans.we operator to either set in (58) will return the same
set of worlds, namely those in which John likes Mary and Suzy. We want, however, a way to
rule out such answers when the question involves a singular which phrase. Dayal suggests
that one way to think about these cases is by invoking the notion of maximality; specifically,
by requiring the answer to a question to denote the maximally informative proposition in
the answer set, similar in a sense to the contribution of the definite article the. Redefining
the answer-hood operator to accomplish this would amount to the following two claims:
the answer to a question needs to be a true proposition belonging to the denotation of the
questions, and that furthermore, that proposition needs to be the strongest such proposi-
tion, as in (59).
(59) [[ans]] = λQ.λw: ∃p [p(w) =1 ∧ Q(p)=1 ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)] presup.
[[ans]] = λQ.λw: ιp [p(w) =1 ∧ Q(p)=1 ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)] denotation
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Let’s consider again a scenario in which John likes two girls, Mary and Suzy. A question
such as (60) will denote the set in (60a), where the bolded propositions correspond to the
propositions true in the actual world. Despite the fact that there are three true propositions
in the question denotation, only one of them, namely (60b), counts as the most informative
answer. This comes out as such given Dayal’s semantics for ans because (60b) entails each
of the other two true propositions.
(60) Which women does John like?
a. Q = {John likes Mary, John likes Suzy, John likes Ann, John likes Mary and
Suzy, John likes Mary and Ann, John likes Suzy and Ann, John likes Mary and
Suzy and Ann}
b. ans(Q) = John likes Mary and Suzy
On the other hand, using a singular which phrase to ask this question in the same situation
would be infelicitous. Dayal’s ans operator accounts for this because given the set of pos-
sible answers in (61a) no true (bolded) proposition would count as the unique maximally
informative proposition.
(61) Which woman does John like?
a. Q = {John likes Mary, John likes Suzy, John likes Ann}
b. ans(Q) is undefined
The fact that plural which phrases appear to be restricted to situations where the answer
is a plurality while monomorphemic wh-phrases are not, is claimed to come about as a
conversational implicature dictated by the fact that there is a singular-plural distinction
made overtly so with which but not with who.
One might ask though whether adopting Dayal’s ans operator is still necessary given
the new semantics of questions I’ve been entertaining up till this point. My claim was that
se questions, of which unembedded questions are assumed to be a type of, actually denote
sets of propositions as in (62):
(62) a. Which women does John like?
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Q = {John likes only Mary, John likes only Suzy, John likes only Ann, John
likes only Mary and Suzy, John likes only Mary and Ann, John likes only
Suzy and Ann, John likes only Mary, Suzy and Ann}
b. Which woman does John like?
Q = {John likes only Mary, John likes only Suzy, John likes only Ann}
Given that these sets consist of exhaustified propositions, there will never be a case in
which more than one proposition could be true in a given world. For example in (62a), if
it’s true that John likes only Mary and Suzy, then it cannot also be true that John likes only
Mary, nor that John likes only Suzy. So in this case, Dayal’s ans operator would return the
same object as ans.we. On the other hand, (62b) would be undefined in such a scenario by
virtue of the fact that no proposition in the set would be true in the actual world. Here is
one place where Dayal’s ans operator proves to be superior to ans.we since it imposes the
requirement that there be an answer in the actual world, something that ans.we does not.
Nevertheless, while Dayal’s ans operator seems to be (almost) vacuous in root questions
under the analysis pursued here, we would still need to appeal to it to account for the fact
that the same contrast between singular and plural which phrases is observed when we
look at we questions, namely those embedded under predicates like surprise.
(63) a. Bill was surprised by which women John likes.
b. Bill was surprised by which woman John likes.
(63b) seems to presuppose that John likes a single woman, while (63a) that he likes multiple
women. Under my analysis of we readings of questions, they denote the sets in (60) and
(61), meaning that the same problem Dayal claims to arise for unembedded questions
would carry over to my analysis of embedded we questions. That is to say, Dayal’s ans
operator would still be required in order to account for the asymmetry in (63).
In this section I have shown that ans.we, as we know it, has too weak of a semantics
to account for the range of data discussed above. In the next section I will discuss a set of
phenomena which points to the conclusion that ans.we might actually be too strong.
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2.3.2 ans.we is too strong
The basic idea, as pursued by the proponents of ans.we, is that embedding a question
amounts to embedding the proposition which constitutes the answer to that question. For
example, in a scenario in which John likes only Mary and Suzy, (64a) and (64b) would be
taken to be equivalent.
(64) a. Bill knows who John likes.
b. Bill knows that John likes only Mary and Suzy.
In essence, for Bill to stand in the know relationship to the question who John likes, (64a),
he needs to stand in the know relationship to the answer to that question, namely to the
proposition John likes only Mary and Suzy, as in (64b). That this is what a theory based
on ans.we predicts can be seen when we remind ourselves what the proposed LF for
embedded questions is, repeated in (65):
(65) a.
surprise we answer
ans.we Hamblin set
b.
knows se answer
ans.se Hamblin set
If things were as simple as that, there would be nothing more to say about question-
embedding predicates since their semantics would literally be the same as that of their
proposition-embedding counterparts. The problem is that the facts are not nearly as sim-
ple as above. In this section I will focus on two cases: questions embedded under non-
veridical predicates and situations where propositional knowledge does not determine
question knowledge.
Consider the question in (66) under the same scenario as before, where John likes Mary
and Suzy and he doesn’t like Ann.
(66) Bill is certain of who John likes.
a. John likes only Mary and Suzy.
b. John likes only Ann.
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The issue is that a proposition such as (66) would count as true even if Bill were certain of
the proposition in (66b). In other words, as long as Bill is certain of a proposition which
counts as a possible answer to the question, he will count as being certain of that question.
However, under the semantics of the answer-hood operator presented above, what would
end up being fed as an argument for certain is the proposition which counts as the true
answer in the actual world, (66a) and not (66b), making (66) false under the scenario we
are considering. What this example shows is that since it is possible to be certain of a
false proposition, true answers are not privileged over false answers in this particular case,
suggesting that the semantics of ans.we, as we know it, is too strong. Lahiri (2002) proposes
to account for this peculiar behavior of be certain, which also holds of agree on, by loosening
the requirements on the answer-hood operator so as to allow for variation in what can
count as an answer. Informally, he proposes to move from a built-in truth requirement, to a
condition that takes p to be an answer to a question as long as it belongs to the denotation
of the question and to the set of propositions C, where Cwould be contextually determined
as in (67); he assumes, furthermore, that there is a default restriction to true propositions,
as in (67b), Lahiri (2002, p. 100).
(67) a. certain:
∀x [x is the agent of V → C⊆λp[consider-likely/possible(w)(p)(x)]]
b. know, surprise:
C⊆λp[p(w)=1]
Even with this tweak in the semantics of the answer-hood operator, other, possibly
more serious, issues arise given a semantics of questions that takes them to denote the
(usually true) answer. This set of data pertains to weakly exhaustive readings of questions
embedded under know and is due to Spector (2005), further developed in Spector and Egre´
2007 and George 2011. Consider the following situation. Bill believes that among Mary,
Suzy and Ann, John likes every single girl. Suppose that in fact John only likes Mary and
Suzy. We can represent Bill’s beliefs and the facts in the actual world as in (68).
43
(68) John likes Mary John likes Suzy John likes Ann
Facts yes yes no
Bill’s beliefs yes yes yes
Recall that applying ans.we to the question in (69a) delivers the proposition in (69b), mean-
ing that for someone to know this question on its weakly exhaustive reading, they would
simply need to know that (69b) is true.
(69) a. Which girls does John like?
b. John likes Mary and Suzy.
c. Bill knows which girls John likes.
Given Bill’s beliefs in (68), it is clear that he stands in a know relation to the proposition in
(69b), meaning that for him to know the question in (69a) it suffices to know its answer in
(69b) (given that questions denote their we or se answer). In other words, given a semantics
of ans.we which takes a set of (non-exhaustified) propositions and returns the proposition
true in the actual world, Bill would count as knowing which girls John likes. That, however,
is wrong, given what we know about Bill’s beliefs. Since Bill falsely believes that John also
likes Ann, we tend to judge a sentence such as (69c) as false. What this shows is that simply
knowing the proposition which constitutes the weakly exhaustive answer is not enough to
render someone as knowing that question. They would additionally need to hold no false
beliefs about the other possible answers to the question. However, in a system in which
question-embedding know takes as an argument the answer to the question, there would
be no way to compositionally impose the requirement that the agent stand in any sort of
relation with the other propositions in the question denotation since at LF, the predicate
would be, in a sense, too far away from the question denotation.
What we’ve seen is yet another set of data which suggests that ans.we over generates.
In the following section I propose a new way to think about questions that no longer takes
them to denote their true answer.
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2.3.3 Doing away with answer-hood operators
In the present formulation, an answer-hood operator, be it ans.we or Dayal’s ans, takes a
set of propositions as its argument and returns a single proposition, the true (maximally
informative) answer. As we saw in the previous section, however, it seems to be the case
that we need question embedding verbs to have access to more than just the answer, they
need to have the ability to quantify over every possible answer. This suggests then that
question-embedding predicates should act directly on sets of propositions, meaning that
we should simply do away with the answer-hood operator, leaving us with a representation
such as in (70).
(70) a.
surprise we answer set
b.
know se answer set
While this would allow us to provide a compositional semantics for how question-embedding
predicates can have access to all possible answers (leaving aside the actual semantics of
these predicates for now), it would still be plagued by the same problems ans.we was
when dealing with the contrast between singular and plural which phrases. The relevant
data is repeated in (71).
(71) a. Bill was surprised by which women John likes.
b. Bill was surprised by which woman John likes.
The fact that questions with singular which phrases always seem to carry the presupposi-
tion that in the actual world the question nucleus is true of a single individual suggests that
questions should always carry a uniqueness presupposition, regardless of whether they are
embedded and/or their strength.14 In other words, doing away completely with an answer-
hood operator as in (70) is too strong of a move, unless we are willing to assume that the
question-embedding predicates themselves carry a presupposition that imposes unique-
ness on their sisters, a somewhat ad-hoc move. One other option would be to assume that
this uniqueness requirement is specific to which-phrases. The issue with this approach is
14When we look at pair-list readings for multiple wh-questions we will see even stronger evidence for the
presence of this uniqueness presupposition.
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that it would miss an important observation that maximality/uniqueness effects surface
even in questions that don’t contain which-phrases, specifically when looking at cases in-
volving negative islands (c.f Rullmann (1995), Fox and Hackl (2007), Spector and Abrusa´n
(2011), Fox (2010), among others).
A simpler solution would be to add this uniqueness restriction as a filter of sorts on the
set of possible answers. This filter/operator would act on a set of propositions and return
that same set if and only if the set contains a maximally informative member; in other
words, its presuppositional component encodes the requirement imposed by Dayal’s ans
operator. Its meaning would be that in (72):15
(72) [[Id]] = λQ.λw: ∃p∈Q ∧ p = ans(Q)(w). Q
[[Id]] = λQ.λw: ∃p∈Q ∧ p = ιp[p(w) =1 ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)]. Q
Specifically, I propose that instead of having an answer-hood operator generated as the
sister of C, as the general take has been, (73a), we actually have an Id operator merged in
that position, as in (73b).
(73) a.
ans
λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p〈s,t〉
. . .
b.
Id
λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p〈s,t〉
. . .
What this means for our theory of questions is that questions will at no point in the
derivation denote anything but a set of possible answers, because, unlike ans, Id will
always return a set of propositions. The complete LF of a we and se question is provided
15Danny Fox points out an issue with the denotation in (72), namely that it makes the wrong prediction
when we look at non-veridical predicates like certain. For a question such as (i), (72) would presuppose that
there is a unique girl that Bill likes in the actual world, which seems to be too strong given that (i) could be
used even in a situation in which we, the audience, know it to be true that Bill likes multiple girls. All that is
conveyed by (i) is that in John’s belief worlds there is a unique girl that Bill likes.
(i) John is certain which girl Bill likes.
It looks like what we might actually want is not a partial function from worlds to questions, but rather a
function from worlds to sets of partial propositions, partial questions in a sense.
(ii) [[Id]](Q) = λw.λp: ∃p’∈Q [ans(Q)(w)=p’ ∧ p’(w)=1]. p∈Q
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in (74a) and (74b), respectively.
(74) a. Id [λp [who [λ1 [ [C p] [λw [John likesw g(1) ]]]]]]
b. Id [λp [who [λ1 [ [C p] [A [only [λw [John likesw g(1) ]]]]]]]]
2.3.4 Taking stock, again
We began the previous section by arguing that we can do away with ans.se by providing
a different way to encode question strength directly at the level of the question nucleus.
This way, I claimed, would derive the behavior of NPIs straightforwardly without having
any ripple effects in other domains of questions. In the following chapter I will show how
powerful this account is in its ability to account for a number of phenomena related to the
acceptability of NPIs in interrogatives that up to this point had surfaces in the literature
merely as empirical generalizations.
By arguing for an analysis that encodes strength within the question nucleus, we have
basically rendered ans.se irrelevant. In this section we turned our attention to ans.we and
lookedmore in depth at what its contribution actually is. We started by looking at data from
Dayal 1996 where she argues for a stronger, presuppositional, version of the answer-hood
operator in order to account for uniqueness presuppositions observed with singular which
phrases. Data from Spector 2005 and George 2011, on the other hand, strongly indicated
that when it comes to embedding questions, the presence of an answer-hood operator
requires us to provide non-compositional semantics for the embedding-predicates. Putting
these observations together, we concluded that a better candidate for the position of the
answer-hood operator would be a filter-like operator that does the work of Dayal’s ans
operator without raising the concerns noted by Spector and George. This operator takes a
set of propositions, Hamblin or exhaustified, and returns the same set of propositions if
and only if they contain a unique (true) maximally informative proposition among them,
basically Dayal’s operator sans the assertive component.
Up till this point we have only briefly mentioned what the semantics of embedded
questions is. We turn to a more detailed analysis of this in the next section.
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2.4 Embedding questions
This concluding section discusses the final piece required of an analysis which takes ques-
tions to denote propositions at the highest level, namely how predicates embed questions.
In the first part of this section I discuss different types of question-embedders and choose
a representative from within each class to illustrate what a possible semantics for them
might look like. A large portion of this section will involve summarizing already existent
proposals. In the second part I turn to the main problem faced by theories of questions that
do away with answer-hood operators, which is the issue of sub-categorizing for a partic-
ular type of reading. I begin by discussing a possible way to deal with this problem and
end by noting certain advantages to adopting such an approach, one of which relates to an
observation made by Sharvit (2002) regarding the unavailability of non-veridical predicates
which select exclusively for we readings.16
2.4.1 The semantics of embedders
Despite the fact that most theories of questions invoke a syntactically projected answer-
hood operator, when it comes to providing a semantics for the predicates that embed them,
they usually always make reference to the possible sets of answers in the denotation of the
question-embedder (henceforth QEP). This, however, should not be possible given that
the question denotation, namely the set of answers, will never act as an argument of the
predicate in the syntax. The only objects the predicate can have access to are the agent and
the proposition returned by applying the answer-hood operator to the question denotation,
as shown below.
(75)
agent
QEP the answer
ans question
16A non-veridical predicate is one which does not entail the truth of its complement; contrast this with
a veridical predicate which does entail the truth of its complement. These are not to be confused with
factive/non-factive predicates, which are used to refer to predicates which presuppose (or don’t) the truth
of their complements.
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And yet a perusal of the literature will clearly point to an array of non-compositional
accounts which provide QEPs with a semantics that makes reference to the more embedded
object denoted by the question. On the other hand, in an analysis such as the one pursued
here, which replaces the answer-hood operator with an identity function on questions,
compositionality is no longer an issue since Id in (76) returns the question and thus gives
the QEP access to each proposition in the set.
(76)
agent
QEP question
Id question
We have already discussed a question-embedding predicate that requires this type of ac-
cess, namely know. Know, when embedding questions, has been claimed to allow for both
weakly and strongly exhaustive readings (cf. Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007, Sharvit 2002,
Beck and Rullmann 1999, among many others). On its se reading, for Bill to know which
girls John likes, he would have to know for every girl who John likes that he likes her, and
furthermore for every girl who he doesn’t like that he doesn’t like her. In other words, Bill
needs to believe the true exhaustive proposition that constitutes the answer to Which girls
does John like?. Based on these intuitions, a possible semantics of knowQ would look as in
(77a), with (77b) constituting the semantics for knowp. Note that just like with the semantics
for Id, I appeal to the shorthand Ans(Q) in the denotation I ascribe to knowQ. To reiterate,
this is merely a shorthanded way of expressing (77c).
(77) a. [[knowQ]] = λw.λQ.λx. knowp(w)(Ans(Q)(w))(x)
b. [[knowp]] = λw.λp.λx: p(w). believe(w)(p)(x)
c. Ans(Q)(w) = ιp[p(w) ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)]
Recall that in the present analysis, a se reading of knowQ amounts to having the question
nucleus contain a silent only. In other words, the set of propositions denoted by Q is a set
of exhaustive propositions of the form John likes x and nobody else.
Turning now to the we reading of knowQ, its argument is going to denote sets of propo-
sitions of the form John likes x. For Bill to know this question on its we reading, he needs
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to know for every girl liked by John that John likes her, which is equivalent to knowing
the true most informative proposition in Q. But, as argued by Spector (2005), this is not
enough since it would also allow for cases where Bill wrongly believes of a girl not liked
by John that John likes her. In order to exclude such situations, we can furthermore impose
a condition that the agent hold no false beliefs with respect to the argument of the predi-
cate. One way to do so would be by adding a second conjunct to the entry for knowQ which
would say that for every proposition in Q that the agent believes, that proposition must be
true. This augmented entry is provided in (78).
(78) [[knowQ]] = λw.λQ.λx. knowp(w)(Ans(Q))(x) ∧ ∀p∈Q [believe(w)(p)(x) → p(w)]
More recently, however, George (2011) has argued that the we reading of questions embed-
ded under know is an artifact of one of a couple possible confounds: domain uncertainty
(not knowing all the individuals in the domain) and complementation failure (cases where
the verb in the question nucleus, like in the case at hand, and its negation not like do not
divide the domain). For George, the fact that (79) is not contradictory is not enough to
claim that know also allows for we readings since it could simply be due to the fact that
Bill is either not aware of the full range of people under discussion, or that not all of the
people in the domain can be divided into being liked and being disliked by John.
(79) Bill knows who John likes but he doesn’t know who John doesn’t like.
While I agree with his intuition about these cases, I still think that there are situations
in which a se reading of the embedded question under know can give rise to stronger
meanings than intended. For example, consider a situation in which I’m at a party, chatting
with a relative, and I’m waiting for my three friends Ann, Bill and Chris to show up. Since
I’m standing by the door, I can see who comes in and I notice that Ann and Bill walked in,
but given that I’m also engaged in a conversation, it’s very possible that I missed someone
walking in. In such a situation it seems that I could still claim that I know who came to the
party, namely that I know that Ann and Bill came, without committing myself to the belief
that only the two of them showed up.17
17I think it’s crucial to note that this is distinct from a mention some answer since I’m answering the question
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Another question-embedding predicate that allows both types of readings is reciprocal
agree on, which differs from know in that unlike for know, the facts of the real world are
irrelevant. Predicates like this, which do not entail the truth of their complements, have
been referred to as non-veridical question-embedding predicates. Consider the following
scenario:
(80) John likes Mary John likes Suzy John likes Ann
Fred’s beliefs yes yes no
Bill’s beliefs yes yes no
Facts yes yes yes
In this scenario, (81) is true by virtue of the fact that Fred’s beliefs coincide with Bill’s
beliefs. Notice that this is so despite the fact that their beliefs regarding Ann conflict with
the actual facts. What is relevant is simply the fact that the agents share their beliefs.
(81) Fred and Bill agree on who John likes.
a. Fred and Bill agree that John likes only Mary and Suzy.
b. John likes Mary, Suzy and Ann.
The lack of veridicality with agree on means that we cannot give it a semantics such as in
(82a) since that would require the agents to believe the true maximally informative answer,
(81b). In order to get around this problem, we can simply require of the agents to believe a
possible maximally informative answer, as in (82b). Since John likes only Mary and Suzy is a
proposition in the set denoted by Q, it counts as a possible answer.18
(82) a. [[agree onQ]] = λw.λQ.λX. ∀x∈X [believe(w)(Ans(Q)(w))(x)]19 ← bad!
b. [[agree onQ]] = λw.λQ.λX. ∃w’ Ans(Q)(w’) ∧ ∀x∈X [believe(w)(Ans(Q)(w’))(x)]
In a scenario such as the one above it is hard to discern between the we and se reading
to the full extent of my beliefs.
18We could, if we wanted to be consistent, use the same strategy for knowQ. In that case it wouldn’t make
a difference however since knowp(Ans(Q)) is defined only if Ans(Q) is true in the actual world. That is, while
you can believe a false proposition, you cannot know a false one. In other words, existentially quantifying over
worlds in the case of factive predicates becomes vacuous.
19Here X refers to a plural individual.
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of the QEP since they are both true. That is, Q could denote either the set in (83a) or the
set in (83b) and the sentence in (81) would still be judged as true since both sets contain a
proposition that both Bill and Fred agree on.
(83) a. Qw = {John likes Mary, John likes Suzy, John likes Ann, John likes Mary and
Suzy, John likes Mary and Ann, John likes Suzy and Ann, John likes Mary and
Suzy and Ann}
b. Qs = {John likes only Mary, John likes only Suzy, John likes only Ann, John
likes only Mary and Suzy, John likes only Mary and Ann, John likes only
Suzy and Ann, John likes only Mary and Suzy and Ann}
To see that there are cases where two people can be said to agree on a question even if they
don’t agree on their negative beliefs, consider the augmented scenario in (84) that includes
a fourth girl, Julie. And assume, furthermore, that Fred believes that John doesn’t like Julie
while Bill has no beliefs about her.
(84) J likes Mary J likes Suzy J likes Ann J likes Julie
Fred’s beliefs yes yes no no
Bill’s beliefs yes yes no ??
Speakers agree that even in such a case it would be valid to claim that Fred and Bill agree on
who John likes. What is happening here is that their beliefs concern a possible maximally
informative proposition in the weakly exhaustive answer set, namely John likes Mary and
Suzy, rather than a proposition in the strongly exhaustive set. Sharvit (2002) uses a similar
scenario to point out that agree on is not exclusively a we question-embedding predicate and
that it does, in fact, also allow for an se interpretation. Consider the following dialogue:
(85) A: Fred and Bill agree on who John likes.
B: They don’t really agree on who John likes since Fred believes that John likes Julie
while Bill has no opinion.
What (85) shows us is that speaker A uses agree on on its we reading while speaker B uses
it on its se reading since she takes the lack of a complete alignment of Fred and BIll’s
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beliefs to be enough grounds for them not to count as standing in agreement (as there is
no maximally informative proposition in the se answer set that Bill believes).
What has been concluded based on these empirical facts is that some predicates, re-
gardless of their veridicality, allow for both we and se readings. What this means for the
present account is that some QEPs are free to embed either type of question denotation,
be it the plain Hamblin question, or the exhaustive question containing a silent only. Not
all predicates exhibit this freedom, however. Take for example surprise and the sentence in
(86), adapted from Heim 1994.
(86) It surprised Bill who cheated on the exam.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, (86) cannot be used to indicate that Bill
expected someone to cheat that ended up not cheating. The surprise can only refer to the
positive extension of the question, meaning that the predicate must only make reference
to the non-exhaustified set of answers. Intuitively, for someone to be surprised by who
cheated, they need to have expected a cheater to not have cheated. For it to be true that
Bill is surprised by who cheated, then, it can only be the case that his surprise is due to
someone who ended up cheating, rather than surprise at someone who didn’t cheat. This
translates into a requirement that to be surprisedQ you need to be surprised by a proposition
in the denotation of the Hamblin set, and crucially not by a proposition in the denotation
of the exhaustified Hamblin set. To see this more clearly, consider the scenario in (87), a
scenario under which it is judged false that Bill was surprised by who cheated.
(87) Mary Suzy Ann
cheaters yes yes no
Bill’s expectations yes yes yes
Assume the semantics for surprisedQ in (88):
(88) Bill was surprised by who cheated.
a. [[surprisedQ]] = λw.λQ.λx. ∃p∈Q ∧ p(w) ∧ surprisedp(w)(p)(x)
b. Qw = {Mary cheated, Suzy cheated, Mary and Suzy cheated}
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c. Qs = {only Mary cheated, only Suzy cheated, only Mary and Suzy cheated}
If the argument of surprise, Q, were to denote the exhaustified Hamblin set, then for Bill to
be surprised by who cheated he would need to be surprised by a true proposition in the
set of strongly exhaustive answers, namely (88c). Since Bill expected Mary, Suzy and Ann
to cheat, he would indeed be surprised upon finding out that the true member in (88c),
only Mary and Suzy cheated, is true given that he also expected Ann to cheat. What this
means then is that if we allow surpriseQ to embed the exhaustified Hamblin set, we would
expect (88) to be true in a scenario like (87), contrary to fact. On the other hand, if we
restrict surpriseQ in such a way so that it can only embed Hamblin sets, (88) will correctly
be predicted to be judged false.
We have so far discussed three types of question-embedding predicates: veridical pred-
icates that allow for both se and we readings (know), veridical predicates that allow only
we readings (surprise), and non-veridical predicates that allow for both we and se readings
(agree on). Give this typology, we expect a fourth kind of predicate, a non-veridical predicate
that can only receive a we interpretation.
(89) we exhaustive we/se exhaustive
veridical
surprise know
amaze wonder
disappoint ask
annoy discover
non-veridical ????
agree on
be certain
As already pointed out by Sharvit (2002), such verbs do not appear to exist. An immediate
reaction would be to see if we can offer an explanation for this otherwise accidental gap. In
the next and final section of this chapter I turn to this issue and discuss potential avenues
for further research.
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2.4.2 Selectional requirements
Let’s begin by discussing the selection requirements of question-embedding predicates.
Specifically, why is it that surprise, as well as other emotive factives (e.g. amaze, disappoint,
annoyed), cannot receive se readings? Within a framework that takes the difference between
these readings to come about as the result of applying different answer-hood operators to
the question denotation, one can argue (as many have), that surprise-like predicates sub-
categorize for a type of answer, as in (90):
(90) a. surpriseQ [ans.we [question ]]
b. *surpriseQ [ans.se [question ]]
At the same time, predicates like know and agree on would be underspecified, in the sense
that either of (91a) or (91b) would be allowed by the grammar.
(91) a. know/agree onQ [ans.we [question ]]
b. know/agree onQ [ans.se [question ]]
Under the present account, however, this approach is no longer an option given that the
difference in strength is encoded at a level embedded much lower within the question. So
unless we can allow for the possibility of a predicate to subcategorize for structures that
lack a certain operator (silent only) as in (92), syntactic sub-categorization will not do the
trick anymore.
(92) *surprise [. . . only . . . ]
There is, however, another way we could look at the problem. Instead of thinking about
sub-categorization for certain syntactic objects, we can think about it in terms of sub-
categorization for certain semantic objects. On this note, observe that the propositions
denoted by the exhaustified Hamblin set for the question in (93), provided in (93a), are
always going to be mutually inconsistent in that for no world will it ever be possible for
more than one proposition in that set to be true. The same cannot be said for the plain
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Hamblin set, (93b).20
(93) Who came?
a. Qs = {only x1 came, only x2 came, only x3 came, only x1 and x2 came, . . . }
b. Qw = {x1 came, x2 came, x3 came, x1 and x2 came, . . . }
Given that surprise-like predicates can only take as their argument the set in (93b), what
we can say then is that certain predicates (semantically) subcategorize for a set of mutually
consistent propositions, i.e. for Qw. In other words, a subcategorization story is viable
even after switching from a system with answer-hood operators to one where the strength
of exhaustivity is encoded within the question nucleus, with the only difference being
that now we talk about semantic rather than syntactic subcategorization. The question is
whether this move affords us any more flexibility in terms of predicting which types of
predicates will behave in a certain way. I claim that it does, and below I outline a few
potential lines of inquiry for further research.
There are two main questions worth exploring: (i) why don’t surprise-like predicates
ever embed se readings, and (ii) why are there no non-veridical predicates that cannot
exclusively embed we readings. For starters, observe that the predicates that satisfy (i) form
a natural semantic class, i.e. they are all emotive factives. This suggests that one place to
look for an answer would be to investigate what these types of predicates have in common
to the exclusion of others.
In their propositional incarnation, emotive factive predicates carry a presupposition that
the speaker knows the complement, namely that (s)he believes it to be true and further-
more that it is actually true, something that neither know-type predicates, nor agree on-type
predicates do.21 Now, how do we encode semantic subcategorization in the grammar? One
way to do so is via a presupposition on the predicate that its argument must satisfy some
requirement. For example, we could claim that these predicates, when they take questions,
carry something akin to a plurality presupposition of belief over the propositions in the
question denotation. That is, we could say that there is a class of QEPs that are defined
20One could also think about it in terms of Qw, but not Qs, being closed under conjunction.
21Agree on p presupposes agent opinionatedness, meaning belief that its possible p or possible not p.
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only if the speaker takes it to be possible that a plurality of Q is true, as in (94):22
(94) plurality presupposition: ∃p,q∈Q ∧ "s(p∧q)
What one would like to know at this point is how, if at all, such a presupposition might
be related to the presupposition these predicates carry when they embed propositions.
Namely how does a predicate go from presupposing knowledge in its propositional in-
carnation, to presupposing mutual compatibility in its question-embedding incarnation?
While I do not have a good answer to this question, I do, nonetheless, believe it is worth
pursuing given that it might open the door to understanding why non-veridical non-se-
predicates do not exist. Not only that, but we will see in Chapters 4 and 5 that this re-
quirement can also straightforwardly account for the inability of these predicates to embed
either alternate or polar questions.23
There is a certain class of predicates that has not been attested, namely non-veridical
predicates that embed exclusively we readings. Under an analysis that accounts for these
patterns in terms of syntactic sub-categorization, this accidental gap remains unaccounted
for. I believe that the account presented above gets us a step closer to understanding
why such question-embedding predicates should be non-existent. By virtue of being non-
veridical, these predicates cannot carry presuppose that the agent knows (believes and
takes it to be true) the complement proposition. If we take the mutual compatibility pre-
supposition to come about as a result of speaker factivity in the propositional incarnation,
we expect predicates that lack this presupposition to impose no restrictions on their ques-
tion complements. Without such a presupposition, there would be nothing to preclude
them from embedding sets of mutually inconsistent (exclusive) propositions.
22This should a speaker belief rather than an agent belief since realize doesn’t seem to presuppose that the
agent believes p. This can be seen by noting that a negated realize p proposition presupposes speaker and not
agent belief. Both Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) and Guerzoni (2007) note that what these predicates have in
common is a presupposition of speaker factivity.
23One concern that was raised by Veneeta Dayal is what happens with questions with singular which-phrases
embedded under surprise and the likes of it, given that the requirement imposed by Id is at odds with the
presupposition I assume is present with these predicates. For example, given a set {p1, p2, p3}, Id imposes the
requirement that there can only be one true proposition in this set, while surprise requires it to be possible that
two propositions are true. The idea would be to somehow divorce these two requirements so that they don’t
conflict with each other.
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Beyond being emotive factive, there are two other semantic properties that distinguish
the two classes of predicates in (95).
(95) a. we exhaustive: surprise, amaze, disappoint, annoy
b. we/se exhaustive: know, wonder, discover, agree on, be certain
The predicates in the know class universally quantify over their complements while the
predicates in the surprise class quantify existentially since to be surprised/amazed/annoyed
by who came, it suffices there to be one person whose arrival was unexpected. Yet another
differentiation criterion is the fact that in their propositional incarnation, the predicates in
the surprise class are all Strawson-DE, contrary to those in the know-class. One solution
that immediately suggests itself is that of appealing to the notion of maximize strength (cf.
Heim (1991), Singh (2011)), which is what we see more generally in cases where strength-
ening is precluded from taking place in the scope of downward-entailing operators as that
would give rise to a weaker meaning than if no strengthening had taken place. Given that
the strongly exhaustive reading of a question is stronger, more informative, than its weakly
exhaustive reading, and that surprise and others in its class create DE contexts, we could
imagine that some version of maximize strength could be invoked in order to rule out
the stronger readings of a question from being embedded under these predicates as that
would give rise to a weaker meaning than if the weakly exhaustive question had been em-
bedded.24 While these options may seem more attractive than one that rides solely on the
fact that surprise-like predicates carry a plurality presupposition, by virtue of being emotive
factives, it’s difficult to see how they would be made to work so as to also account for the
lack of non-veridical non-se question-embedding predicates.
24I say “some version” of maximize strength because maximize strength as we know it is an overridable
pragmatic constraint in grammar, and that by itself would be too weak in these cases.
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Chapter 3
NPIs in questions
In this chapter we focus on the behavior of NPIs in constituent questions. Having laid the
foundations for an analysis in the previous chapter, we can now take an in depth look at
why these items exhibit the peculiarities they do. We begin with a general discussion of
how questions with quantifiers behave, focusing specifically on the predictions made by an
analysis which takes strength to be encoded internal to the question. This discussion will
pave the way for the account I present in Section 2 of the behavior of NPIs in the scope
of questions given that NPIs too are taken to be quantifiers. This section will also discuss
a contrast observed by Han and Siegel 1997 that NPIs are licensed only when they are c-
commanded by the wh-phrase. I will show how the present account is fully endowed to
deal with this contrast and furthermore predicts that non-argumental wh-phrases should
exhibit the same asymmetry with respect to their position relative to the NPI. One other
prediction that will fall out seamlessly from my account concerns strong NPIs like in weeks
which turn out to be disallowed from questions regardless of their strength or the relative
c-command order with the wh-phrase. Finally, in Section 3 we change gears, switching our
attention from the nuclear scope of the wh-phrase to its restrictor. Here too I build on an
observation made by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) and provide a compositional analysis
to account for why plural and not singular which-phrases allow NPIs in their restriction,
regardless of the overall strength of the question. I will ultimately argue that understanding
how to account for this contrast can help us make sense of why NPIs can never function as
(or embedded within) the focus associate of overt only.
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3.1 Quantifiers in questions
Having postulated the presence of a covert operator in the structure, we now need to make
sure its presence does not give rise to unattested readings. Specifically, we’re interested to
see what, if any, other readings are predicted when we look at the interaction between only,
a propositional operator that associates with the trace of the wh-phrase, and other scope-
bearing elements in the structure. In particular, what happens when we have quantifiers in
questions and how do they scopally interact with this covert operator? In the appendix to
this chapter I discuss a different analysis that takes only to be a phrasal operator and point
out how such an account would make the wrong predictions with respect to the behavior
of quantifiers in questions.
Questions with quantifiers have been known to give rise to multiple readings, such as
single pair, pair list and functional readings. For the purposes of this section, we will focus
solely on the single pair reading, which is taken to come about as a result of moving the
quantifier, for type-theoretical reasons, right under the question operator; in other words,
at the lowest IP level, as in (1) and (2). For transparency, I will use Q to stand in for the
complex C head. For each question below, (a.) represents its LF, (b.) its semantics and (c.)
the set it denotes.
(1) Who did everyone kiss?
a. λp [who [2 [Q [everyone [1 [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
b. λp. ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = ∀y [person(y)→ y kissed x]]
c. {Everyone kissed Mary, Everyone kissed John, Everyone kissed Bill, . . . }
(2) Who kissed everyone?
a. λp [who [1 [Q [everyone [2 [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
b. λp. ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = ∀y [person(y)→ x kissed y]]
c. {Mary kissed everyone, John kissed everyone, Bill kissed everyone, . . . }
Under the analysis entertained in this thesis, however, direct questions, by virtue of
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being interpreted strongly exhaustively, have a more complex underlying representation
than shown in (1)-(2). They also contain a silent only which is merged at the IP-level, that
is, the first scope level of the question nucleus, and which associates with the trace of
moved wh-phrase. The presence of a covert only, a scope bearing element itself, allows for
a second scope position, meaning that quantifiers (QP for short) have the option of QRing
either below or above only, as illustrated in (3).
(3) a. only [QP kissed who]


lowQR: who [2 [Q [only [QP [1 [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
highQR: who [2 [Q [QP [1 [only [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
b. only [who kissed QP]


lowQR: who [1 [Q [only [QP [2 [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
highQR: who [1 [Q [QP [2 [only [t1 kissed t2]]]]]]
Let’s begin by looking at every in both subject and object position and the two possible
readings that come about depending on whether the quantifier QRs below or above only.
The first case we’ll consider is every in subject position, and for transparency, we’ll only look
at what happens below the Q operator, namely what follows p = in the final denotation.
(Since only associates with the trace of the wh-phrase, these LFs should be read as “it’s only
the case that everyone kissed g(2)F”.)1
(4) only [everyone kissed who]
a. only [everyone [1 [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [(∀x(x kissed a))→ (∀x(x kissed g(2))) ⊆ (∀x(x kissed a))]
b. everyone [1 [only [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
∀x[person(x)→ ∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [(x kissed a) → (x kissed g(2)) ⊆ (x kissed a)]]
These LFs yield different truth conditions. (4a) is true in those worlds where the only per-
son who was kissed by everyone is g(2) while (4b) furthermore imposes the restriction that
g(2) be the only person who was kissed; that is, that every person kissed only g(2).2 Observe
that the highQR reading, namely every>only, entails the lowQR reading only>every. When
1We’ll also be ignoring the assertion operator A since its contribution is irrelevant for our present purposes.
2I’m silently assuming that g(2) here can quantify over atoms as well as pluralities, i.e. groups of people,
given that this is generally the assumption we make about the elements that belong to the quantificational
domain of monomorphemic wh-phrases (cf. Dayal 1996).
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we step back and look at what the questionWho did everyone kiss? is asking, we see that the
lowQR construal yields the correct interpretation, since (4a) but not (4b) corresponds to the
salient reading for this question. For example, consider a situation where everybody kissed
Mary and furthermore some, but not all boys also kissed Suzy. There is no individual who
satisfies the highQR LF in this situation since even though Mary is kissed by everyone,
she’s not the only one who was kissed, as required by (4b). Given that in this situation
nobody is not an appropriate answer, but a misleading answer at best, we can conclude that
the highQR reading is disallowed.
Observe that we see a similar contrast in the case in (5), which disallows the inverse
scope reading in (5b).
(5) John didn’t meet every student of mine.
a. not > every
b. *every > not
One proposal for why these readings are systematically ruled out (or strongly dispreferred)
comes from Mayr and Spector (2011), who advocate for a generalized scope economy con-
dition wherein a covert scope shifting operation (QR in this case) cannot apply if the mean-
ing associated with the resulting scopal configuration is equivalent to or stronger than (i.e.
entails) the meaning associated with the surface scope LF, which is the case in both (5b) as
well as the highQR LF for the question.
Turning now to the question in (6), where the wh-phrase c-commands the quantifier, we
derive the two readings in (6a) and (6b), depending on the QR site of the quantifier with
respect to only.
(6) only [who kissed everyone]
a. only [everyone [2 [g(1) kissed t2]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [(∀x(a kissed x))→ (∀x(g(1) kissed a)) ⊆ (∀x(a kissed x))]
b. everyone [2 [only [g(1) kissed t2]]]
∀x[person(x)→ ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [(a kissed x)→ (g(1) kissed x) ⊆ (a kissed x)]]
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Here once again we see that the low QR, (6a), gives rise to a weaker reading, which co-
incides with our interpretation of the corresponding interrogative. (6a) requires that only
g(1) be such that he kissed everyone, while (6b) furthermore requires that no one be kissed
by anyone other than g(1). This second reading where the quantifier QRs above only entails
the low QR reading, and we can rule it out by appealing to the same generalization as
before.
Summing up, it looks that in order to derive the readings corresponding to the informa-
tion sought by the question, the universal quantifier needs to QR below only. One possible
way to enforce the fact that only needs highest scope is by appealing to the generaliza-
tion in Mayr and Spector 2011 regarding scope-shifting operations where it’s claimed that
the grammar rules out the inverse scope LF if the meaning corresponding to it is strictly
stronger than the meaning corresponding to the surface scope LF.
Let’s turn now to existential quantifiers like someone. Here the judgements are much
more subtle, which is mainly due to the nature of indefinites which can also be interpreted
as specific indefinites. We begin by looking at cases where the indefinite is in subject posi-
tion, as in (7):
(7) only [someone kissed who]
a. only [someone [1 [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [∃x(x kissed a)→ ∃x(x kissed g(2)) ⊆ ∃x(x kissed a)]
b. someone [1 [only [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
∃x[people(x) ∧ ∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [x kissed a→ x kissed g(2) ⊆ x kissed a]]
The LFs in (7) correspond to the following two readings: under the lowQR LF in (7a), the
question corresponds to a reading for which the only (group of) person(s) that was kissed
is g(2), while on its highQR LF in (7b) it says that there are some people who kissed only
g(2), without excluding cases where other people were kissed. The lowQR LF gives us
the reading that corresponds most closely to what we ask for when we pose the question
Who was kissed by someone?. As for the reading corresponding to the highQR LF, unlike in
the case of universals, I believe that it too is possible and that in fact constitutes the most
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natural single-pair reading for a question such as Who did one of your friends kiss?. That this
reading would be more salient is due to the fact that indefinites have a tendency to be
interpreted specifically and this is what QRing them high amounts to, a specific reading.
We have two options at this point: we could either give up on the claim that only targets
a special high position wherein quantifiers cannot QR above it, which seemed to be the
conclusion to draw based on the universal data, or we could see if there is another way
to derive the specific reading for indefinites without appealing to highQR. Incidentally,
there is such a way. It is a well documented phenomenon that indefinites appear to exhibit
unusually high scope, namely that their scope-taking abilities don’t seem to be syntactically
constrained in the same manner as that of other quantifiers. It has been argued, however,
that these specific readings do not, necessarily, have to be attributed to the fact that they
undergo high QR. One such proposal is due to Schwarzchild (2002) who claims that we can
still maintain normal scopal behavior (akin to that of universals, say) by taking indefinites
to be existential quantifiers over singleton domains. Taking an indefinite such as one of your
friends to have as its domain a singleton set essentially renders the quantifier scopeless.
The idea is that by virtue of denoting a singleton, whether it QRs above or below a scope-
bearing element will become irrelevant since it would give rise to the same interpretation;
this is essentially identical to treating one of your friends on par with the lifted version of a
definite description which we know to be immune to scope. Suffice it to say, the fact that
indefinites exhibit highQR-like readings is not necessarily a reflection of their syntactic
behavior. We can thus continue to assume that indefinites, just like universals, QR below
only, but that unlike universals, they also have the option of quantifying over singleton
domains, giving rise to a second possible reading.
The same situation seems to hold when the indefinite is in object position, as in (8):
(8) only [who kissed someone]
a. only [someone [2 [g(1) kissed t2]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [∃x(a kissed x)→ ∃x(g(1) kissed x) ⊆ ∃x(a kissed x)]
b. someone [2 [only [g(1) kissed t2]]]
∃x[person(x) ∧ ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [a kissed x→ g(1) kissed x ⊆ a kissed x]]
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Here again we see that the lowQR LF more closely corresponds to the non-specific reading
of the indefinite, while the highQR LF gives us the interpretation for the specific reading.
(8a) says that only g(1) did any kissing, while (8b) says that there is someone that only g(1)
kissed, but doesn’t exclude other kissing situations by non g(1) people. Just like before, I
claim that the specific reading in these cases comes about via the same lowQR LF in (8a),
with the difference being that the domain of the existential is a singleton.
Lastly, when we look at negative quantifiers we see that the same condition holds true
in these cases, namely that only requires highest scope within the question IP.
(9) only [nobody kissed who]
a. only [nobody [1 [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [¬∃x(x kissed a)→ ¬∃x(x kissed g(2)) ⊆ ¬∃x(x kissed a)]
b. nobody [1 [only [t1 kissed g(2)]]]
¬∃x[people(x) ∧ ∀a∈A lt(g(2)) [x kissed a→ x kissed g(2) ⊆ x kissed a]]
For the question corresponding to (9), Who did nobody kiss?, only (9a) is a possible reading;
(9a) says that nobody kissed g(2) while (9b) says that nobody is such that they kissed only
g(2), which is clearly not the reading we get for such questions. Similarly for (10):
(10) only [who kissed nobody]
a. only [nobody [2 [g(1) kissed t2]]]
∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [¬∃x(a kissed x)→ ¬∃x(g(1) kissed x) ⊆ ¬∃x(a kissed x)]
b. nobody [2 [only [g(1) kissed t2]]]
¬∃x[person(x) ∧ ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [a kissed x→ g(1) kissed x ⊆ a kissed x]]
(10a) corresponds to a reading that picks out the (group of) individual(s) that kissed no-
body, as requested by the question. (10b), on the other hand, selects the individuals who
are such that they are not the only ones who kissed someone, i.e., the people who kissed
someone who was also kissed by somebody else. This reading is clearly not available for
such questions.
In summary, we have shown that when it comes to the relative scope of quantifier
phrases and the silent operator only I claim to be present in direct questions, only always
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ends up receiving highest scope. Despite the availability of two QR positions for the quan-
tifiers, the only possible reading is that which corresponds to the lowQR LF. In the case
of universal quantifiers we saw that independently motivated constraints, such as the one
proposed in Mayr and Spector (2011), can help us understand why interpretations corre-
sponding to the highQR LF are not possible. On the other hand, in the case of indefinites,
it looked as if both low and high QR gave rise to acceptable readings. We saw, however,
that by appealing to an analysis of existentials as quantifiers over singleton domains we
could derive both readings solely on the basis of a lowQR LF. And lastly, in the case of
negative quantifiers, similarly to universals quantifiers, we noted that only the lowQR LF
corresponds to the information sought by the corresponding question. We can conclude
from the data presented above that only requires highest scope. This constraint could be
due to a semantic restriction on scope, a` la Mayr and Spector (2011), or it could also be due
to a syntactic requirement that takes only to target a special high position in the clause,
possibly one that is too high for QR.
3.2 NPIs in the scope of questions
Recall the generalization made in Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007: NPIs are acceptable in a
question only if the question is interpreted as strongly exhaustive. The authors showed
that under the account of questions they were assuming, there was no way to substantiate
this generalization by appealing to what we already know about the licensing of NPIs,
namely that they are acceptable only if in the scope of a downward entailing operator.
They were hence forced to assume that a multi-layered approach is needed in order to
account for the acceptability of NPIs: NPIs would thus be sensitive to entailment reversal
in declarative sentences, but to strength of exhaustivity in interrogatives.
One of the goals of this thesis is to show that we can maintain a “one-layered” ap-
proach to account for the distribution of NPIs: NPIs are sensitive to entailment reversal in
both declaratives and interrogatives. This proposal hinges on the claim I made in the pre-
vious chapter that strength of exhaustivity is encoded at the level of the question nucleus,
rather than via different answer-hood operators. By taking the difference in strength to be
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contingent on the presence versus absence of a silent only-like operator and recognizing
that only is a Strawson-DE operator, we will have essentially gone from a description of the
facts, namely Guerzoni and Sharvit’s claim that strength is relevant for NPI licensing, to an
explanation of these facts. Informally, the layout of the argument will be as follows. If the
acceptability of NPIs is, in a sense to be spelled-out later, dependent on the monotonicity
of their environment, and only reverses the entailment pattern, we should be able to show
that the embedded IP is the level at which NPI licensing either works, in the case of se
questions see (11a), or fails, in the case of we readings see (11b).
(11) a. NPI licensed
IPse
only
λw
t[f]
atew anything
b. NPI not licensed
IPwe
λw
t
atew anything
In its simplest form, the argument is that NPIs are licensed in se questions for the same
reason they are licensed in the declarative corresponding to the question IP, namely (12).
(12) Only John[f] ate anything.
Similarly, we can account for their unacceptability in we questions by noting their unac-
ceptability in (13b), the declarative counterpart of (12b).
(13) *John ate anything.
By reducing the behavior of NPIs in questions to their behavior of declaratives, this
account requires no additional machinery to derive the (un)acceptability of NPIs. That is,
whatever analysis one uses to account for the acceptability of NPIs in the scope of only
in regular declaratives will carry over to account for their behavior in strongly exhaustive
questions. The facts, however, are not quite as straightforward, and to that we turn to next.
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3.2.1 A contrast in questions with NPIs
Observe the contrast in (14) where it appears that the relative base position of the wh-phrase
and the NPI has an effect on the acceptability of these questions. Namely, if the NPI is not
c-commanded by the wh-phrase, the only possible reading is that of a rhetorical, emphatic,
question.3 For the remainder of this section, a starred question is one that cannot receive a
non-emphatic interpretation.
(14) a. Who ate anything at the party yesterday?
b. *What did anybody eat at the party yesterday?
To adduce support to this generalization, and furthermore reinforce the fact that this
is not simply a constraint against having any in subject position, observe the facts in (15)
where the NPI acts as the object of a ditransitive verb. Han and Siegel (1997) note that an
NPI is acceptable in a DOC only if it acts as the indirect object and the wh-phrase as the
direct object, namely, if the NPI is c-commanded by the wh-phrase in their base positions.4
(15) a. Who did Jeff introduce to anyone at the party?
b. *Who did Jeff introduce anyone to at the party?
Yet more evidence that this contrast is real comes from looking at adverbial NPIs like ever
which too appear sensitive to their position relative to the base position of the wh-phrase.
(16) a. Which girls have ever visited Paris?
b. *Which girls did John ever kiss?
Further reinforcing the fact that this contrast is related to the interaction between the NPI
and the wh-word, and not a constraint against having NPIs in subject position in questions,
note that in polar questions NPIs may serve as either the subject or object, without giving
rise to unacceptability:
3Rhetorical questions differ from regular constituent questions in that they are not information-seeking,
basically being used for declarative purposes, suggesting that they ought to be given a different analysis to
begin with. I will not discuss such questions in this thesis but the interested reader can consult Han 2002,
Abels 2003, Guerzoni 2004 and Caponigro and Sprouse 2007, among others.
4Recall that direct objects asymmetrically c-command indirect objects in DOCs (cf. Barss and Lasnik 1986,
Bruening 2001).
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(17) a. Did you eat anything?
b. Did anyone eat the cake?
The goal of any theory of questions that aims to account for the behavior of NPIs is to
explain why NPIs receive non-emphatic interpretations in constituent questions only when
the wh-phrase c-commands the NPI in their base positions, as summarize in (18).
(18) a. !wh>NPI acceptable
b. ∗NPI>wh ruled out
Recall that, informally, the analysis we’re pursuing here takes the acceptability of NPIs in
a question to depend on their acceptability in the declarative corresponding to the ques-
tion IP. Since direct questions are always interpreted exhaustively, that is to say, there is no
weak/strong exhaustivity distinction, the questions in (14) will correspond to the declara-
tives in (19), respectively.
(19) a. It’s only the case that x ate anything.
b. It’s only the case that anyone ate x.
At this point we need to understand what it is about (19b) that makes the corresponding
question unacceptable under a non-emphatic interpretation. Intuitively, the solution seems
pretty straightforward: in (19b) but not in (19a) the NPI linearly intervenes between the
covert only and its associate, the wh-trace. However, what still needs to be done in order for
this analysis to hold any water is to substantiate this generalization by showing how it can
be derived compositionally. Essentially, we want the argument to go as follows:
! When the NPI is c-commanded by the wh-phrase, it ends up interpreted in the scope of
only, which creates a downward entailing context, as required by the NPI
! When the NPI c-commands the wh-phrase, it ends up being interpreted outside the
scope of only, hence in a non-DE environment, rendering the NPI unacceptable
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3.2.1.1 The problem
Let’s begin by taking a closer look at the underlying structures of these types of questions.
Recall that we’re dealing with a quantifier, the NPI, which needs to undergo QR. The key
to the solution is where the NPI QRs to with respect to only. In the following LFs I illustrate
the three possible landing sites for the NPI, either below only (a.), above only but below the
wh-phrase (b.), or above the wh-phrase (c.):
(20) only [who likes anyone]
a. lowQR: who [1 [Q [only [anyone [2 [t1 likes t2]]]]]
b. midQR: who [1 [Q [anyone [2 [only [t1 likes t2]]]]]
c. highQR: anyone [2 [who [1 [Q [only [t1 likes t2]]]]]
(21) only [anyone likes who]
a. lowQR: who [2 [Q [only [anyone [1 [t1 likes t2]]]]]
b. midQR: who [2 [Q [anyone [1 [only [t1 likes t2]]]]]
c. highQR: anyone [1 [who [2 [Q [only [t1 likes t2]]]]]
The question we need to ask ourselves now is the following: is each landing site pos-
sible, and if not, what rules it out? Recall from the previous section where we argued that
quantifiers appear to be ruled out from QRing above only for interpretive reasons: QRing
a quantifier above only, be it an existential or a universal, is going to give rise to a non-
existent reading. In effect, the conclusion we drew in the last section is that only needs to
be an operator with highest scope in the nucleus of the question; that is, an operator that
applies to the matrix IP. Having established that, we can now eliminate the (b.) and (c.) LFs
from our pool of possible alternatives, leaving us solely with the following LFs:
(22) only [who likes anyone]
LF: who [1 [Q [only [anyone [2 [t1 likes t2]]]]]
(23) only [anyone likes who]
LF: who [2 [Q [only [anyone [1 [t1 likes t2]]]]]
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As discussed at the beginning of the section, there is a contrast between (22) and (23)
in terms of their acceptability. (23) is unacceptable and the consensus in the literature is
that this is due to the fact that the wh-phrase does not c-command the NPI in their base
positions. However, as it stands, nothing in our arsenal of constraints helps us distinguish
between the two LFs above. What I mean by that is that where the NPI is with respect to the
trace of the wh-phrase is not predicted to matter since the NPI ends up being interpreted in
the DE environment created by only regardless of whether it is the subject or object; so we
falsely predict it to be licensed. We can see this by looking at the formulas in (24), which
correspond to the two LFs in (22) and (23), and noting that both are downward entailing
with respect to D.5
(24) a. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D like(a,x)→ (∃x∈D like(y,x) ⊆ ∃x∈D like(a,x))]
b. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D like(x,a)→ (∃x∈D like(x,y) ⊆ ∃x∈D like(x,a))]
And yet we know that (23) is unacceptable, contrary to what is predicted if the low QR LF
is available in cases where the NPI is not c-commanded by the trace of the wh-phrase; that
is, if (23) receives the interpretation in (24b) then we are out of luck (see fn 4). The goal then
is to pin point what other independently motivated constraint we can use to rule out the
low QR configuration in cases where the NPI c-commands the wh-phrase so as to derive
the fact that such questions are unacceptable, i.e. that they cannot receive the interpretation
in (24b).
One could say then that we are at an impasse, as it appears that our way of construing
strongly exhaustive questions over-generates: while it accounts for the acceptability of NPIs
in such questions, (22), it also wrongly predicts that NPIs should be acceptable in strongly
exhaustive questions across the board, (23). Fortunately for us, however, the analysis is not
5Let’s prove that (24b) is downward entailing with respect to D. In order to do so we need to show that (ia)
entails (ib), where D’ is a subset of D.
(i) a. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D like(x,a)→ (∃x∈D like(x,y) ⊆ ∃x∈D like(x,a))]
b. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D’ like(x,a)→ (∃x∈D’ like(x,y) ⊆ ∃x∈D’ like(x,a))]
We proceed with a proof by contradiction. Assume that (ia) is true and (ib) is false. For (ib) to be false, by the
rules of logic, it must be the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For the consequent to be
false, however, it has to be the case that ∃x∈D’ like(x,a)) is false, namely that its own consequent is false. But
we already assumed that the antecedent of (ib), ∃x∈D’ like(x,a)), is true, so how can it be the case that ∃x∈D’
like(x,a)) is false. We have thus shown that (ia) cannot be true while (ib) is false.
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as simple as I have made it out to be up to this point. Namely, the careful reader will
have noticed that so far we have completely ignored the question of how exactly NPIs are
“licensed”. For ease of exposition I have simply been assuming that NPIs are acceptable
whenever they appear in a DE environment, which served our purposes just fine up to
this point. That NPIs are licensed in DE environments, however, is simply a description
of the facts and provides no explanatory value; not to mention that it makes the wrong
predictions in some cases, such as the ones we are concerned with here.
In the following section I will show why taking seriously the issue of how NPIs are
licensed will provide us with the necessary tools to rule out the unacceptable configuration
in (23). By taking the distribution of NPIs to be governed by the interplay between their
activation of alternatives and a grammatical requirement that alternatives be used up by
an exhaustifying operator, the problematic configuration will fall out as a violation of the
constraint against crossing dependencies. In section 3.2.1.3 I pursue a different way of
thinking about this contrast which relies heavily on the notion of superiority and aims
to connect the unavailability of NPI>wh configurations to the unavailability of pair-list
readings for questions with quantifiers whenever the quantifier is c-commanded by the
wh-phrase in their base positions.
3.2.1.2 An intervention account
As mentioned above, the account I will provide for the contrast in (25) relies on the
exhaustification-based analysis of NPIs that I have outlined in the introductory chapter.
(25) a. Who ate anything?
b. *What did anybody eat?
Recall the structure of the argument, repeated from Chapter 1. NPIs have the semantics
of regular existential quantifiers with the only difference being that they are additionally
endowed with obligatorily active (scalar and domain) alternatives, as shown in (26a-b).
Grammar encodes the presence of alternatives via a feature on the item, call it [d], and
their need to be used up (since alternatives need to be incorporated into the meaning)
by requiring all items that bear such features to enter into an agree relationship with an
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alternative-exhaustifying operator that bears the same feature, call it E xh[d]. Besides check-
ing the feature on the NPI, this exhaustifier also has a semantic contribution, given in (26c),
namely that of negating all non-entailed alternatives.
(26) a. anything = λP. ∃x∈D [thing(x) ∧ P(x)]
b. anythingA lt = {λP. ∃x∈D’ [thing(x) ∧ P(x)]: D’⊆D}
c. E xh = λp. λw. p(w) ∧ ∀q∈A lt(p) [q→ p⊆q]
In such a system, the fact that NPIs end up being acceptable only in DE environments
falls out without having to stipulate a licensing by DE-operators condition. Once we take
into account the nature of the alternatives (subdomains) and the semantics of the exhaus-
tifying operator, we see that in UE environments a contradiction will ensue, while its con-
tribution in DE contexts is vacuous and simply returns the assertion.
(27) a. *E xh[d] [UE . . . anything[d] . . . ] contradiction
b. E xh[d] [DE . . . anything[d] . . . ] vacuous
Returning now to the issue of NPIs in questions, I claim that we can account for the
unacceptable cases by looking at the interaction between focus association of covert only
with the wh-trace, and the exhaustification of the NPI. Specifically, the unacceptability of
(25b) will turn out to be due to conflicting requirements between the syntactic constraints
that govern agreement relations and the semantics of the operators involved.
Consider the two questions in (28) and (29). For each question we have to consider the
two possible LFs that come about as a result of adjoining E xh[d] either below or above
only[f], which, recall, is obligatorily present in direct questions given that they are always
interpreted strongly exhaustive.
(28) Who ate anything?
a. only[f] [E xh[d] [t[f] ate anything[d]]] crossing dependencies
b. E xh[d] [only[f] [t[f] ate anything[d]]] nesting dependencies
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(29) What did anyone eat?
a. only[f] [E xh[d] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]] nesting dependencies
b. E xh[d] [only[f] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]] crossing dependencies
What we see above is that the relative position of the NPI and the wh-trace dictates the
relative adjunction sites of the two covert operators in terms of what type of dependency
is created. Assuming that crossing dependencies are ruled out by the syntax (cf. Pesetsky
1982, Kitahara 1997), and that the acceptability of a structure depends on the satisfaction
of both syntactic and semantic constraints, we can put aside the cases where we have
crossing dependencies and look only at the nesting dependencies to check whether the
semantics gives rise to a coherent interpretation. When we consider configurations with
nesting dependencies it is generally assumed that the outer dependency is evaluated with
respect to the result of the innermost one. In other words, for our purposes, we can assume
that the most embedded dependency is calculated first, the results of which I outline below.
In (28b), we first take care of the [only[f] . . . g(1)[f]] dependency, as in (30a), and then the
[E xh[d] . . . anyone[d]] dependency, as in (30b).
(30) E xh[d] [only[f] [g(1)[f] ate anything[d]]]
a. only[f] [g(1)[f] ate anything[d]]
= ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [∃x∈D(a ate x)→ ∃x∈D(g(1) ate x) ⊆ ∃x∈D(a ate x)]]
b. E xh[d] [only [g(1) ate anything[d]]]
= ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [∃x∈D(a ate x)→ ∃x∈D(g(1) ate x) ⊆ ∃x∈D(a ate x)]]
Since the [only[f] . . . g(1)[f]] dependency is calculated first, this creates a downward entailing
environment, by virtue of the semantics of only, as in (30a). This means that when it comes
to calculating the [E xh[d] . . . anyone[d]] dependency, the NPI will end up being interpreted
as a regular indefinite given that the exhaustification of its alternatives is vacuous, as in
(30b).6 This is precisely the meaning corresponding to this question: who are the people
who ate something.
6Recall that exhaustification is vacuous whenever the alternatives are entailed.
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Turning now to (29a), repeated below in (31), we see that we are now dealing with
the reverse situation. We first have to take care of the [E xh[d] . . . anyone[d]] dependency,
followed by the [only[f] . . . g(1)[f]] dependency, the steps of which I spelled out below.
(31) only[f] [E xh[d] [anyone[d] ate g(1)[f]]]
a. E xh[d] [anyone[d] ate g(1)[f]]
= ∃x∈D(x ate g(1)) ∧ ∀D’⊆D ¬∃x∈D’(x ate g(1)) = ⊥
b. only[f] [E xh [anyone ate g(1)[f]]] = ⊥
Here we see that syntactically, the NPI needs to be exhaustified before only has been able to
apply and create the DE environment necessary for the NPI’s consistent exhaustification,
rendering it ungrammatical. In a sense, the NPI is checked for semantic coherence to the
exclusion of only, showing that just because the NPI is c-commanded by a DE-creating
operator does not ensure that the environment supports downward entailing inferences
at every single node in its c-commanding domain.7 Given that the NPI is exhaustified
in an upward entailing environment, a contradiction will ensue even before the second
dependency can be calculated, thus rendering the entire construction unacceptable.
Putting these observations together, as in (32), we can see straight away why NPIs give
rise to unacceptable questions when not c-commanded by the wh-trace: of the four possible
LFs, only one of them satisfies both the syntactic and semantic constraints discussed above.
(32) a. Who ate anything?
i. only[f] [E xh[d] [t[f] ate anything[d]]]
ii. E xh[d] [only[f] [t[f] ate anything[d]]]
b. What did anyone eat?
i. only[f] [E xh[d] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]]
ii. E xh[d] [only[f] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]]
syntax semantics overall
✗ ✗ ✗
✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✗ ✗
✗ ✓ ✗
7Basically, the NPI is too close to the DE operator for it to have the necessary effects.
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One might worry at this point about the prediction made by assuming this exhausti-
fication -based account of NPIs, namely the fact that we must now assume that only does
not, necessarily, have highest scope, as proposed in the last section. This should not be
a problem though, since the E xh operator is vacuous and does not affect the semantics.
The constraint on highest scope for only could thus be reformulated so as to require that
we ultimately end up with a set of mutually exclusive propositions. In other words, what
we took to be a syntactic constraint up till now, could in fact be a semantic one. That
this is possibly a better formulation relates back to the claims made in the previous chap-
ter where we discussed the selectional requirements of question-embedding predicates. I
claimed that surprise-like predicates cannot embed se questions due to a presupposition
they carry which requires their sister to denote a set of propositions such that some plural
subset of it needs to consist of mutually compatible propositions.
A possible follow-up question could be to ask whether we can rule out the problematic
constructions on purely semantic grounds. In other words, is there a way we can think
of the syntactic constraint on crossing dependencies in terms of a violation of semantic
principles? One such possibility would be to say that covert only is an un-selective binder.
What that would mean is that in (32b.ii) only would not be able to “skip over” the NPI’s
alternatives as it targets the trace, that is, it would operate unselectively on both sets of
alternatives. Given that the NPI’s alternatives are all stronger than the assertion, only op-
erating on them amounts to negating them all, which would result in a crash. Basically,
the ungrammaticality of (32b.ii) could be attributed to the same factors that rule out a
declarative such as Only anyone came to the party. In (32a.ii), however, only can stop once it
hits its target, meaning that it is not forced to enter into an agree relation with any lower
alternative-bearing items as long as it hits its target.
In conclusion, we have shown that the unacceptable constructions are those where the
only semantically coherent interpretation would arise by assuming a configuration with
crossing dependencies, which is independently ruled out on syntactic grounds (and pos-
sibly semantic grounds as well). For this type of account to hold, we had to assume that
NPIs need to enter into an agree relation with an exhaustifying operator E xh (cf. Chierchia,
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2012) and furthermore that a covert only needs to associate with the wh-trace. This section
is entitled “an intervention account” because it appeals to the same principles used to rule
out cases such as (33), which involve the intervention of a universal quantifier between the
NPI and the DE-creating operator (cf. Linebarger 1980, Gajewski 2011, among others).8
(33) *Mary didn’t tell everybody to buy any books.
While the problem here is of a different nature, the solution is essentially the same: the
interplay between the syntactic constraint against crossing dependencies and the seman-
tic requirements of the exhaustifiers. Simplifying a bit for ease of exposition, assume that
all quantifiers are endowed with active scalar alternatives, represented by the feature [σ],
which must be exhaustified by an operator that eliminates all non-entailed alternatives,
E xh[σ]. In the case of everybody, its scalar alternative will be the existential, as in (34a). If
exhaustification occurs above negation, the alternatives become stronger and their exhaus-
tification gives rise to a scalar implicature, as in (34b).
(34) a. everyoneA lt = {λP. ∀x [person(x)→ P(x)], λP. ∃x [person(x) ∧ P(x)]}
b. E xh[σ] Mary didn’t see everybody[σ] = ¬∀x [person(x)→ saw(Mary, x)] ∧
E xh[σ] Mary didn’t see everybody[σ] = ∃x [person(x) ∧ saw(Mary,x)]
So returning to the intervention cases, we see that just as before, in the presence of two
distinct dependencies, we expect two possible LFs, depending on the relative order of the
two exhaustifiers, as illustrated in (35). Of these two LFs, however, only one conforms to
the syntactic requirement of non-crossing dependencies, namely (35a). The problem with
this configuration, however, is that the scalar implicature is calculated first, meaning that
by the point the exhaustification of the NPI takes place, the environment will no longer be
DE, but rather non-monotonic (see (34b)), which renders its exhaustification contradictory.
In (35b) the exhaustification of the NPI is calculated before the implicature associated with
everybody is included, resulting in a semantically coherent LF. The problem with this LF
though, as mentioned, is that it requires crossing dependencies, which are ruled out inde-
8Such sentences can, however, receive an acceptable interpretation if the intervening quantifier “moves
out” the path of negation, in other words, if it receives wide scope. For this sentence, this reading would be
something along the lines of “everyone is such that Mary didn’t tell them to buy any books.”
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pendently by the syntax.
(35) *Mary didn’t give everybody anything.
a. E xh[d] E xh[σ] Mary didn’t give everybody[σ] anything[d]
b. E xh[σ] E xh[d] Mary didn’t give everybody[σ] anything[d]
syn sem all
✓ ✗ ✗
✗ ✓ ✗
There is a preponderance of such instances in the literature on polarity items, including in-
tervention by presuppositional elements (cf. Homer (2011) and Chierchia (2012) on how to
implement these fact within an alternative-based approach), as well as the peculiar behav-
ior that governs the co-occurence of PPIs and NPIs discussed in Homer (2011) and Nicolae
(2012).
3.2.1.3 A superiority account
Questions with quantifiers can also give rise to pair-list readings of the type in (36b), be-
sides their regular single-pair reading in (36a).
(36) What did everyone eat?
a. sp: Everyone ate pizza.
b. pl: Mary ate cake, John ate pizza and Bill ate salad.
While the single pair answer is always a possible answer to a question with a quantifier, the
pair list reading is only available if the quantifier c-commands the wh-trace, as in (36). For
(37), where the wh-trace c-commands the quantifier, the pair list answer is not a possible
answer:
(37) Who ate everything?
a. sp: Mary ate everything.
b. pl: *Mary ate cake, John ate pizza and Bill ate salad.
While single pair answers come about via short QR of the quantifier under the question
operator, that is, within the question nucleus, as in (38a) and (39a), pair list answers are
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claimed to come about as a result of quantifying-in; that is, as a result of QR’ing the quan-
tifier to a position above the wh-phrase, as in (38b) and (39b)9:
(38) What did everyone eat?
a. LF-sp: what [2 [Q [only [everyone [1 [t1 ate t2]]]]]]
b. LF-pl: everyone [1 [what [2 [Q [only [t1 ate t2]]]]]]
(39) Who ate everything?
a. LF-sp: who [1 [Q [only [everything [2 [t1 ate t2]]]]]]
b. LF-pl: everything [2 [who [1 [Q [only [t1 ate t2]]]]]] ←ruled out!
If quantifying-in is what gives rise to pair-list readings, why is (39b) not a possible
LF for (39)? One account for this contrast was offered by Chierchia (1993) who attributes
the unavailability of (39b) to the same principle that rules out weak crossover effects in
declaratives with quantifiers. For example, (40) cannot receive the interpretation that would
result under the indexing given below because the binder, the quantifier everybody, needs
to crossover at LF its intended bindee, the pronominal his mother, thus giving rise to a weak
crossover violation.
(40) *His motheri loves everybodyi.
Chierchia shows that we can carry over this analysis to account for the unavailability of
pair-list readings for questions where the wh-trace c-commands the quantifiers, as in (39b).
In order for these cases to be parallel, however, it’s crucial that wh-traces are analyzed as
functional traces, meaning that they are co-indexed with both the moved wh-phrase, as
well as the quantifier, as in (41).10 Under this assumption, (39b) becomes a case of weak
crossover since the quantifier, the binder, crosses over its bindee, the wh-trace t21.
(41) LF-pl: everything [2 [who [1 [Q [only [t21 ate t2]]]]]]
9The LFs I provide for pair-list readings in this section are greatly simplified. We will return to these
questions in Chapter 6 where I provide a compositional analysis for how these readings are derived.
10The move to functional traces is independently assumed to be necessary in order to deal with the functional
reading of these questions.
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One other possible way to rule out this reading for questions is offered by Fox (2012)
who claims that we can think about the problematic cases as a type of superiority violation.
Namely, he wants to derive the lack of pair-list readings in wh>QP questions as a violation
of superiority since the relative order of these elements within the CP projection does not
respect their base-positions at LF. Specifically, looking at (41) we see that in order to derive
the pair-list reading, everything must move to a position that c-commands who, which is the
opposite of the c-commanding relation established within the question nucleus, namely
under Q. His account is meant to deal specifically with the asymmetry observed with pair-
list readings for questions with quantifiers. I claim that we can extend his account a step
further so as to also cover the asymmetry with NPIs in regular single-pair readings. Under
such an extension, the proposal would be that superiority is checked not only with respect
to copies within the CP projection, as Fox crucially assumes for his account, but rather with
respect to all copies that end up being interpreted, irrespective of their landing positions.
Reiterating, his account can only make predictions for questions that receive pair-list read-
ings since that is the only instance when the quantifier will end up in the CP projection.
In other words, his account would only be able to account for the unacceptability of the
pair-list reading for What did anybody read?, having nothing to say about the unavailability
of the single-pair reading.
Extending his proposal for the present cases would go as follows: the linearization of
the highest copies of the wh-phrase and the quantifier needs to respect the linearization
of their lower copies, namely their traces. If the wh-phrase c-commands the quantifier in
their base positions, at LF the head of the wh chain needs to c-command the head of the
quantifier chain. Similarly, if the wh-phrase is c-commanded by the quantifier in their base
positions, at LF the head of the wh chain needs to be c-commanded by the head of the
quantifier chain.11
This constraint would derive the unavailability of pair-list readings for questions where
the quantifier is c-commanded by the wh-phrase in their base positions, as already ar-
gued by Fox. It would, furthermore, also rule out the problematic single-pair answers for
11It’s crucial that this be a constraint specific to wh-phrases or else we would predict that scope ambiguities
could never arise, at least not syntactically.
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questions with NPIs. Specifically, we saw that if the NPI c-commands the wh-phrase, the
single-pair answer is unavailable. If we assume that the landing sites of quantifiers need
to respect the relative order of their respective traces, the contrast between the two LFs in
(42) would be derived straightforwardly: (42a) can receive a single-pair answer while (42b)
cannot.
(42) a. Who likes anybody?
LF-sp: who [1 [Q [only [anyone [2 [t1 likes t2]]]]]]
b. *Who does anyone like?
LF-sp: who [2 [Q [only [anyone [1 [t1 likes t2]]]]]] ←ruled out!
We predict then that (42b) should only receive a pair-list reading, but since that would
require the NPI to have wide scope and thus be interpreted outside the scope of only, this
reading would be ruled out for the same reason that NPIs are ruled out in UE environ-
ments.
This account, however, is slightly more powerful than the one proposed by Fox in that it
furthermore predicts that certain questions should never allow single-pair answers. While
Fox’s account was applicable only to pair-list readings, the present one extends to single-
pair readings as well since it doesn’t look only at copies within the CP projection any
more. Specifically, when we look at questions where the wh-phrase is c-commanded by
the quantifier, we predict that the only available LF should be one where the quantifier is
interpreted above the wh-phrase, meaning that the only possible answer to such questions
should be the pair-list answer. This is not right though, since we showed at the beginning
of this section, also repeated below, that such questions can easily receive a single pair
answer as well.
(43) What did everyone eat?
a. LF-sp: what [2 [Q [only [everyone [1 [t1 ate t2]]]]]] ←ruled out?
Everybody ate pizza.
b. LF-pl: everyone [1 [what [2 [Q [only [t1 ate t2]]]]]]
Mary ate pizza, John ate salad and Bill ate cake.
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In order to reconcile this analysis with the empirical facts, we would thus have to
claim that what appears to be a single pair reading is in fact one possible reading of the
pair list answer, namely the case where every single person ate the same thing; in other
words, we are not dealing with a real structural ambiguity here, unlike what has generally
been assumed. Essentially, this account commits us to a proposal wherein there are no
true single-pair answers to questions with quantifiers when the quantifier c-commands
the wh-phrase; that is, such questions will always denote, depending on the analysis of
quantifying-in we end up adopting, either lifted questions or a family of questions, but
in either case a higher type than regular questions. So the obvious next step would be to
see if we can find situations where quantifying-in/pair-list are blocked, but single-pair are
possible, since under this account the two should be, in a sense, interchangeable. One such
example is (44), which can receive either a single-pair or functional reading, but definitely
not a pair-list reading, contrary to what our account predicts:
(44) Who does nobody like?
a. Nobody likes their mother in law.
b. Nobody likes Susan.
c. *John doesn’t like Susan, Bill doesn’t like Mary, . . . .
More generally, this issue is always going to arise when dealing with downward entailing
quantifiers since this account predicts that they should be able to quantify into a question
for the purposes of obtaining the single-pair or functional reading. But this cannot be
possible since a quantifying-in analysis would require us to specify for no person who
they like. One possible fix for this, which, understandably, would undermine the overall
viability of the system, would be to adopt a principle such as the one in (45). Doing so
would allow us to revert to low QR even when that would lead to a superiority violation
as defined in this case.
(45) If it’s sensible to quantify in, you must
In essence, the idea is that superiority can be violated whenever the alternative, namely
quantifying-in, is semantically ruled out. It’s not sensible to quantify-in DE quantifiers,
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since asking a question about no person is not reasonable. Note that this principle would
have to be sensitive only to the quantificational force of the quantifier, meaning that it
would only be applicable to DE quantifiers and not to NPIs, which, for all intents and
purposes, are regular existential quantifiers and should thus be able to quantify-in without
a problem. Another issue with this account is that it wrongly predicts that for John to
know the single-pair answer to a question, namely (46a), he needs to know the pair-list
answer as well, (46b). This doesn’t seem to be quite right, however, since John could easily
be completely ignorant about the identity of the eaters.
(46) John knows what everybody ate.
a. John knows that everybody ate pizza.
b. John knows that Mary ate pizza, that Bill ate pizza and that Fred ate pizza.
It might, ultimately, turn out that this account is not feasible, especially given the issues
brought up above. However, even if we do give up on this account, we can still maintain
Fox’s superiority proposal (limited to the extended CP projection) to account for the un-
availability of pair-list readings for quantifiers in object position. In other words, the initial
version of the superiority story might be right even if we decide to stick with the inter-
vention analysis in order to account for the subject-object asymmetry with NPIs. We will
return to issues pertaining to quantifiers in questions in Chapter 6.
3.2.1.4 A previous account: Han and Siegel (1997)
Up to date, the most detailed account for the asymmetry in (47) is due to Han and Siegel
1997.
(47) a. Who ate anything?
b. *What did anybody eat?
The authors assume a Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) analysis of questions wherein ques-
tions denote partitions, but argue that their proposal is also compatible with a semantics of
questions which takes them to denote sets of possible answers. To facilitate this discussion,
I will present their account in a Hamblin/Karttunen style. They assume the questions in
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(47) denote the sets of answers in (48a) and (48b), respectively.
(48) a.


Nobody ate anything,
Mary ate anything,
John ate anything,
...


b.


Anybody ate nothing,
Anybody ate cake,
Anybody ate salad,
...


Their proposal is quite brilliant in its simplicity. The idea is that what is responsible for the
licensing of the NPI in (48a) but not in (48b) is the availability of a proposition in the answer
set in which the NPI is licensed, namely the negative proposition nobody ate anything. They
claim that whenever the NPI is c-commanded by the wh-phrase in their base positions, one
of the possible answers is going to be the proposition in which the NPI is c-commanded
by a negative quantifier. Given that NPIs are licensed by negative quantifiers in regular
declaratives, the acceptability of NPIs in these questions would fall out instantly. On the
other hand, whenever the NPI is not c-commanded by the wh-phrase, no answer, not even
the one with a negative quantifier, would constitute a proposition in which the NPI is
licensed, as seen by the form of the answers in (48b).
This account, while elegant in its simplicity, suffers from a number of pitfalls. Among
them is the crucial reliance on the presence of negative answers. In order for this asym-
metry to hold, Han and Siegel need to assume that question denotations contain negative
answers. This, however, goes against what is generally assumed to be the case. As we dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, questions carry an existence presupposition (be it due to
an answer-hood operator or a filter), meaning that negative answers will never actually be
part of the denotation of the question. There are, of course, cases where negative answers
are felicitous. In order to account for the felicity of a discourse such as in (49), the gen-
eral take has been to assume that negative answers implicitly deny the presupposition of
the question, rather than actually answering it (cf. Dayal 1996, Comorovski 1996, among
others).
(49) Who ate cake?
Nobody did.
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Dayal points out a contrast with cleft questions to illustrate this more clearly. The idea here
is that cleft constructions carry a conversational implicature that it is part of the common
ground that somebody ate cake, making a negative answer infelicitous since the hearer
cannot implicitly deny a presupposition that he himself holds in his common ground.
(50) Who is it that ate cake?
#Nobody did.
Note, furthermore, that NPIs are perfectly fine even in cleft questions, despite the fact that
they are unacceptable in the corresponding declaratives.
(51) a. Who was it that brought any veggie dishes to the reception?
b. *It was John who brought any veggies dishes.
The fact that NPIs are acceptable in questions that otherwise disallow negative answers,
suggests that an account of the acceptability of NPIs that relies on the availability of a
negative answer cannot, at best, be the whole story.
Another issue that arrises with Han and Siegel’s account is the fact that it has nothing
to say about the weak/strong exhaustivity distinction and why that seems to play a role in
the acceptability of NPIs. Given the way they set up their proposal, it is hard to imagine
how they would deal with we questions other than by possibly claiming that we questions
do not allow negative answers, an otherwise purely stipulative move.
Finally, I’d like to point out another set of data that, as far as I can tell, has not been
discussed in the literature on NPIs in interrogatives. This concerns so-called strong NPIs
which have a more restricted distribution than the any/ever-type NPIs. Among these strong
NPIs we find in weeks and either. Just like any and ever, they are ruled out in positive contexts
and acceptable in the scope of negation and negative quantifiers.
(52) a. Mary has *(not) seen John in weeks/either.12
b. Nobody has talked to me in weeks/either.
c. Mary has *(not) seen anybody.
12A star before parentheses indicates that the sentence is unacceptable without the element in the parenthe-
ses.
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d. Nobody ever talked to anybody.
Unlike any and ever, however, they are not acceptable in the scope of few and only, as shown
below.
(53) a. Few students brought anything to the reception.
b. Only the students brought anything to the reception.
c. *Few students have seen her in weeks.
d. *Only John has talked to me either.
Incidentally, these strong NPIs are also ruled out from questions, even when they are c-
commanded by the wh-phrase.
(54) a. *Who read that essay either?
b. *Who has visited Mary in weeks?
These facts create a problem for an account that takes the acceptability of NPIs to be depen-
dent on their acceptability in the negative answer (granting, of course, that there actually is
such an answer). Given that both either and in weeks are perfectly acceptable in the scope of
negative quantifiers, as shown above, Han and Siegel’s account would lead us to conclude
that they should also be acceptable in questions, contrary to fact. In the following subsec-
tion I outline how the present account of questions can derive and in fact actually predicts
that this asymmetry should hold between weak NPIs like any and strong NPIs like in weeks.
3.2.2 Prediction: Strong NPIs in questions
Strong NPIs such as in weeks and either (cf. Gajewski 2011) are characterized by their inabil-
ity to survive in weakly-negative environments, such as the scope of only.
(55) a. Bill hasn’t visited Mary in weeks.
b. *Only Bill has visited Mary in weeks.
(56) a. Mary doesn’t like you either.
b. *Only Mary likes you either.
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As mentioned above, it turns out that these strong NPIs are also disallowed from occurring
in questions, both embedded and non-embedded, as shown in (57).
(57) a. *Mary wants knows who has visited John in weeks.
b. *Who read that essay either?
c. *Who has visited Mary in weeks?
The present analysis straightforwardly accounts for these facts since it assumes a covert
only is present in questions. In doing so, we can reduce the unacceptability of strong NPIs
in questions to their unacceptability in the scope of only; that is, whatever account we use
to rule out strong NPIs from the scope of overt only in declaratives we can use to account
for their unacceptability in questions. Below I present one such account.
Recall that we take only propositions to be partial propositions:
(58) [[Only Bill ate cake]]
a. is defined if Bill ate presup
b. if defined, it asserts that nobody other than Bill ate denotation
The issue with only, as discussed in detail by von Fintel (1999), is that it is not as clearly
downward entailing as other operators that license NPIs, such as negation or negative
quantifiers. One way to see this is by looking at the two sets of propositions in (59).
(59) a. (i) Only Bill ate pizza.
(ii) Only Bill ate mushroom pizza.
b. (i) Nobody ate pizza.
(ii) Nobody ate mushroom pizza.
The problem presented by only is that (59a.i) doesn’t necessarily entail (59a.ii), while con-
structions of the form (59b.i) always support inferences to their subset counterparts, (59b.ii).
Von Fintel claims that the difficulty with (59a) is due to the fact that only carries a presuppo-
sition, and specifically, that the entailment is reliant on that presupposition being satisfied.
In other words, if we take for granted that Bill ate pizza, and furthermore, that he ate
mushroom pizza, we will have no problem inferring from the fact that he is the only one
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who ate pizza that he is also the only one who ate mushroom pizza.
Now, returning to the issue related to the behavior of NPIs in the scope of only, one
proposal for the asymmetry between weak and strong NPIs comes from Gajewski 2011
and Chierchia 2012. These authors claim that weak NPIs like any and ever are licensed in
a partial proposition as long as they are licensed in the assertive component of meaning.
In other words, the fact any is acceptable in (60) is due to the fact that the entailment from
(60a) to (60b) goes through, that is, because any is in a DE environment with respect to the
non-presuppositional contribution of only.
(60) Only Bill ate any pizza.
a. Nobody other than Bill ate pizza.
b. Nobody other than Bill ate mushroom pizza.
On the hand, in order to account for the unacceptability of in weeks or either in these same
environments, their proposal is that strong NPIs are also sensitive to the other components
of meaning. Since the presuppositional component of an only proposition, namely its pre-
jacent, creates an upward entailing environment, the enriched meaning will no longer be
downward entailing (but merely non-monotonic). So the fact that these NPIs are unaccept-
able under only, like in (61), can be attributed to the lack of entailment between (61a) and
(61b), two non-monotonic propositions (I’m using in days to represent a subset alternative
to in weeks).
(61) *Only Bill has seen Mary in weeks.
a. Bill has seen Mary in weeks and nobody other than Bill has seen her in weeks.
b. Bill has seen Mary in days and nobody other than Bill has seen Mary in days.
One way to implement this in an alternative exhaustification framework is to say that
the exhaustifier with which strong NPIs agree is different than the one that agrees with
weak NPIs. The strong NPI exhaustifier, call it E xh[d-s], is such that it negates alternatives
whenever they are not entailed by the assertion with respect to the enriched meaning.
Since the enriched meaning of only is always going to be non-monotonic, all sub-domain
alternatives will be non-entailed, and thus required to be negated. Negating them, however,
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will contradict the assertion, rendering these NPIs unacceptable in such environments. I
outline the contrast between weak and strong NPIs in (62).
(62) a. *E xh[d-s] [only . . . in weeks[d-s] . . . ] contradiction
b. E xh[d] [only . . . anything[d] . . . ] vacuous
In conclusion, what we have shown in this subsection is that given an analysis of questions
that takes their strongly exhaustive reading to be the result of a covert only, the asymmetry
between weak and strong NPIs in the scope of such questions falls out immediately simply
by appealing to independently-motivated proposals for the behavior of such NPIs.
3.2.3 Prediction: High vs Low wh-adjuncts
Another prediction made by this account relates to the behavior of NPIs with respect to
non-argumental wh-phrases. Specifically, we should expect a difference between high and
low wh-adjuncts with respect to the acceptability of subject NPIs. If we assume that low wh-
adjuncts, such as how and where adjoin at the VP level and are thus base-generated below
the subject, questions with subject NPIs should only allow for a rhetorical interpretation,
similarly to cases where the wh-phrase is the object of the verb. Effectively, a low adjunct
should behave like an object wh-phrase with respect to an NPI in subject position since the
NPI ends up outside the c-commanding domain of the wh-trace. That this contrast holds
can be seen in (63) where we see that high wh-adjuncts like why allow for non-emphatic
readings even with subject NPIs.13
(63) a. Why did anyone leave before the party was over?
b. *How did anyone cook this?
c. *Where did any linguist go to grad school?
At the same time, we expect no difference in acceptability between high and low adjuncts
when the NPI is in object position, as shown in (64). The idea here is that regardless of the
high/low distinction, wh-adjuncts will always attach only as low as the VP, meaning that
transitive objects will always end up in their c-command domain.
13Recall that I use an asterisk to indicate the unavailability of a non-emphatic reading.
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(64) a. Why did Mary bring anything?
b. How did he manage to cook anything?
c. Where does Mary do any of her homework?
Further arguments that this is a robust structural asymmetry comes from double object
constructions involving manner adverbs such as how.14 Consider the examples below:
(65) a. *How did John sell any students tickets?
b. How did John sell his students any tickets?
Since we are dealing with a double object construction, we know that the dative object, the
NPI any students in (65a), is generated high, in Spec of VP, and that the manner adverb,
how, is a VP adjunct, hence lower in the structure than the NPI (Larson 1988, Larson 1990).
On the other hand, when the NPI serves as the direct object, it functions as the complement
of the verb, and thus ends up being c-commanded by the adjunct, helping us understand
the contrast between the sentences in (65). The structures we are dealing with in (65) are
provided in (66a) and (66b) respectively:
(66) a. vP
John VP
any students VP
how V’
sell tickets
b. vP
John VP
his students VP
how V’
sell any tickets
This prediction regarding wh-adjuncts is not necessarily specific to my account but
rather falls out as a consequence of the claim that NPIs are licensed only if c-commanded
by the wh-phrase. One could imagine that Han and Siegel’s account could also explain this
observation under the assumption that questions with wh-adjuncts also allow for negative
14I’d like to thank Masha Polinsky for bringing these examples to my attention.
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answers, albeit it would be quite difficult to imagine what such answers would look like.15
3.3 NPIs in the restrictor of the wh-phrase
3.3.1 The problem
Our discussion up to this point has focused exclusively on the behavior of NPIs in the
nucleus of questions. However, as pointed out by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), when NPIs
appear in the restrictor of the wh-phrase, their acceptability appears to be independent of
whether the question is interpreted strongly or weakly exhaustive. In (67) we have two
unembedded questions which are independently assumed to be strongly exhaustive. In
(68), on the other hand, the questions are embedded under surprise, which is assumed to
embed only weakly exhaustive questions. The fact that we observe the same variability in
terms of the acceptability of the NPI in the restrictor of the wh-phrase suggests that their
acceptability in these environments is to be attributed to a different source.
(67) a. Which students who have any books on NPIs are selling them?
b. *Which student who has any books on NPIs is selling them?
(68) a. It surprised her which students who took any linguistics passed the exam.
b. *It surprised her which student who took any linguistics passed the exam.
For the present account, the fact that NPIs are acceptable even in questions such as
(68b) suggests that the licensing of the NPI occurs at a more embedded level than what we
have been assuming to be the case when NPIs occur in the nucleus of the question; in other
words, (68a) but not (68b) has a level at which the NPI can be said to be licensed. At the
same time, we see that whatever licenses NPIs in strongly exhaustive questions as in (67) is
either not available, or simply blocked, as can be see by the fact that (67b) is unacceptable.
What I hope to convince the reader in this section is that what is interesting about this data
set is not so much the fact that NPIs can, sometimes, be acceptable in weakly exhaustive
15I can imagine that some might find even the questions marked as “good” bad. One potential response to
that could be that their grammars simply don’t allow only to associate with non-arguments.
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questions, as in (68a), but rather the fact that they are not uniformly acceptable in strongly
exhaustive ones, as in (67b).
Looking at the data in (67) and (68), we see that the only difference between the (a) and
(b) sentences is the fact that the wh-phrase is plural in (a) and singular in (b). So the first
question we need to address is what it is about the plurality of wh-phrases that, in a sense,
rescues NPIs from an environment that otherwise would have led to a crash. In trying
to account for this observation, Guerzoni and Sharvit point out the parallel with sentences
such as those in (69) where we see that NPIs are licensed in the restrictor of a plural definite
phrase, (69a), but not in the restrictor of a singular definite, (69b).
(69) a. The students who took any linguistics classes passed the exam.
b. *The student who took any linguistics classes passed the exam.
To account for why NPIs are licensed in the restrictor of the plural definite determiner,
consider its truth-conditions in (70). The idea is that the assertive component of the defi-
nite determiner, given in (70a), is precisely the same as that of every, meaning that its left
argument, the restrictor, supports downward entailing inferences, hence the acceptability
of NPIs in this position.
(70) The students who took any linguistics passed the exam.
a. Assertion: ∀x [(x is a student who took any ling)→ (x passed)]
Presupposition: |{λx. x is a student who took any ling}| #= ∅
b. [E xh[d] [the students who took [any ling][d]]] passed ✓ E xh>thepl
Turning now to the singular definite determiner, I follow Gajewski 2011 and Chierchia 2012
and propose that its assertive component is as in (71a), with the difference between the
singular and plural being that the singular also has an existence requirement incorporated
into the assertive component. See Yablo 2005 for a discussion on why the behavior of
singular definites might suggest that the non-empty requirement is part of the assertive
component (rather than merely a presupposition). It’s precisely this additional requirement
that disrupts the otherwise downward monotonicity of the restrictor, accounting for the
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unacceptability of the NPI in this position.
(71) *The student who took any linguistics passed the exam.
a. Assertion: ∃y [(y is a student who took any ling) ∧
Assertion: ∀x [(x is a student who took any ling)→ (x passed)]]
Presupposition: |{λx. x is a student who took any ling}| = 1
b. *[E xh[d] [the student who took [any ling][d]]] passed ✗ E xh>thesg
To recap, the denotations of the determiners are as in (72):
(72) a. [[thepl]] = λP.λQ:|P| #=∅. ∀x[P(x)→Q(x)]
b. [[thesg]] = λP.λQ:|P|=1. ∃y[P(y) ∧ ∀x[P(x)→ Q(x)]]
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) propose to account for the facts regarding NPIs in the restric-
tor of which-phrases by taking these phrases to behave like definite noun phrases: “the idea
would be, then, that a which-phrase contains a hidden, cross-categorial, the (which means
that the restrictor of which is in the scope of the)” Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007, p. 19).16
However, beyond noting the similarities between the two sets of data, which in itself is a
very significant observation, they do not provide a compositional account that shows why
this parallel should hold. The next section presents one such account.
3.3.2 A reconstruction account
3.3.2.1 Weakly exhaustive questions
Following the intuition in Guerzoni and Sharvit I propose to account for the contrast we
observe in (73) by the same means that give us the contrast discussed above between the
singular and plural definite article.
(73) a. It surprised her which girls who took any linguistics classes passed the exam.
b. *It surprised her which girl who took any linguistics classes passed the exam.
16Although they assume a different analysis for why plural and not singular definite articles license NPIs,
the details of which are orthogonal to the present discussion.
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The trick behind compositionally deriving the parallel between the restrictor of which-
phrases and that of the definite article is to consider how wh-traces are interpreted. In-
cidentally, the semantics of movement, namely the copy theory of movement, takes us one
step closer (cf. Chomsky 1993, , Sauerland 1998, Fox 1999, Fox 2002). For transparency, up
to this point I have taken the trace of the wh-phrase to be interpreted as a plain variable, as
it made no difference one way or the other for the purposes of the analysis. We know, how-
ever, that copies can be more complex than that. Specifically, in the case of hand, I propose
that the traces of the which-phrases will be interpreted as in (74a) and (74b), respectively,
where I provide the LFs for the nucleus of the question, namely the embedded IPs, a well
as their corresponding interpretations.
(74) a. [IP thepl [girls who took any ling] [passed]]
→ ∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[passed(x)]
b. [IP thesg [girl who took any ling] [passed]]
→ ∃y [(girl took any✗ ling)(y) ∧ y=z] ∧
∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[passed(x)]
Assuming, as we have, that the NPI can be licensed/exhaustified within the nucleus of the
question, it should be pretty easy to see that the NPI will be licensed in (74a) and not in
(74b), since it occurs in a DE environment in the former, the restriction of a universal, but
not in the latter. Note that for this parallel to hold, it’s crucial to assume that the definite
article is specified for whether it is plural or singular.
We still need to worry about the higher copy of the moved wh-phrase however. If we
assume that which-phrases are existential quantifiers, as we have been assuming all along,
and that the relative clause is also interpreted in the higher copy, then we make the pre-
diction that NPIs should be ruled out regardless of the plurality of the head noun. To see
why, consider the LFs for the full question in (75) and (76).
(75) [CP which girls who took any ling [1 [Q [IP thepl girls who took any ling passed]]]]
(76) [CP which girl who took any ling [1 [Q [IP thesg girls who took any ling passed]]]]
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Under the assumption that the relative clause is also interpreted in the highest copy, we
now have to check whether the NPI is licensed in this position as well. Given an account
that takes which phrases to be existential quantifiers, the NPI in the higher copy will always
end up being interpreted in the restrictor of an existential, irrespective of the plurality of
the head noun. Since the restrictor of an existential is not the right environment for an NPI,
we predict NPIs to fail across the board. In (77) I offer the semantics corresponding to the
LFs in (75) and (76) and use ✗ and ✓ to indicate which copy of the NPI is licensed where.
(77) a. ∃z [(girl took any✗ ling)(z) ∧
p = ∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[passed(x)]]
b. ∃z [(girl took any✗ ling)(z) ∧
p = ∃y [(girl took any✗ ling)(y) ∧ y=z] ∧
p = ∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[passed(x)]
What we see then is that in order for NPIs to survive in the restrictor of a which-phrase,
the relative clause containing the NPI cannot be interpreted in its surface position, as the
semantics in (77) shows. What we want then, is a way to interpret only the lower copy of
the NPI. This can easily be achieved by imposing obligatory reconstruction of the relative
clause, a phenomenon independently observed in cases of binding (cf. Fox 1999, Fox 2002,
Sauerland 2000). Consider the examples below:
(78) a. *[Which argument that Johni was wrong]j did hei accept tj in the end?
b. [Which girl that Johni saw]j did hei like tj better?
c. [Which girl that hei saw]j did Johni like tj better?
The ungrammaticality of (78a) shows us that arguments, namely that John was wrong, are
obligatorily reconstructed in their base positions. Since John is part of the argument of the
head noun, it must reconstruct, ending up in a position c-commanded by the co-indexed
pronominal he. This, however, induces a Condition C violation, hence the ungrammaticality
of (78a). Adjuncts, unlike arguments, do not have to reconstruct, which can be seen by the
acceptability of (78b) (cf. Safir 1999). However, in cases where lack of reconstruction would
induce a Condition C violation, the adjunct has the option of reconstructing, as it must be
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the case in (78c). In other words, we see that adjuncts can optionally reconstruct whenever
interpretation in their surface position would give rise to an unacceptable configuration.
Returning to the case at hand, I claim that in order for questions with NPIs in the
restrictor of which phrases to be acceptable, the wh-phrases must reconstruct, which, in
effect, is similar to what goes on in (78c), where the only plausible interpretation is one
involving reconstruction of the wh-phrase below the R-expression.17 Thus the actual LFs
for the questions under discussion will be as in (79):
(79) a. [CP which girls [1 [Q [IP the1(pl) [girls who took any ling] [passed]]]]]
∃z [girl(z) ∧ p = ∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[x passed]]
b. [CP which girl [1 [Q [IP the1(sg) [girl who took any ling] [passed]]]]]
∃z [girl(z) ∧ p = ∃y [(girl took any✗ ling)(y) ∧ y=z] ∧
∃z [girl(z) ∧ p = ∀x [(girl took any✓ ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→[x passed]
Before turning to strongly exhaustive questions, let’s consider a final derivation involv-
ing NPIs in the restrictor of a non-subject wh-phrase, as in (80). We’ll see that even though
this derivation is slightly more complex than those presented above, it ultimately gives us
the intended meaning, assuming once again that the relative clause can reconstruct to a
position where the NPI is licensed.
(80) It surprised me which girls who took any linguistics you passed.
Since the which-phrase originates in object position, it must undergo two separate move-
ments: one in order to resolve the type mismatch caused by the fact that we are dealing
with a quantifier in object position, and another to check the [+wh] feature.18 Assuming
trace conversion throughout, the first QR must leave behind a copy of type e in order to
satisfy the type requirements of the verb. In order to leave a type e trace behind, the defi-
17Note that I’m ignoring the question of whether the head noun is also interpreted in the upstairs copy since
this issue is still being debated in the literature and makes no difference one way or the other for our purposes.
For more on this issue, see Sauerland 1998, Sauerland 2000, Safir 1998, Sharvit 1999, to name just a few.
18Note that in general, a single move would suffice to satisfy both requirements. This is not an option in
the present case, however, since a single move would leave us with no landing site at which the singular and
plural which-phrases would be differentiated for the purposes of NPI licensing given that the lowest copy will
always be interpreted as the unique individual satisfying the relevant property.
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nite article needs to be interpreted as the uniqueness operator. The second instance of QR,
i.e. the wh feature-driven movement, will leave behind a copy headed by the higher type
definite determiner, similarly to what we assumed above. In (81) I provide the LF of the
plural which-phrase and the corresponding interpretation (the gray material corresponds
to the copies that end up not being interpreted).
(81) [CP which girls who took any ling [1 [Q [IP the1(pl) girls who took any ling [1 [you
passed the1(ι) girls who took any ling]]]]]]
a. ∃z [girl(z) ∧ [λv. p = thepl[λx. (girls who took any ling)(x) ∧ x=v][λv. you
passed theι[λy. (girls who took any ling)(y) ∧ y=v]]](z)]
b. ∃z [girl(z) ∧ [p = thepl[λx. (girls who took any ling)(x) ∧ x=z][λz. you passed
theι[λy. (girls who took any ling)(y) ∧ y=z]]]
c. ∃z [girl(z) ∧ p = ∀x[(girls who took any ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→ [you passed ιy[(girls
who took any ling)(y) ∧ y=x]]]
d. ∃z [girl(z) ∧ p = ∀x[(girls who took any ling)(x) ∧ x=z]→ [you passed x]]
So what we see here is that in order for the NPI to be licensed, we need genuine reconstruc-
tion of the relative clause to a QR position, namely the middle copy. Note that I’m assuming
the relative clause is not interpreted in the lowest copy, as that would mean having the NPI
in the nucleus of a universal, an upward-entailing environment.19
There are also cases such as (82) which involve both the potential for a Condition C
violation, as well as the issue of NPI licensing.
(82) [Which boys who gave Maryi any flowers]j did shei ask tj on a date?
19This same issue arrises in simple cases such as (i) where the trace of the QRed object must be interpreted as
a plain variable, as in (ia), in order to avoid having the NPI also be interpreted in the nucleus of the universal,
as in (ib).
(i) John passed every girl who ever took a linguistics course.
a. every [λx. girl who ever took a linguistics course(x)][λy. John passed the girl y]
b. every [λx. girl who ever took a linguistics course(x)][λy. John passed the (girl who ever took a
linguistics course) y]
But consider cases like (ii) which have the NPI in an argument position.
(ii) John read every review of any linguistics book.
Since arguments obligatorily reconstruct, the NPI will end up being interpreted in the nuclear scope of the
universal, an UE position, so the sentence should be ruled out. Incidentally my informants agree that there is
a contrast between (i) and (ii) so this account might be on the right track.
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On the one hand we need the adjunct to reconstruct so as not to have the NPI be interpreted
in the restrictor of an existential, while at the same time we need to avoid complete recon-
struction so as to avoid a Condition C violation which would come about by interpreting
the R-expression below the pronoun. Such examples also point to the need for intermediate
reconstruction.20
3.3.2.2 Strongly exhaustive questions
What about the strongly exhaustive questions in (83)?
(83) a. Which students who took any linguistics classes passed?
b. *Which student who took any linguistics classes passed?
The acceptability of (83a) is quite straightforward since it follows from the same principles
as the acceptability of an NPI in the restrictor of a plural which-phrase under surprise.
What’s not as straightforward, however, is why (83b) is unacceptable given that the NPI
ends up in the scope of the covert only assumed to always be present in direct questions. In
other words, what we need to ask ourselves is why the NPI can’t be licensed/exhaustified
above the covert only where it should be felicitous given that only supports downward
entailing inferences in its scope. One reaction might be to say that this doesn’t work because
the NPI is in the subject position and we saw earlier on that NPIs are never acceptable
in subject position (modulo rhetorical questions). Notice, however, that what is actually
relevant is the relative position of the NPI with respect to the wh-phrase. So the fact that the
NPI is (embedded within) the subject is irrelevant, as supported by the following example
where the NPI is in object position and still unacceptable.
(84) *Which student who took any linguistics did you pass?
So essentially we need to figure out why the licensing cannot take place above only. In
a framework that assimilates licensing conditions with agreement relations between an
alternative-bearing item, the NPI, and a covert exhaustifier, the question becomes the fol-
lowing: why can’t exhaustification occur above the covert only, as in (85a). The analysis we
20I’d like to thank Uli Sauerland for bringing these constructions to my attention.
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used to account for the subject/object asymmetry in the previous section readily suggests
itself for this set of facts. Here too we witness a clash between the syntactic conditions on
dependencies (crossing versus nesting) and the semantic requirements of exhaustification.
(85) *Which girl who took any linguistics passed?
a. E xh[d] [only[f] [[the girl who took [any ling][d]][f] passed]]
b. only[f] [E xh[d] [[the girl who took [any ling][d]][f] passed]]
syn sem all
✗ ✓ ✗
✓ ✗ ✗
That this is not a problem when we turn to plural which-phrases can be seen in (86b) where
we see that the presence of a plural definite description allows for the NPI to be exhausti-
fied below only, thus satisfying the syntactic requirement.
(86) Which girls who took any linguistics passed?
a. E xh[d] [only[f] [[the girls who took [any ling][d]][f] passed]]
b. only[f] [E xh[d] [[the girls who took [any ling][d]][f] passed]]
syn sem all
✗ ✓ ✗
✓ ✓ ✓
What we’ve shown in this section is that the licensing of an NPI when it occurs in the
restrictor of a plural which-phrase takes place at the level of the (reconstructed) wh-phrase,
rather than at the level of the embedded question which is what otherwise dictates the
acceptability of NPIs in the scope of wh-phrases. This is in line with the generalization
proposed by Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) that the licensing of NPIs in the restrictor of
wh-phrases is independent of the strength of the question. The way this generalization is
couched in the present analysis is by showing that exhaustification necessarily takes place
below only when the NPI is in the restrictor of the wh-phrase, thus rendering the presence,
or lack thereof, of only irrelevant for the purposes of exhaustification. This is in sharp
contrast with the cases discussed in the previous section where the acceptability of NPIs in
the nucleus of the question is reliant on the presence of only, in that exhaustification must
take place above the only operator.
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3.3.3 Prediction: NPIs within the focus associate of overt only
The account presented in this section has immediate consequences for our understanding
of why NPIs are ruled out from the focus associate of overt only, a generalization argued
for in Wagner (2006). While his ultimate goal is to argue for an association-via-movement
account of only, Wagner points out the significant empirical observation that when only
associates with a DP, no NPIs are licensed within it, as shown by (87a).
(87) a. *Only [an author of any comic][f] met Particle Man.
b. Only [an inhabitant of Twin Earth][f] ever met any aliens. Wagner (2006, ex.
23b-c)
This peculiar aspect of the behavior of NPIs, namely the fact that they are acceptable only
outside the focus associate of only, remains a mystery, particularly for accounts which take
only to be a propositional operator. The problem is that as a propositional operator, only is
blind to the sub-constituency of its propositional argument. That is, the notion of restrictor
versus scope does not arise when calculating the semantics of only. We saw this same
problem come up in the discussion on the subject-object asymmetry of NPIs in questions
in the previous section when I argued that both (88a) and (88b) are downward entailing
with respect to x.
(88) a. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D like(a,x)→ (∃x∈D like(y,x) ⊆ ∃x∈D like(a,x))]
b. ∀a∈A lt(y) [∃x∈D like(x,a)→ (∃x∈D like(x,y) ⊆ ∃x∈D like(x,a))]
The idea pursued in this chapter, which I claim here can be extended outside the domain of
questions, is that while semantically only is a propositional operator, syntactically it enters
into an agreement relation with a constituent of its argument. The idea is that we can have
long-distance agreement between only and its focus associate, as in (89).
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(89)
only
. . .
[ ]f
. . .
As soon as an NPI comes into the picture, a second agree relation needs to be estab-
lished between it and an exhaustifier. Whenever there are multiple agreement relations,
constraints on path containment need to be respected.21 As I show in the examples below,
the only configuration involving an NPI in the scope of only which is both syntactically
and semantically coherent is one where the NPI is distinct from the focus associate of only
and furthermore c-commanded by it, as in (91).
(90) NPI is embedded in the focus associate of only
a. ✓syntax, ✗semantics
only
E xh[d]
[. . . NPI[d] . . . ]f
. . .
b. ✗syntax, ✓semantics
E xh[d]
only
[. . . NPI[d] . . . ]f
. . .
(91) NPI is distinct from and follows the focus associate
a. ✗syntax, ✗semantics
only
E xh[d]
. . .
[ ]f
NPI[d]
b. ✓syntax, ✓semantics
E xh[d]
only
. . .
[ ]f
NPI[d]
21I use path containment to refer to the constraint against crossing dependencies.
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Summing up, the prediction made by this take on questions is that given an unacceptable
question containing an NPI, we expect the corresponding assertive sentences involving
overt association of a focused element with only to also be ruled out, as shown below.
The generalization that comes out from this is that the focus associate of only needs to
c-command the NPI in order for it to be licensed.
(92) a. (i) *What did anyone eat?
(ii) *I only said that anyone ate cakef.
b. (i) Who ate anything?
(ii) I only said that Johnf ate anything.
3.4 Appendix: Adnominal only
Another possible way to implement the idea that questions can be interpreted exhaus-
tively is by taking wh-phrases to be base generated as sisters to an adnominal only, whose
denotation is provided in (93).
(93) a. [[only]] = λx. λP: P(x). ∀y [P(y)→ y=x] 〈e, 〈et, t〉〉
b. λw: Mary kissed John.∀y[y kissed John→ y=Mary]
λP:P(M).∀y[P(y)→y=M]
Only Mary
λx.x kissed J
kissed John
So a question nucleus, before the C head applies to form a question, would look either
as in (94a), for se readings, or as in (94b) for we readings.
(94) a. Who kissed Mary?
only who kiss Mary
b. Who did Mary kiss?
Mary
kissed
only who
Below I provide the full derivation of the se reading for Who kissed Mary?:
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(95) λp. ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = λw: x kiss M. ∀z (z kissw M→ z=x)]
λp ∃x[person(x) ∧ p=λw: x kissw M.
∀x[x kissw M→ z=x]]
who λy. p = λw: y kissw M.
∀z[z kissw M→ z=y]
2 p = λw: g(2) kissw M.
∀z[z kissw M→ z=g(2)]
Cint p
λw: g(2) kissw M.
∀z[z kissw M→ z=g(2)]
λP: P(g(2)).
∀z[P(z) → z=g(2)]
only t2
λx. x kissw M
1 g(1) kissw M
t1 λx. x kissw M
kissed Mary
Let’s consider now what happens when we replace Mary with a quantifier like every-
body. One possible reading for these questions, the one we will focus on in this section, is
the single pair reading, which is taken to come about as a result of QR’ing the quantifier
right under the question operator; in other words, leaving it within the question nucleus.
Since we’re assuming that the wh-term is base-generated as a sister of adnominal only, i.e.
that it starts embedded in a quantifier phrase, it itself needs to undergo QR. So under this
new approach, questions with quantifiers actually involve two quantificational elements:
the only-phrase and the other QP. Given that we have two QPs, an issue that is going to arise
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is that of the relative scope of QR: either the only-phrase QRs above everybody, or everybody
QRs above only. Let’s consider each options in turn. For transparency, I will henceforth
abbreviate the complex head C p as Q.
(96) Who kissed everybody?
a. only > every
λp [who [3 [Q [ [only t3 ] [1 [everybody [2 [t1 [kissed t2 ]]]]]]]]]
b. every > only
λp [who [3 [Q [everybody [2 [ [only t3 ] [1 [t1 [kissed t2 ]]]]]]]]]
These two LFs turn out to have different truth conditions. An easy way to compute
these differences is by looking at the simpler case in (97) and its two possible LFs:
(97) Only John kissed every girl.
a. [only John] [1 [every girl [2 [t1 kissed t2]]]]
b. every girl [2 [[only John] [1 [t1 kissed t2]]]]
The LFs in (97) correspond to the truth conditions provided in (98):
(98) a. only > every
∀y [∀x[girl(x)→ y kissed x]→ y=John]
b. every > only
∀x[girl(x)→ ∀y[y kissed x→ y=John]]
(98a) describes a situation that is true in those worlds where John is the only person who
kissed every girl, thus allowing for other kissing pairs so long as nobody else kisses every
single girl. (98b), on the other hand, furthermore imposes the restriction that John should
also be the only kisser; that is, every girl needs to be kissed only by John. Note that this
inverse scope reading entails the surface scope reading since there cannot be a situation for
which (98b) is true without (98a) also being true. Notice, however, that (98b), the inverse
scope reading, is not actually a salient reading of (97). We see a similar contrast in the case
in (99), which also disallows the inverse scope reading in (99b).
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(99) John didn’t meet every student of mine.
a. not > every
b. *every > not
One proposal for why these readings are systematically ruled out (or strongly dispreferred)
comes from Mayr and Spector (2011), who advocate for a generalized scope economy con-
dition wherein a covert scope shifting operation (QR in this case) cannot apply if the mean-
ing of the resulting scope is equivalent to or stronger than (i.e. entails) the meaning of the
surface scope.
Returning now to questions, it appears to be the case that this principle carries over to
the domain of questions as well. Namely, if the LF where every has scope over only were a
possible configuration, then we would predict that a question such as Who kissed every girl?
could be answered negatively even if there is someone who kissed every single girl. For
example, consider a situation where every girl was kissed by John and furthermore some,
but not all, girls were also kissed by Bill. As we already mentioned, this situation is false
under the truth conditions of the inverse scope LF. Given that in this situation nobody is
not an appropriate answer, a misleading answer at best, we can conclude that the inverse
scope LF is disallowed.
Let’s turn now to questions where the wh-word is c-commanded by the quantifier.
(100) Who did every boy kiss?
a. λp [who [3 [Q [ [every boy] [1 [ [only t3] [2 [t1 [kiss t2 ]]]]]]]]]
b. λp [who [3 [Q [ [only t3] [2 [ [every boy] [1 [t1 [kiss t2 ]]]]]]]]]
In order to evaluate which LF corresponds to the possible interpretation, let’s consider the
corresponding declarative and evaluate it in the scenario provided next to it.
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(101) Every boy kissed only Mary.
a. [every boy] [1 [[only Mary] [2 [t1 kissed t2 ]]]]
∀x[boy(x)→ ∀y(x kissed y→ y = Mary)]
b. [only Mary] [2 [[every boy] [1 [t1 kissed t2 ]]]]
∀y[∀x(boy(x)→ x kissed y)→ y = Mary]
Scenario:
b1→ Mary
b2→ Mary
b3→ Mary, Sue
The LF in (101a) corresponds to a situation where the only person that was kissed was
Mary and furthermore, she was kissed by every single boy, rendering it false in the scenario
above. The LF in (101b) corresponds to a situation where the only person that was kissed
by everyone is Mary; this allows for cases where other people were kissed by some boys, so
long as nobody other than Mary was kissed by everyone, consistent with the scenario. We
see then that here the opposite occurs; namely, the surface scope reading entails the inverse
scope reading, since (101b) true in more situations than (101a). Interestingly, it once again
appears to be the case that only the surface scope reading is a possible interpretation for
this sentence; namely (101) is judged to be false in this scenario, i.e. on its weaker inverse
scope reading.
Let’s return to the question Who did every boy kiss?. This question seems to be after the
set of people who were kissed by every boy, and nothing else; in other words, the inverse
scope LF looks like a better characterization of the truth conditions of the question, contrary
to what we saw in the previous case. So while the declarative receives the strong reading
associated with the SS LF in (101a), the interrogative has the weaker reading associated with
the IS LF in (101b), which is a problem! The lack of parallelism between the declarative and
interrogative in terms of where quantifiers are interpreted suggests that there’s a problem
with adnominal only.
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Chapter 4
Alternate questions
In this chapter we turn our attention to non wh-questions and focus specifically on what
are generally referred to as alternate, or disjunctive, questions, as in (1).
(1) Did you order cakef or flanf for dessert?
I ordered cake.
Alternate questions are characterized by the presence of a disjunctive phrase whose indi-
vidual disjuncts bear focus. Notice that when the disjuncts are not focused, as in (2), the
only possible answers are yes or not, meaning that the question takes on a polar meaning.
(2) Did she order cake or flan for dessert?
Yes, she ordered one of those desserts./ No, she ordered the souffle´.
While they differ from regular wh-questions in their lack of a morphologically-marked wh-
phrase, they resemble wh-questions in the types of answers they receive. I will capitalize
on this parallel and offer an analysis that accounts for both the similarities and differences
between wh-questions and alternate questions. As before, I will use NPI behavior to inform
our understanding of the semantics of these questions.
Given the lack of a wh-marked phrase, as well as the fact that when embedded they
resemble polar questions, most analyses of alternate questions take them to be a variant of
polar questions.
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4.1 Background
We begin this chapter with a brief overview of some of the current proposals for alternate
questions.1 The starting point when dealing with these questions is a comparison with
their minimally different counterparts, polar questions. The form of a question such as (3)
corresponds to two possible questions: an alternate question (3a) or a polar question, (3b).
(3) Did your order cake or flan?
a. Which of cake or flan did you order?
b. Did you order cake or flan, or not?
Crucially, these two interpretations correspond to different answers, a constituent answer
for the alternate reading and a yes/no answer for the polar reading. This parallel carries
over even in embedded positions where they both end up being embedded with whether:
(4) Mary knows whether your ordered cake or flan.
a. Mary knows which of the two you ordered.
b. Mary knows if you ordered cake or flan, or not.
These parallels have been taken as support for a uniform analysis of the alternate and
polar reading of a question containing a disjunctive phrase. One possible account, due
to Karttunen (1977), is to analyze these questions as polar questions across the board.
Assuming that the polar reading of a question denotes the set containing it and its negation,
Karttunen takes alternate questions like (5) to denote the disjunction of two polar readings,
like in (5a). Given that polar questions denote a set of two propositions, the disjunction of
two polar questions would denote a set of four propositions, as in (5b).
(5) Did your order cake or flan?
a. Did you order cake, or did you order flan?
b. {I ordered cake, I didn’t order cake, I ordered flan, I didn’t order flan}
1This is in fact a very crude, yet hopefully representative, overview of the proposals that are out there
in the literature. I refer the interested reading to Han and Romero (2004a), Pruitt and Roelofsen (2011),
Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009), Biezma and Rawlins (2013), among many others.
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The issue with such an account is that it predicts that any one of the propositions in the set
above should count as an appropriate answer, contrary to fact. The only possible answers
to alternate questions are the affirmative propositions corresponding to the disjuncts, and
crucially, not their negations.
Such an analysis also runs into problems once we turn to the behavior of NPIs in these
questions. As is well known, NPIs are acceptable in polar questions across the board:
(6) a. Did anyone eat soup?
b. Did John eat anything?
If alternate questions were in fact analyzed as polar questions, then we would expect NPIs
to behave similarly to how they do in regular polar questions. This, however, turns out not
to be the case, as shown below in (7), which only allows for a yes/no answer, that is, it can
only be interpreted as a polar question.
(7) Did anyone eat soup or salad?
a. y/n: Is it the case that anyone ate soup or salad? Yes.
b. *alt: Which of soup or salad did anyone eat? unavailable
The issue is that if (7) were analyzed as a family of polar questions under its alternate
reading, as in (8), then we would expect the NPI to be acceptable under this alternate
reading, given its acceptability in the two respective polar questions:
(8) Did anyone eat soup? or Did anyone eat salad?
Yet a more recent approach, which I will also adopt in my analysis in section 2, is to
take alternate questions like (9a) to denote the set of propositions in (9b).
(9) a. Did she order cake or flan?
b. {she ordered cake, she ordered flan}
The debate within this camp concerns the compositional mechanisms that derive these an-
swers. In the remainder of this section I discuss one such account, due to Han and Romero
(2004b). Their account crucially relies on the assumption that both movement and ellipsis
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are involved. The claim is that all alternate questions involve whether, either covertly (root
questions) or overly (embedded questions), and that this element is a wh-phrase that moves
to the specifier of CP, similarly to any other wh-phrase. Following Larson (1985), they take
whether to be the wh variant of either and assume that it is base-generated adjacent to the
disjunctive phrase. Lastly, following Schwarz (1999), they take the underlying representa-
tion to contain a form of ellipsis, namely gapping as in (10a). In this account, the fact that
the individual disjuncts bear focus is due to the nature of ellipsis and the requirement that
the contrast between the remnant and its correlate be made overtly, i.e. via focus on the
relevant constituents.
(10) Did she order cake or flan?
a. whetheri did ti [she order cake or she order flan]
b. {she ordered cake, she ordered flan}
In so far as I understand their account, if we were to adopt Han and Romero’s proposed
representation to fit within the general framework of questions I am adopting in this thesis,
we would predict that whether the question involves a disjunction over the object, verb
or subject should have no effect on the compositional mechanisms that yield the set of
propositions in (10b) given that such questions are uniformly taken to be disjunctions over
propositions. The LF of a question such as (10) would thus be as in (11), where the either p
or q proposition undergoes wh-movement to the specifier of C.
(11) λp. ∃q ∈ {λw. she orderedw cake, λw. she orderedw flan} ∧ p = q
λp
whether {she ordered cake, she ordered flan}
λp
C p t〈st〉
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In the following section I propose a different account of alternate questions that ultimately
delivers the same denotation as Han and Romero’s but arrives at this denotation via a
different mechanism. I will crucially build on an observation by Krifka (2011) that alternate
questions should be analyzed on par with constituent questions and show how we can
derive these similarities compositionally.2 I will argue in section 3 that adopting such an
analysis allows us to account for the distribution of NPIs as well as explain a contrast that
has not been noted before in the literature.
4.2 A new take on alternate questions
The stance I take in this thesis is that alternate readings are, underlyingly, constituent ques-
tions with the domain of the wh-phrase restricted to the atomic members of the disjunction.
In other words, the alternate reading of a non wh-question with a disjunctive phrase comes
about by interpreting the disjunctive constituent as a wh-phrase. To adduce support to this
claim, observe that the questions in (12) will always receive the same answer in a context
that involves only two girls.
(12) a. Did John kiss Mary[f] or Suzy[f]?
b. Which girl did John kiss?
c. John kissed Mary.
d. #John kissed Mary and Suzy.
e. #John didn’t kiss either girl.
The fact that neither (12a) nor (12b) allows for an answer that names two girls, as in (12d),
nor a negative answer as in (12e), constitutes further evidence that these questions denote
the same sets of answers, which I provide in (13). For the time being, I am ignoring the
issue of exhaustivity, to which I return in a later section.
(13) a. {John kissed Mary, John kissed Suzy}
b. λp. ∃x ∈ {Mary, Suzy} ∧ p = λw. John kissedw x
2As Krifka (2011, p. 16) pointedly notes: “As there is no overt movement of a question constituent, they appear
syntactically as a subtype of polarity questions, yet semantically they are similar to constituent questions.”
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I claim that this parallel is not just coincidence, but rather that both questions in
(12a) and (12b) have the same underlying representation. That is, the answer set in (13)
is achieved via the same compositional mechanism for both questions.
4.2.1 Alternate questions as wh-questions
Notice that the equivalence between (12a) and (12b) parallels a similar phenomenon we
observe in declarative sentences. That is, both (14a) and (14b) denote the same proposition,
namely (14c), when the context specifies two girls.
(14) a. John likes Mary or Suzy.
b. John likes a/some girl.
c. ∃x ∈ {Mary, Suzy} ∧ λw. John kissedw x
Understanding why this is so for declaratives will get us a step closer to a compositional
account of alternate questions. Specifically, in order to derive the parallel between alternate
and constituent questions compositionally, we essentially need to explain how and why the
disjunction takes on the flavor of a wh-word. Breaking it down even further, that amounts
to understanding why the following hold true:
! semantically, the disjunction is interpreted as a wh-term
! syntactically, the disjunction undergoes the same movement as a wh-term
I have already hinted at an answer for the semantic component, namely the parallel we
see in declaratives between disjunctive phrases and existential quantifiers in (14). In order
to show that the disjunctive phrase is interpreted as a wh-phrase, it will be enough to argue
that the disjunctive phrase has the same semantics as an existential quantifier given that
we are already taking for granted the fact that wh-phrases are existential quantifiers at their
core. I follow Ivlieva (2012) and claim that disjunction is a generalized quantifier consisting
of a covert existential quantifier and a predicate, as in (15a).3
3We could in fact assume that the covert existential can optionally be realized as either, which might turn
out to be an even more faithful representation of the parallel between disjunctive phrases like (either) Mary or
Sue and quantificational phrases like some girl.
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(15) Mary or Suzy came
∃x[(x=M ∨ x=S) ∧ x came]
λQ.∃x[(x=M ∨ x=S) ∧ Q(x)]
∃
λP.λQ.∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)]
Mary or Suzy
λx. x=M ∨ x=S
came
λy. y came
Note that a sentence with an existential quantifier denotes the same proposition in a context
containing only two girls, Mary and Suzy.
(16) Some girl came
∃x[(x=M ∨ x=S) ∧ x came]
λQ.∃x[(x=M ∨ x=S) ∧ Q(x)]
some
λP.λQ.∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)]
girl
λx. x=M ∨ x=S
came
λy. y came
Given that a wh-phrase like which girl has the same semantics as some girl, we have shown
how disjunctive phrases turn out to have the same denotation as singular which phrases:
(17) a. [[Mary or Suzy]] = λQ. ∃x [x∈{Mary, Suzy} ∧ Q(x)]
b. [[some girl]] = λQ. ∃x [x∈{Mary, Suzy} ∧ Q(x)]
c. [[which girl]] = λQ. ∃x [x∈{Mary, Suzy} ∧ Q(x)]
The next hurdle in understanding why disjunctions can take on the behavior of which-
phrases is figuring out the syntactic part. Recall the claim I made at the beginning of
the section, namely that disjunctive questions are compositionally identical to constituent
questions. Basically, all we have left to show is why the disjunctive constituent undergoes
wh-movement like a wh-phrase. The proposal for why disjunctions can function both as
regular existentials and as interrogative existentials is that they can optionally bear a wh
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feature. Just like existential quantifiers have a +wh and -wh incarnation, (18a), so do dis-
junctive phrases, (18b). The only difference is that or+wh undergoes covert wh-movement
(only at LF) while regular wh-words move overtly.
(18) a. ∃
-wh
some
+wh
which
b. or
-wh
or
+wh
or
Putting all the pieces together, we end up with the following derivation for the alt reading
of Did John kiss Mary or Suzy?.
(19) Did John kiss Mary or Suzy?
a. Id [λp [[∃ Mary or Suzy] [λ1 [[C p] [λw [John kissed g(1)]]]]]]
b. Id(λp. ∃x ∈ {Mary, Suzy} ∧ p = λw. John kissedw x)
c. {John kissed Mary, John kissed Suzy}
The fact that neither a negative answer nor an answer that names both girls counts as
appropriate falls out immediately given that the set of propositions is determined by the
quantificational domain of the disjunction, which includes only the individual disjuncts.
Yet another option that begs exploring is assuming, like most other work on this topic,
that whether is the wh-counterpart of either, as in (20).
(20) ∃
-wh
either
+wh
whether
As it stands, my account makes no reference to whether, a discussion I postpone for when
we discuss embedding. In an account as the one above, disjunctive phrases would be base-
generated in the complement of a phrases headed by either, which I take to be a determiner
similarly to some/which. A number of issues would arise in regards to this proposal: why
does whether never surface in direct questions, and when it does, in embedded questions,
how is it possible that the head of the phrase, whether, ends up spelled out in the specifier
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of CP while its complement, the disjunction Mary or Suzy, ends up spelled out in its base
position? As it stands, I see no good answer to either of these questions, so I will continue
assuming that what we’re dealing with is a disjunctive phrase headed by a covert existential
operator endowed with a +wh feature. The viability of this account over the one in (20) is
reliant on how plausible my analysis for the obligatory presence of whether in embedded
clauses is, which will be presented in section 4.
4.2.2 Focused disjuncts
Like in constituent questions, we have the option of adjoining only at the level of the ques-
tion nucleus, as in (21), and having it associate with the trace of wh-phrase, which in the
case of (21) would be Mary or Suzy.4
(21)
Id
λp
∃ Mary or[+wh] Suzy λx
C p
only
λw
John
kissed tf
Having only associate with the wh-trace gives us the set of propositions in (22) as the
denotation of the question, which is in line with the intuition in Dayal (in progress, ch 4,
p. 14) that an alternate question is only asked in situations where it is presupposed that
exactly one of the alternatives will be answered.
(22) {John kissed Mary and not Suzy, John kissed Suzy and not Mary}
Recall that in order for a question with a disjunctive phrase to receive an alternate
reading, the disjuncts need to be prosodically marked with focus. It seems fair to conclude
4As before, this would be accompanied by local accommodation in order to avoid problems caused by
presupposition projection. Unless otherwise relevant, I will henceforth ignore this node.
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that the reason why these readings always involve focus on the disjuncts is due to the fact
that the disjunction ends up being analyzed as the focus associate of only.5 Notice that in
the corresponding declarative, overt only has the same prosodic effect:
(23) John kissed only Mary[f] or Suzy[f].
The next issue we need to address is whether the presence of only is optional (in embedded
contexts), as we took it to be in the case of regular wh-questions. In the next section I
will adduce evidence to indicate that one place where alternate questions differ from wh-
questions is in the optionality of only in embedded contexts. Specifically, I will claim that
(22) is the only available underlying representation for these types of questions.
4.2.3 Alternate questions are obligatorily strongly exhaustive
That alternate readings pattern with the se readings of wh-questions in terms of the oblig-
atory presence of only is based on the fact that when embedded, alt readings surface only
under predicates that embed se readings, like know in (24a), and never under a predicate
like surprise, as in (24b), which was argued in a previous chapter to disallow se readings of
wh-questions.
(24) a. Bill knows whether John kissed Mary[f] or Suzy[f].
b. *It surprised Bill whether John kissed Mary[f] or Suzy[f].
One can see that in the absence of only, my analysis predicts that the question in (25a)
would denote the same set of propositions as the we reading of (25b), namely (25c).
(25) a. Did John kiss Mary or Suzy?
b. Which of Mary and Suzy did John kiss?
c. {John kissed Mary, John kissed Suzy}
That is, the absence only would translate into lack of focus on the disjuncts and in turn no
strong exhaustivity. If that were possible, we would expect (26a) to be possible, similar to
5Crucially, this is different from regular wh-questions because the focus associate of only, the disjunctive
phrase, ends up being spelled out in-situ, rather than in its higher copy. This, I claim, is the driving force
behind why focus is prosodically realized in alternate questions but not in regular wh-questions.
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how (26b) is for the minimally different wh-question. But this is clearly not an available
reading of the embedded question in (26a), since the only possible reading in the absence
of focus is a yes/no reading, which too is ruled out from occurring in the scope of surprise.
(26) a. *It surprised Bill whether John kissed Mary or Suzy.
b. It surprised Bill which girl John kissed.
Why are these questions always interpreted strongly exhaustive? As it stands, I do not
have a good answer to this question. One possible way to think about it would be as fol-
lows. I have basically claimed that disjunctive phrases are equivalent to whichsg phrases,
both in their semantics and their syntax. Language usually avoids appealing to different
constructions in order to convey the same meaning, suggesting that at some level, there
must be a difference between the two.6 One such difference could be their ability to as-
sociate with only: while wh-phrases can optionally associate with only, it is conceivable
to imagine a requirement that takes disjunctive phrases to do so obligatorily, possibly by
virtue of them being overtly scalar.7 What that would mean for the general architecture is
that the alternate reading, by being unambiguously se, is more restricted in its use, and
can thus be used whenever one wants to disambiguate between the weakly and strongly
exhaustive reading of the corresponding wh-question, a situation that can only arise when
embedding under predicates like know which allow for both we and se.
Regardless of how we choose to couch this distinction, the bottom-line is that alternate
readings are syntactically and semantically no different than their wh-counterparts. In the
following section I outline a number of predictions made by this analysis and use them to
argue that this analysis is superior to other analyses of alternate questions.
6One could say that the covert versus overt movement is already a difference, but since this has no effect on
the overall meaning, I take it to be irrelevant.
7If we adopt an analysis that takes these phrases to be headed by either, we could relate this observation to
a principle that requires the complement of either always to be interpreted exhaustively. For example, in (i), the
only reading we can get is one where Mary likes only one of the boys.
(i) Mary likes either John or Bill.
See for example the suggestion in Spector (2012) that French soit . . . soit, ‘either’, is obligatorily exhaustive.
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4.3 NPIs in alternate questions
Turning now to the distribution of NPIs in these questions, it’s been observed that a ques-
tion such as (27), where the NPI functions as the subject, can only receive a polar-question
reading (cf. Higginbotham 1993 and Guerzoni 2011); in other words, focusing the disjuncts
is not possible.
(27) Did anyone eat soup or salad?
a. y/n: Is it the case that anyone ate soup or salad? Yes.
b. *alt: Which of soup or salad did anyone eat? unavailable
Contrast this with the minimally different (28) which allows for both readings.
(28) Did John eat soup or salad?
a. y/n: Is it the case that John ate soup or salad? Yes.
b. alt: Which of soup or salad did John eat? Soup.
As it stands, the behavior of NPIs in alternate questions is not well understood and in
fact, for theories which take alternate questions to denote a family of polar questions, such
as Karttunen, their unacceptability is especially problematic. The main issue with such an
account is the fact that the acceptability of NPIs would remain a mystery since, unlike in
alternate questions, see (27), NPIs are always acceptable in polar questions, regardless of
whether they function as the subject or object of the verb:
(29) a. Did you talk to anyone at the party?
b. Did anybody come to the party?
If it were in fact the case that alternate questions denote the disjunction of two polar ques-
tions, given that NPIs are acceptable in polar questions across the board, we would have to
blame their unacceptability in alternate questions on something else. As it stands, I know
of no comprehensive account that can deal with the distribution of NPIs in a uniform man-
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ner.8 Another mention of NPI-licensing in these questions is made in Han and Romero
(2004b, fn. 13) where the authors point out explicitly that their account makes no predic-
tions with respect to NPI licensing. In fact, as they mention themselves, given the accept-
ability of NPIs in polar questions and the fact that they assume similar underlying struc-
tures for both polar and alternate questions, their account would predict NPIs to behave
similarly in alternate and polar questions, contrary to fact.
Under the present account, on the other hand, taking alternate questions to have the
same underlying representation as strongly exhaustive wh-question, we expect the peculiar
distribution of NPIs to have the same source in both questions. Specifically, I claim that
the availability of an alternate reading for a question with an NPI is governed by whether
or not the corresponding wh-question is acceptable. Recall that in wh-questions, NPIs are
acceptable only when they are c-commanded by the wh-phrase in their base positions, as
repeated in (30).
(30) a. Who talked to anyone? wh>NPI
b. *What did anyone bring? *NPI>wh
As argued for in Chapter 3, this asymmetry can be attributed to where the NPI is inter-
preted with respect to the covert only that associates with the wh-phrase. If the NPI is
c-commanded by the trace of the wh-phrase, and the wh-question is interpreted as strongly
exhaustive, i.e. there is a covert only underlyingly, the NPI will be interpreted in the scope
of only, and hence in a DE environment. On the other hand, if the NPI c-commands the wh-
trace, no syntactically acceptable configuration would allow for the NPI to be interpreted
in the scope of only, resulting in a crash. I repeat the relevant facts in (31).
8In so far as I understand her proposal, Guerzoni 2011 tries to provide an account for why alt readings
with NPIs are ruled out under the assumption that underlyingly, these questions involve the disjunction of two
propositions (similarly to how polar questions would involve the disjunction of an affirmative and negative
proposition). Her account crucially rests on the assumption that NPIs in polar questions are “licensed” by the
covert negation present in the or not disjunct, which, however, is not present for alt questions since the two
disjuncts are the propositions anyone ate soup and anyone ate salad, rather than anyone ate soup or salad and not
[anyone ate soup or salad]. As far as I can tell, her account would be unable to account for acceptability of (i) since
she takes these structures to involve disjunctions over entire propositions rather than just over constituents.
(i) Did Mary[f] or John[f] win anything?
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(31) a. Who ate anything?
i. only[f] [E xh[d] [t[f] ate anything[d]]]
ii. E xh[d] [only[f] [t[f] ate anything[d]]]
b. What did anyone eat?
i. only[f] [E xh[d] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]]
ii. E xh[d] [only[f] [anyone[d] ate t[f]]]
syntax semantics overall
✗ ✗ ✗
✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✗ ✗
✗ ✓ ✗
Taking alternate readings to have the same underlying representation as se wh-questions
predicts that NPIs should behave similarly across the two constructions. Specifically, we
expect that a non-wh-question containing a disjunctive phrase will disallow an alternate
interpretation whenever the NPI is base-generated above the disjunctive phrase. This is
borne out given that (32) can only receive a polar reading, while (32b), its wh-variant, is
simply ruled out (on the non-emphatic reading).
(32) Did anyone eat soup or salad?
a. y/n: Did anyone eat something?
b. *alt: Which of soup or salad did anyone eat?
I claim that whatever account we use to rule out an NPI from constituent questions when
it’s not c-commanded by the wh-word can be used in this case as well. To illustrate what
happens in a case such as (32), consider the two possible LFs that come about as a result
of adjoining E xh[d] either below or above only[f]; recall that we are assuming NPIs need to
enter into an agree relation with a silent exhaustifier E xh[d].
(33) Did anyone see Mary[f] or Sue[f]?
a. E xh[d] [only[f] [anyone[d] see [M or S][f]]] crossing dependencies
b. only[f] [E xh[d] [anyone[d] see [M or S][f]]] nesting dependencies
(i) E xh[d] [anyone[d] saw g(1)[f]]
= ∃x∈D(x saw g(1)) ∧ ∀D’⊆D ¬∃x∈D’(x saw g(1)) = ⊥
(ii) only[f] [E xh [anyone saw g(1)[f]]] = ⊥
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Ignoring the case involving crossing dependencies, this leaves us with (33b), which, while
syntactically plausible, gives rise to a contradiction by virtue of having to exhaustify the
NPI before only has had the chance to create a downward entailing environment. In other
words, this is exactly the same case as (31b-i).
This is not to say that NPIs are always ruled out from alternate questions. A prediction
made by this account is that NPIs should exhibit the same subject/object asymmetry in
these questions as they do in wh-questions. Specifically, we predict that a question with a
disjunctive term in subject position and an NPI in object position should be able to receive
an alternate interpretation, which is corroborated by the acceptability of (34):9
(34) Did Mary or John win anything in the raffle?
a. y/n: Did they win anything? Yes, they did.
b. alt: Which of Mary and John won anything in the raffle? Mary did.
Such cases allow for an alternate reading because, unlike before, the NPI is exhaustified in
the scope of only and doesn’t give rise to a syntactic violation, as illustrated below in (35b).
(35) Did Mary[f] or John[f] win anything in the raffle?
a. only[f] [E xh[d] [[M or J][f] win anything[d]]] crossing dependencies
b. E xh[d] [only[f] [[M or J][f] win anything[d]]] nesting dependencies
(i) only[f] [g(1)[f] win anything[d]]
= ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [∃x∈D(a ate x)→ ∃x∈D(g(1) win x) ⊆ ∃x∈D(a win x)]]
(ii) E xh[d] [only [g(1) win anything[d]]]
= ∀a∈A lt(g(1)) [∃x∈D(a win x)→ ∃x∈D(g(1) win x) ⊆ ∃x∈D(a win x)]]
Finally, another interesting parallel with constituent questions is exhibited by the avail-
ability of alternate readings when the NPI occurs within the individual disjuncts. Guerzoni
(2011) points out that the following question is ruled out when the disjuncts bear focus.
(36) *Did John open with any Russian openings[f] or end with any Sicilian endgames[f]?
9To my knowledge, this empirical fact is not discussed anywhere else in the literature.
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The unacceptability of such questions falls out straightforwardly in the present account
once we observe that questions such as (36) and (37a) are fully parallel to the ungrammat-
ical (37c).
(37) a. *Did the student with any linguistics[f] background or with any philosophy[f]
background pass?
b. Did the student with math[f] or logic[f] background pass?
c. *Which student with any linguistics or philosophy background pass?
The idea is that when the NPI occurs within the focused disjunct, the only way to exhaus-
tify the NPI without giving rise to a syntactic violation is below only, that is, in an upward
entailing context. I illustrate the relevant configurations in (38).
(38) *Did the student with any linguistics[f] background or with
any philosophy[f] background pass?
a. E xh[d] [only[f] [[the student with [any g(1)][d]][f] pass]]
b. only[f] [E xh[d] [[the student with [any g(1)][d]][f] pass]]
syn sem all
✗ ✓ ✗
✓ ✗ ✗
What we’ve seen in this section is that as far as NPI behavior is concerned, alternate
questions behave as one might expect given an account that takes them to be completely
parallel to wh-questions underlyingly.
4.4 Embedding alternate questions
Note that when embedding non-wh questions, whether is always present.
(39) John was wondering whether Mary had soup or salad for lunch.
a. John was wondering whether she had soup or salad, or something else.
b. John was wondering whether she had soup, or whether she had salad.
The fact that alternate questions and polar questions are introduced by whether is one of the
main reasons why these questions have been claimed to have basically identical underlying
122
representations. One drawback of the present account is that by taking alternate questions
to be a variant of constituent questions, we would expect them to behave similarly with
respect to embedding patterns. In particular, given that wh-questions can never co-occur
with whether when embedded, my account predicts that the same should be the case with
alternate questions. As an example, consider the fact that the wh variant of the alternate
question in (39b), namely (40), surfaces as (40a) when embedded, and not as (40b) or (40c).
(40) Which of soup or salad did she have for lunch?
a. John was wondering which of soup or salad she had for lunch.
b. *John was wondering whether which of soup or salad she had for lunch.
c. *John was wondering whether she had which of soup or salad for lunch.
And yet, in embedded contexts, alternate questions must be introduced by whether, like
polar questions and unlike constituent questions. Note that what unifies alternate and
polar questions, to the exclusion of wh-questions, is the fact that both lack phonologically
marked wh-phrases. The fact that whether surfaces only in embedded contexts and only
with questions that lack a phonologically-marked wh-phrase points towards an account
that takes whether to be a dummy element whose function is simply that of a repair strategy
for embedded +wh CPs whose specifier positions are phonologically null. The idea is that
we have to employ some strategy for embedded clauses to indicate that we are dealing
with an embedded question rather than a plain declarative. The problem with English is
that embedded clauses do not employ I to C movement, meaning that there is no way to
differentiate between an embedded declarative and an embedded non-wh question. For that
reason, a language like English needs to resort to a different strategy in order to indicate
that the embedded clause is a question and one way to do so is via a dummy element like
whether, which would be semantically vacuous. The prediction is that if a language (call it
English prime) employed I to C movement for both root and embedded questions, no such
repair strategy should be needed given that we would be able to differentiate between an
embedded declarative, (41a), and an embedded question, (41b).
(41) Did John come to the party? English prime
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a. Mary wants to know that John came to the party.
b. Mary wants to know did John come to the party.
Further support for such a proposal comes when we look at the co-occurrence of disjunc-
tive phrases and regular wh-phrases in embedded contexts. The fact that whether is not
allowed in these cases adds support to the proposal outlined above since the presence of
a phonologically-marked wh-phrase, which girl, is indicative of a +wh CP and thus further
disambiguation is not needed.
(42) a. *Mary wants to know whether John or Bill kissed which girl.
b. Mary wants to know which girl John or Bill kissed.
An account such as Han and Romero’s, or for that matter any account that takes whether
to be the wh-counterpart of either or disjunction more generally, would run into problems
with the data above since it would have to rule out the co-occurrence of whether and other
wh-phrases on independent grounds. There are pros and cons to both approaches but as it
stands, no knock-down argument for either one. In the next chapter we turn our attention
to polar questions and we will see that unfortunately, the picture becomes even murkier
with respect to the status of whether.
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Chapter 5
Polar questions
In this chapter we turn our attention to polar questions, a type of interrogative that, like al-
ternate questions, lacks phonologically marked wh-phrases. This type of question requests
an answer that specifies whether the proposition expressed by the question holds or does
not hold. There are two ways to ask such a question, and they can be distinguished by the
presence versus absence of an or not constituent.
(1) a. Did Mary come to the party or not?
b. Did Mary come to the party?
Most analyses take the questions in (1) to denote the same set of propositions, namely (2):
(2) {Mary came to the party, Mary didn’t come to the party}
Despite this apparent similarity which might suggest that underlyingly there is no differ-
ence between the two, we see one domain where they do differ, namely with respect to NPI
behavior. Guerzoni (2011) notes that there is a contrast, however slight, between (3a) and
(3b) in terms of the acceptability of NPIs in their scope.
(3) a. *Did Mary eat anything or not?
b. Did Mary eat anything?
Using the contrast above as a starting point, I will propose, with others, that the p or not p?
polar question is a type of alternate question that denotes a set containing the proposition
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corresponding to the question nucleus and its negation. This, I will show, is responsible for
the unacceptability of NPIs in questions such as (3a). On the other hand, in order to account
for the acceptability of NPIs in p? questions like (3b), I depart from previous accounts and
propose that these types of polar questions have a different underlying representation that
resembles a conditional-like structure.
5.1 Background
Polar questions are generally taken to denote a set of two propositions, {p, ¬p}. The stan-
dard compositional semantics for questions that we adopted in the earlier chapters, namely
one that involves quantifying in of a wh-phrase, does not appear to be available in these
cases as there is no overt wh-phrase. Karttunen (1977) proposes to deal with these questions
by putting the burden on (a possible silent) whether, which is claimed to take as its sister
the singleton set containing the proposition and return a set containing the proposition and
its negation, with the semantics in (4).
(4) [[whether]] = λQ〈st,t〉. λp. p∈Q ∨ ¬p∈Q
His account relies on the presence of a proto-question forming operator that delivers this
singleton set. Within the present architecture of questions, which lacks such an operator,
Karttunen’s whether would have to adjoin at the top most level, as in (5a), delivering the set
of propositions in (5b):
(5) a. [whether [Id [λp [[C p] [λw. Mary camew to the party ]]]]]
b. [[whether]](λp. p = λw. Mary camew to the party) =
{Mary came to the party, Mary didn’t come to the party}
Guerzoni 2003 agrees with the baseline assumption that polar questions involve a possibly
covert whether but calls instead for a unification of polar and wh-questions by suggesting
that whether should be analyzed on par with other wh-phrases. Namely, she proposes to
analyze whether as an existential that, like other wh-phrases, undergoes movement to the
specifier of C and leaves behind a trace. Under this account, whether denotes an existential
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quantifier over functions of type 〈st, st〉, and comes with an implicit restrictor, a set contain-
ing the identity and negation {λp.p,λp.¬p}. For transparency, I will henceforth abbreviate
〈s, t〉, the type of propositions, with pi.
(6) [[whether]] = λf〈〈pi,pi〉,t〉.∃h∈{λp.p, λp.¬p} ∧ f(h) 〈〈〈pi,pi〉 , t〉 , t〉
Similarly to who, we can think of whether as which of yes or no, i.e. the wh counterpart of a
polarity phrase, PolP. One of the main advantages of such an account is that it maintains
a uniform analysis of all questions and in effect, groups together questions by taking them
all to involve existential quantification over a certain domain. In (7) I provide the (adapted)
LF proposed by Guerzoni 2003.
(7) Mary came, Mary didn’t come
Id λp. ∃h〈pi,pi〉[h∈{λp.p,λp.¬p} ∧
p=h(λw. M camew)]
λp
whether λh.p=h(λw.M camew)
λh〈pi,pi〉 p=h(λw.M camew)
Cint p
h(λw.M camew)
t〈pi,pi〉
λw M camew
Mary came
While this account constitutes a step closer towards a unification of polar and wh-questions,
it still leaves open a number of questions. For one thing, it is difficult to imagine what the
non-wh counterpart of whether might be. Most significantly, however, it leaves open the
question of how this carries over to alternate questions, discussed in the previous chapter,
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which too must (obligatorily) co-occur with whether. It’s difficult to see what Guerzoni,
or for that matter Karttunen, would be able to say about alternate questions which de-
note the disjunction of two affirmative propositions given that the denotation of whether
is specifically catered to derive a negative proposition on their account. Lastly, this family
of accounts makes no suggestion as to whether or not the polar questions in (8) are to be
given the same analysis.
(8) a. Did Mary come?
b. Did Mary come or not?
In the following section I provide an account for the question in (8b) that analyses it on par
with alternate questions. This account is by no means novel but merely a notational variant
of previous proposals, as many have already suggested that polar and alternate questions
should receive a similar analysis based on the fact that they both involve the disjunction of
two propositions and obligatorily co-occur with whether when embedded.
5.2 p or not p? polar questions
5.2.1 p or not p? questions as alternate questions
Han and Romero (2004b) claim that all whether. . . or questions should receive a parallel
account based on the claim that they uniformly involve clausal disjunction at some under-
lying level. For example, for the questions in (9a) and (9b), they claim that the two clauses
that are being disjoined are as in (9a’) and (9b’), respectively.
(9) a. Did Mary order or not?
a.’ [IP1 Mary ordered] or [IP2 Mary not ordered]
b. Did Mary order cake or flan?
b.’ [IP1 Mary ordered cake] or [IP2 Mary ordered flan]
In order to derive the question meaning, that is, to get from a disjunction of propositions to
a set of propositions, Han and Romero (2004b) propose that, just like in regular questions,
here too we are dealing with an interrogative CP and wh-movement. The element they
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claim to undergo wh-movement is whether, which they take to be the wh-counterpart of
disjunctive either. . . or. The proposed LF for these questions is the following:1
(10) Id [λp [whetheri [[C p] [ti [IP1 . . . ] or [IP2 . . . ]]]]]
I already discussed in the previous chapter why this account is not ideal for the case of
alternate questions where I claimed that what actually undergoes wh-movement is not
whether, but rather the disjunctive phrase. I claimed whether is merely a dummy element
that is used only in embedded cases. I furthermore departed from Han and Romero’s anal-
ysis by taking the disjunction to be phrasal rather than clausal, and involve only those
elements that overly flank the disjunction or. I repeat the proposed LF for alternate ques-
tions below:
(11) a. Id [λp [[∃ cake or flan]i [λi [ [C p] [λw [Mary [orderedw ti ]]]]]]
b. λp. ∃x∈{cake, flan} ∧ p = λw. Mary orderedw x
Turning now to polar questions of the form p or not p?, I follow Han and Romero’s
suggestion that these questions are to be analyzed on par with alternate questions. What
that would mean in the present account is that what undergoes movement in this case is
the constituent representing the disjunction Mary ordered or not, that is, a quantifier over
propositions. Here I side with them in taking the disjunction to be at the IP level, and
assume, as before, that it’s base generated as a sister to a covert existential, as in (12). I
furthermore follow Han and Romero and assume that in these cases (but crucially not in
the case of alternate questions), we are dealing with ellipsis (cf. Schwarz 1999).2
1As before, I’m incorporating their account into the general architecture of questions assumed in this thesis.
These changes, as far as I can tell, do not affect the general outcome.
2I’m taking or to be an unselective operator of type 〈α, 〈α, αt〉〉, where α stands for any conjoinable type. In
the case of Mary or Suzy, the type of or would have to be 〈e, 〈e, et〉〉, while in the cases at hand, it would have
to be 〈st, 〈st, stt〉〉.
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(12) λQ〈pi,t〉.∃p[(p=Mary ordered ∨ p=Mary didn’t order) ∧ Q(p)]
∃
λP〈pi,t〉.λQ〈pi,t〉.∃p[P(p) ∧ Q(p)]
Mary ordered or not
λp. p=Mary ordered ∨ p=Mary didn’t order
At this point the rest of the derivation falls out straightforwardly. As in the case of alternate
questions, I claim that the existential in (12) bears a [+wh] feature, which attracts it to the
specifier position of C.3 This movement leaves behind a trace of type 〈pi〉, giving us the LF
in (13a), which the corresponding denotation in (13b).
(13) a. Did Mary order or not?
Id
λp
∃ Mary ordered or not
λq
C p t〈pi〉
b. λp. ∃q∈{Mary ordered, Mary didn’t order} ∧ p = q
c. {Mary ordered, Mary didn’t order}
What we’ve shown in this section is that a uniform account of wh-questions, alternate and
polar questions is not out of the realm of possibilities and in fact falls out arguably easy
once we assume that disjunctive phrases can also bear a [+wh] feature that leads to them
being interpreted on par with regular wh-phrases.
3Recall that unlike in the case of regular wh-phrases, this movement occurs at LF.
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5.2.2 Embedding polar questions
Turning now to the behavior of polar questions in embedded contexts, we see that similarly
to the case of alternate questions, the presence of whether is obligatory. I propose a similar
solution as in the previous chapter, namely one that takes whether to be a dummy element
that needs to be adjoined to the embedded question in the lack of other morphological cues
that the embedded CP is a question, such as other morphologically-marked wh-phrases.
Under such an account, the issue of why whether never co-occurs with other wh-phrases
never arises. An embedded question such as (14) would simply not be generated by the
grammar in the presence of another wh-phrase.
(14) *John wonders whether Mary ordered what or not.
We do, however, still need to rule out questions like those in (15), that is, address why it is
that polar questions are incompatible with wh-questions.
(15) a. *What did Mary order or not?
b. *John wonders what Mary ordered or not.
I see a couple of ways to go about dealing with this problem. First of all, note that the
wh-phrase what is embedded within a constituent that it itself bears a [+wh] feature. The
question nucleus would thus look as below:
(16) IP3[+wh]
∃
IP1
Mary ordered what[+wh]
IP2
Mary didn’t order what[+wh]
Assuming that this configuration is even possible, although one could imagine that this is
what actually rules out these configurations to begin with,, presumably the topmost [+wh]
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would move first, followed by across the board movement of the wh-phrase what, giving us
the LF in (17).
(17) Id [λp [whatj [λj [ [∃[Mary ordered tj or Mary didn’t order tj]]i [λi [ [C p] ti]]]]]]
The denotation of this question would be as in (18a), and it would correspond to the set in
(18b), assuming a domain with two dishes.
(18) a. λp. ∃x∈{cake, flan} ∧ ∃q∈{Mary ordered x, Mary didn’t order x} ∧ p=q
b. {Mary ordered flan, Mary ordered cake, Mary didn’t order flan, Mary didn’t
order cake}
The issue with having questions denote such sets is that when we apply Id to it, we are
going to end up with a presupposition failure. Consider a situation in which Mary ate cake.
In this case, there will be two propositions that are true in the set above, Mary ate cake and
Mary didn’t eat flan. The problem is that neither of these two counts as most informative
(since they don’t stand in an entailment relation), meaning that the requirement of Id
will not be satisfied.4 This observation is due to Bittner (1998), also adopted by Dayal
(in progress) who points out that appealing to the notion of the existence of a maximally
informative answer can help shed light on this incompatibility. Such questions will be
defined, i.e. have a maximally informative answer, only in cases in which the nucleus holds
true of all the individuals in the domain, i.e. both cake and flan above. However, given that
such questions are not defined for the general case, such as in situations as the one above,
polar questions with wh-phrases turn out to be unanswerable and thus deviant. Ultimately,
whether we want to say that it is this deviance, or the fact that we are dealing with two wh-
phrases embedded within each other, we have good reasons to rule out the co-occurence
of wh and polar questions.
4The same would hold true if the constituent question is interpreted strongly exhaustive, i.e. if it associates
with only. In this case we would have the propositions in (i).
(i) {Mary ordered only cake, it’s false that Mary ordered only cake, Mary ordered only flan, It’s false that
Mary ordered only flan}
Here it’s false that Mary ordered only flan would be true but again it wouldn’t entail Mary ordered only cake; nor
the other way around, hence the lack of a unique maximally informative proposition.
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A big question that looms over the literature of question embedding predicates is why
certain predicates cannot embed polar questions despite their ability to embed regular
constituent questions. For example surprise and realize can only embed wh-questions:
(19) a. Mary was surprised by who showed up at the party.
a.’ *Mary was surprised by whether John showed up at the party or not.
b. Mary realized who showed up at the party.
b.’ *Mary realized whether John showed up at the party or not.
One possible answer would be to say that these particular predicates cannot co-occur with
whether, due to some lexical constraint that says *surprise/realize+whether. This, however, is
a purely stipulative story that merely describes the facts and doesn’t capture the fact that
these predicates are the same ones that disallow strongly exhaustive questions as their
complements (cf. Lahiri 1991, Guerzoni 2003, Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007). In Chapter 2 I
addressed the issue of why certain predicates cannot embed strongly exhaustive questions
and offered a solution in terms of presupposition failure. I claimed that predicatess like
surprise, when they embed a question, carry a presupposition of mutual compatibility. That
is, they require that the set of propositions they embed be mutually consistent, which
cannot be possible if they embed a set of exhaustified propositions such as in (20).
(20) Qse = {Mary ate only cake, Mary ate only flan}
Incidentally, this same account carries over to the case of polar questions, which, by virtue
of denoting a set containing a proposition and its negation, will always consist of mutually
inconsistent propositions since in no world can both p and not p hold true. The fact that
the account for why certain predicates cannot embed strongly exhaustive questions can be
carried over seamlessly to deal with their inability to embed polar questions suggests that
an analysis of questions that does away with answer-hood operators like the one I adopt in
this thesis is superior to previous ones. In a theory that appeals to answerhood operators,
in order to account for the aforementioned constraints one would have to appeal to selec-
tional restrictions of different predicates such as claiming that surprise/realize cannot embed
a question headed by ans.we (cf. Guerzoni 2003). Not only are restrictions of this sort stip-
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ulative and lack in explanatory value, they also run into problems when trying to deal with
the parallel between strongly exhaustive and polar questions given that they are forced to
assume that polar questions can only be headed by ans.se in order to account for why
surprise/realize cannot embed them. Since a polar question would deliver the same answer
if headed by ans.we or ans.se, nothing prevents us from having both weak and strongly
exhaustive polar questions, so these theories need to either stipulate that polar questions
are obligatorily headed by ans.se, or offer a different account for why they pattern with
strongly exhaustive questions.
5.2.3 No weak/strong ambiguity
As mentioned above, polar questions, unlike wh-questions, do not exhibit a weak/strong
ambiguity given that the true proposition in the denotation of a polar question will al-
ways count as the complete, or exhaustive, answer. What a complete answer is depends
exclusively on the alternatives with respect to which we evaluate that answer. In the case
of wh-questions, the complete, or strongly exhaustive, answer will be the proposition that
conjoins the maximally informative true proposition with the negation of all propositions
in the set that are not entailed by it. With the exception of special cases, i.e. those where
every proposition in the set denoted by the question is true, a weakly exhaustive answer to
a question like (21), namely (21a), will be different (and in fact weaker) than the strongly
exhaustive answer to the question, namely (21b).
(21) What did Mary order?
a. Mary ordered flan.
b. Mary ordered flan and it’s false that Mary ordered cake.
The same is not true in the case of polar questions. Given that the propositions in the set
denoted by these questions are mutually exclusive regardless of the situation, a weakly ex-
haustive answer to (22) will be equivalent to a strongly exhaustive answer, i.e. (22a)=(22b),
since the strongly exhaustive answer is obtained by negating all non-entailed propositions.
This, of course, is rendered vacuous in this case by virtue of the fact that p ∧ ¬(¬p) = p.
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(22) Did Mary order or not?
a. Mary ordered.
b. Mary ordered and it’s false that Mary didn’t order.
What this suggests for the theory entertained in this chapter is that given that the presence
of only in polar questions is rendered vacuous, there is no reason to assume that this
operator is present in the LF of p or not p? questions.
5.2.4 NPIs in p or not p? questions
Just about every work on polar questions that also discusses NPIs points out that questions
like the following are acceptable across the board, regardless of whether the NPI is in
subject or object position.
(23) a. Did Mary order any dessert?
b. Did any girls come to the party?
The issue, however, is that none of these questions involve the constituent or not. Guerzoni
(2011) observes that the or not equivalent of these questions is significantly degraded.
(24) a. *Did Mary order any dessert or not?
b. *Did any girls come to the party or not?
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the fact that there is a contrast between
these two ways of asking questions with respect to the behavior of NPIs suggests that
underlyingly they have different representations. In the following section I will provide an
account for polar questions of the form in (23) that can explain why NPIs are acceptable.
For the remainder of this section, however, we will try to understand why NPIs are ruled
out in p or not p? polar questions. Consider what the question nucleus of a question such
as (24a) looks like, repeated from before.
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(25) IP3
∃
IP1
Mary ordered [any dessert][d]
IP2
Mary didn’t order [any dessert][d]
The presence of the NPI calls for a silent exhaustifier, Exh[d]. Under the assumption that
Exh[d] is a propositional operator, it must adjoin to each of IP1 and IP2.5 The problem,
however, is that while the exhaustification of the NPI in IP2 is consistent given that any
dessert occurs in the scope of negation, the exhaustification of the NPI in IP1 is not, precisely
for the same reason that NPIs cannot occur in declarative sentences that create upward
entailing contexts. I illustrate this below.
(26) a. ∃x∈D [Mary ordered x] ∧ ∀D’⊂D [¬∃y∈D’ [Mary ordered y]] ⊥
Exh[d] IP1
Mary ordered [any dessert][d]
b. ¬∃x∈D [Mary ordered x] where D=[[dessert]]
Exh[d] IP2
Mary didn’t order [any dessert][d]
5We could equivalently say that Exh[d] adjoins to the node immediately dominating these IPs and applies
point wise to every proposition in the set.
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Under the arguably reasonable assumption that failure of even one instance of exhaustifi-
cation will lead to an overall crash, we can now see clearly why NPIs are ruled out from
p or not p? polar questions given that one of its two occurrences cannot be exhaustified
coherently.
5.3 p? polar questions
In this section I turn to polar questions of the form in (27).
(27) Did Mary order cake?
I refer to these as p? polar questions so as to contrast them with the nearly equivalent p
or not p? questions discussed above. Most of the literature on polar questions takes these
questions to have the same underlying representation and thus to denote the same two-
membered set, and claim that the only difference lies in how much of the second disjunct
is elided (cf. Han and Romero 2004b). Given the contrast observed by Guerzoni (2011) with
respect to the behavior of NPIs, I side with those who claim that the two types of questions
are in fact semantically distinct. One such account is due to Biezma and Rawlins (2013),
who take a p? polar question to denote a singleton set containing the nucleus proposition.
They assume then that (27) ends up denoting the set in (28).
(28) {Mary ordered cake}
Given that I will ultimately end up proposing a similarly-minded account, it’s worth trying
to understand how such a set would be compositionally derived. The idea is that since we
are dealing with a question, we must have an interrogative C head, which in turn requires
the presence of a constituent that bears a [+wh] feature. In the case of p? questions I assume
that this constituent is the nucleus proposition itself. Assuming a flexible mapping between
propositions and their type denotations, I take this type 〈pi〉 proposition to type-shift to a
〈pi,pit〉 element, a generalized quantifier over propositions, as in (29).6
6This is no different than the flexibility endorsed by Partee and Rooth (1983) and Partee (1986) in order to
deal with the need of lifted meanings for noun phrases.
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(29) λw. Mary orderedw
li f t
−→ λQ〈pi,t〉. Q(λw. Mary orderedw)
Putting all the pieces together, we can derive the singleton proposition via the same mech-
anisms as before:
(30) λp. p = λw. Mary orderedw
λp p = λw. Mary orderedw
λQ〈pi,t〉. Q(λw. Mary orderedw)
Mary ordered
λq. p = q
λq p = g(1)
C p g(1)〈pi〉
Biezma and Rawlins (2013) don’t discuss the question of how NPIs are licensed in these
questions and given their proposal, it’s unclear how their would actually account for these
facts. We can see that simply moving from the two-membered set {p, ¬p} to the singleton
{p} will not get us any closer to accounting for the acceptability of NPIs, given that the
exhaustification of the NPI would be checked with respect to an upward entailing environ-
ment. Something more needs to be said.
In order to capture the fact that NPIs are actually licensed in these questions, I propose
that p? polar questions can (optionally) be reinterpreted as conditionals. That is, there are
two possible ways to interpret these types of questions. One option is to interpret them as
p or not p? questions and assume that the not p constituent undergoes ellipsis, similar to the
approach taken in Han and Romero 2004b, while another option is to interpret (31a) as a
conditional, like in (31b).
(31) a. Did Mary order the cake?
b. I want to know if Mary ordered the cake.
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This move is arguably quite intuitive given that asking the question in (31a) conveys the
same meaning as the conditional in (31b). Most striking, however, is that by encoding this
likeness in the semantics we end up interpreting the nucleus proposition in the antecedent
of a conditional, an environment well known for its ability to license NPIs.
5.3.1 p? questions as conditionals
Given the assumption that all direct questions are to be interpreted as speech acts, namely
as embedded under a silent I want to know, for the remainder of this section all the examples
will involve questions embedded under overt I want to know since I take the analysis of em-
bedded and unembedded questions to be equivalent. As mentioned above, I will endorse
a hybrid account of p? questions wherein they can receive one of two interpretations. A p?
question like (32) can optionally receive the same interpretation as its p not p? counterpart,
with the only difference between the two being in terms of how much material is elided, as
in (32a) (cf. Han and Romero (2004b)). Another option for p? questions is to be interpreted
as conditionals, like in (32b).
(32) Did Mary order?
a. I want to know whether Mary ordered or Mary didn’t order
b. I want to know if Mary ordered.
There are a couple of ways to go about delivering the conditional meaning in (32b). One
option is to say that although whether is a dummy element, it is actually not semantically
vacuous (contrary to what I have claimed up to this point) and has the meaning in (33).7
(33) [[whether]] = λP〈pi,t〉.λQ〈pi,t〉. ∀p [P(p)→ Q(p)] 〈〈pi, t〉 , 〈〈pi, t〉 , t〉〉
Under this approach we would take whether to be a quantifier over sets of propositions,
with essentially the same meaning as that of a universal quantifier. When adjoined to a
question, it creates a quantifier phrase which in turn must QR above the matrix subject.
The LF for the question would be as in (34). Given that the constituent whether Mary ordered
7Alternatively, we could take if to carry this meaning.
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is of type 〈〈pi, t〉 , t〉, it leaves behind a type 〈pi〉 trace which is subsequently abstracted over:
(34) a. [[whether Mary ordered] [λp〈pi〉 [John [wants to know t〈pi〉]]]]
b.
whether〈〈pi,t〉,〈〈pi,t〉,t〉〉
∀p[P(p)→ Q(p)]
P〈pi,t〉
λp. p = λw.Mary orderedw
Q〈pi,t〉
λq. John wants to know q
This is not any different from the run of the mill cases of QR of quantifier phrases from
object position, like (35):
(35) John knows every girl
every〈〈e,t〉,〈〈e,t〉,t〉〉
∀x[P(x)→ Q(x)]
P〈e,t〉
λx. girl(x)
Q〈e,t〉
λy. John knows y
Yet another option is to maintain, as before, that whether is devoid of any meaning and
that the conditional interpretation comes about via an operator that is base-generated in
the interrogative C head, as below. That is, instead of having the Id operator be the internal
argument of C, like in (36a) for constituent questions, in the case of polar questions what is
actually merged in that position is an operator If, like in (36b), with the meaning in (36c).8
(36) a.
C〈pi,pit〉 Id
. . .
−→
Id
λp
...
C〈pi,pit〉 p〈pi〉
. . .
8Taking If to be merged as a sister to the question operator is similar to the account proposed in Heim
(2012) where she assumes a similar underlying structure for polar questions, with the main difference being
that her operator, Op2, constructs partitions.
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b.
C〈pi,pit〉 If
. . .
−→
If
λp
...
C〈pi,pit〉 p〈pi〉
. . .
c. [[If]] = λP〈pi,t〉.λQ〈pi,t〉. ∀p [P(p)→ Q(p)] 〈〈pi, t〉 , 〈〈pi, t〉 , t〉〉
d. If [λp [[C p] [λw [Mary orderedw ]]]]
These two options for deriving the conditional-like meaning of p? polar questions differ
only in terms of how the antecedent of the conditional is obtained: either via a contentful
whether that adjoins to the question, or by positing a different complex interrogative C head.
Both options agree on the fact that these questions end up being interpreted as generalized
quantifiers over questions and must undergo QR over the matrix subject. Whichever option
we adopt, we will end up with the same final meaning:
(37) a. John wants to know whether Mary ordered.
b. ∀p [p∈{λp. p = λw. Mary orderedw}→ p∈{λq. John wants to know q}]
c. If Mary ordered, John wants to know that Mary ordered.
5.3.2 NPIs in p? questions
Let’s turn now to NPIs and see how this analysis of p? questions can derive their acceptabil-
ity in these types of polar questions. Consider again the LF of such a question. As we well
know by now, in the presence of an NPI, an Exh needs to be adjoined at a scope position.
We could, as before, adjoin this operator at the level of the question nucleus, as in (38a), but
this would result in a contradiction for the same reason why exhaustifying an affirmative
proposition containing an NPI crashes. There is, however, another scope position available
for Exh, namely the topmost IP, the conditional, as in (38b).
(38) John wants to know whether Mary ordered anything.
a. ∀p [p∈{λp. p = Exhd [λw. Mary orderedw anythingd]}
→ p∈{λq. John wants to know q}] ✗
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b. Exhd [∀p p∈{λp. p = λw. Mary orderedw anythingd}
→ p∈{λq. John wants to know q}] ✓
When the Exh operator adjoins at the topmost level as in (38b), the exhaustification of the
NPI takes place with respect to a downward entailing environment given that the NPI
occurs in the restrictor of a universal quantifier. This, I claim, is why NPIs are acceptable
in these types of polar questions.
Assuming this underlying representation for p? polar questions furthermore allows
us to understand two other NPI-related facts: the lack of a subject-object asymmetry and
the unacceptability of strong NPIs. The fact that no subject-object asymmetry is observed
in polar questions, as seen in (39), is due to the fact that the entire question nucleus is
interpreted in the restrictor of a universal, a DE environment, so whether the NPI is an
object or subject is deemed irrelevant.
(39) a. Did Mary order anything?
b. Did anybody order cake?
On the other hand, a contrast that does surface in both polar and wh-questions is that
of the weak/strong NPI divide. While weak NPIs like any and ever are acceptable in these
questions, strong NPIs like in weeks and adverbial either are not. For constituent questions
we derived this contrast by taking NPIs to be base generated in the scope of a covert only.
We saw that NPIs exhibit the same weak/strong contrast when in the scope of overt only,
and since this is how they are interpreted in strongly exhaustive questions, the fact that
only weak NPIs are acceptable fell out immediately. Incidentally, a conditional analysis for
polar questions allows us to apply the same reasoning. We independently know that weak,
but not strong NPIs are acceptable in the antecedent of conditionals and the restrictor of
universals, as in (40).
(40) a. If Mary ever calls you, let me know.
a.’ *If Mary called John in weeks, I want to know.
b. Every girl who has ever taken a linguistics class passed the admittance test.
b.’ *Every girl who has taken a linguistics class either passed the admittance test.
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By assuming that p? polar questions are conditionals underlyingly, the fact that strong
NPIs are ruled out from these questions can, and should be, attributed to the same factors
that rule them out in regular conditionals. I refer the interested reader to Chierchia 2012
for an exhaustification-based account of why conditionals are not good licensors of strong
NPIs. The account is similar to what we see with only as it relates back to the Strawson-DE
character of these operators (von Fintel, 1999).
5.3.3 Conditional strengthening
In the previous subsections I claimed that in order for NPIs to be acceptable in p? polar
questions, the question needs to take on a conditional-like meaning. Crucially, we assumed
that the question, at its core, denotes a singleton, the set containing the nucleus proposition.
This was a necessary move so as to avoid running into the same problem as in the case of
p or not p? questions where the NPI occurs in two propositions that give rise to opposite
entailment patterns. However, even a question such as (41) can receive a negative answer,
and under a theory of questions that takes answers to be “picked out” from the question
denotation, this conditional analysis runs into problems.
(41) Did Mary order anything?
a. Yes, she did.
b. No, she didn’t.
In other words, it seems that beyond the conditional in (42a), we also want to somehow
derive the conditional that comes about from substituting p for ¬p, as in (42b):9
(42) a. If Mary ordered anything, John knows that she did.
b. If Mary didn’t order anything, John knows that she didn’t.
9A somewhat similar problem is faced by Biezma and Rawlins (2013) since they too analyze these questions
as singletons. They propose an anti-singleton coercion mechanism (p. 25) via which a singleton proposition
{A} is coerced into the denotation {λw. A(w), λw. ¬A(w)}, which amounts to giving the p? question the same
denotation as its p or not p? counterpart. This is not going to be of any use to us since it would deliver a
conditional of the form in (i) and exhaustification of the NPI at the matrix level, i.e. above the conditional,
would result in a contradiction as one of the NPIs is in the scope of two downward entailing operators, the
embedded negation and the conditional.
(i) If Mary ordered anything or Mary didn’t order anything, John knows that.
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As it stands, this portion of the meaning is not predicted in this account. In order to obtain
this second conditional, I claim that can we appeal to the notion of conditional perfection
from von Fintel 2001. The basic idea is that sentences such as (43a) convey not just if p, q but
also if not p, not q, which von Fintel claims to come about via the mechanism of Conditional
Perfection.
(43) a. If you mow the lawn, I’ll pay you 5 dollars.
b. If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t pay you 5 dollars.
In a nutshell, the inference from (43a) to (43b) comes about as follows: if p, q has an alter-
native q no matter what, which is essentially equivalent to if not p, q. Since this alternative is
stronger, we have to negate it, which amounts to if not p, not q.10
Turning to the conditional in (42), we see that Conditional Perfection is going to give us
(44a), which is not right. What we need is (44b).
(44) a. If Mary didn’t order anything, it’s not the case that John knows that she did.
b. If Mary didn’t order anything, John knows that she didn’t.
This issue arises due to the factivity of know, which in (44a) contradicts the antecedent.
Since know presupposes that its complement is true and negation is a hole for presup-
positions, the consequent will end up presupposing the complement of know, that Mary
ordered, which is incompatible with the presupposition of the conditional, namely that the
antecedent Mary didn’t order must be possible. To avoid this problem I claim that know in
these cases is not actually factive, meaning that to know whether p should actually be to
believe whether p, where believe is the non-factive variant of know.11 At this point we see that
the inference from (45a) to (45b) will come out right away given that believe is neg-raising
and thus ¬(believe p) = believe (¬p).
10Negating if not p, q gives us if not p, not q due to the fact that conditionals obey the law of Conditional
Excluded Middle (CEM) (Stalnaker 1981, Gajewski 2005). This law is stated as in (i):
(i) (if p, q) ∨ (if p, not q)
So in the case of if not p, q, CEM would give us (if not p, q) ∨ (if not p, not q). Since negating one of the disjuncts
amounts to asserting the other disjunct, ¬(if not p, q) is equivalent to if not p, not q.
11Doing completely away with the factive presupposition of know is too strong so we’ll probably want to say
that this presupposition is encoded at a different level.
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(45) a. If Mary ordered anything, John believes that she did.
b. If Mary didn’t order anything, John doesn’t believe that she did.
= If Mary didn’t order anything, John believes that she didn’t.
5.3.4 Outstanding questions
In the previous section I proposed a new way to interpret polar questions so as to account
for the fact that NPIs are acceptable in these types of questions. I claimed that one possible
way to go about accounting for their acceptability is by reanalyzing polar questions of the
form p? as conditionals and I discussed two options for how we might want to derive this
conditional interpretation. One way would be to assume that whether is not semantically
vacuous and that its contribution to meaning is that of a universal quantifier over questions,
giving us the conditional flavor of these questions. Yet another option would be to maintain
that whether is semantically vacuous and its contribution is simply that of a morphological
flag that the embedded CP is an interrogative. Under this proposal, the conditional mean-
ing would come about by assuming that p? polar questions are associated with a different
complex C head, one where an operator If, a quantifier over questions, is base generated as
the sister of the interrogative C head. The second part of the proposal is the same regard-
less of which of the above we adopt. The question, which at this point denotes a singleton
proposition, undergoes QR above the matrix IP and ends up being interpreted in the re-
strictor of a universal, which accounts for the acceptability of NPIs and furthermore lets us
understand why strong NPIs are ruled out from these questions by drawing an analogy to
their behavior in the restrictor of universal quantifiers over individuals.
Two issues need to be addressed in connection with these proposals. Why is it that
surprise-type predicates cannot embed these questions and what prevents us from employ-
ing this same conditional reinterpretation for other questions. In addressing the first issue,
I claim that these questions cannot function as the complement of surprise for the same
reason why strongly exhaustive wh-questions, alternate questions or p or not p? polar ques-
tions cannot: its complement does not denote a set of mutually consistent propositions. If
we can convince ourselves that surprise and its kins carry a presupposition as in (46), then
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this will in fact not be an issue given that a singleton complement will never be able to
satisfy this requirement.
(46) [[surpriseQ]] = defined iff ∃p, q ∈ Q ∧ "(p ∧ q)
Let’s turn now to the second problem, namely why this conditional re-interpretation is
not available for regular wh-questions. Here the answer will depend on which of the above
two approaches we adopt. If we take whether to adjoin to a question if and only if there
are no other morphologically-marked wh-phrases in the structure, and furthermore assume
that what is responsible for the conditional meaning is whether itself, then it will never be
the case that whether could co-occur with another wh-phrase and hence it will never be
possible to derive this conditional meaning for these questions.12 But what if we assume
that the conditional meaning is not encoded in whether, but rather in the C head? What
prevents us from having this version of C with regular questions? One instance where
it’s clear that we want to avoid this option is in the case of weakly exhaustive questions
embedded under surprise. If (47b) were a possible LF for (47a), then we would wrongly
predict NPIs to be licensed in these cases since they would end up being interpreted in the
restrictor of a universal, as in (47c).
(47) a. *John was surprised by who ordered anything.
b.
John
surprise
If
who
λx
C p
x ordered anything
c. ∀p [p∈{x ordered anything | x∈[[person]]}→ John was surprised that p]
Even putting aside the issue of NPIs, it’s clear that this is not the right meaning we want
for surprise. For John to be surprised by who ordered cake, it suffices that he be surprised
by one proposition in the denotation of the question, and not all as (47b) would require.
12The reader can check that this gives us the right meaning for both alternate questions and p or not p? polar
questions, the other types of interrogatives that co-occur with whether.
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At this point all we can do is leave this as an open problem and suggest that one possible
avenue for dealing with this is to have If itself carry some sort of presupposition that its
complement not denote a set of mutually compatible propositions (i.e. the opposite of what
surprise requires). One might even aim to have this constraint fall out from independently
motivated assumptions about conditionals.
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Chapter 6
Higher-order questions
A full story cannot be complete without looking at more complex questions, such as mul-
tiple wh-questions, questions with quantifiers, and mention some questions. First and fore-
most, one needs to check whether the theory proposed in this thesis holds water once these
more complex questions are considered. In particular, we need to look at the distribution
of NPIs in these types of questions and see whether it follows from the predictions we
made for the basic cases. The discussion of these empirical facts will be mostly expository
in nature as much field work still remains to be done in order to obtain the full range of
data. At first glance, however, we will see that the judgements align with the predictions
made by the general theory presented in Chapters 2 and 3, namely that NPIs are acceptable
in root questions whenever they are c-commanded by a wh-phrase.
Second, since I am basically arguing for a new semantics of questions, one needs to un-
derstand how this analysis extends to the more complex cases mentioned above. The dis-
cussion in this chapter is preliminary and aims mainly to pave the way for a more thorough
investigation of the complications we run into once we turn to higher-order questions. On
perusing the literature on this topic, one can find two types of analyses given to these ques-
tions; on the one hand there are theories that aim to offer a unified account of single and
multiple wh-questions that cannot be easily extended to questions with quantifiers, while
on the other hand we have analyses that look at single wh-questions and questions with
quantifiers but exclude multiple wh-questions from the analysis. The issue, as it stands, is
that it is not clear how these two types of solutions can be made compatible with each
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other and the goal of this chapter is to offer a possible unification of all these phenomena
by more or less adopting the essence of both approaches. In the last section of this chapter
I turn to mention some questions and I propose a novel way to account for these read-
ings compositionally and uniformly in such a way that is compatible with the theory of
questions this thesis advocates for.
6.1 Multiple wh-questions
6.1.1 Single pair readings
Similarly to single wh-questions, the single-pair reading for multiple wh-questions is de-
rived as in (1), with the only difference being that in this case the C head attracts two
[+wh] elements, with the LF in (1a) and the denotation in (1b). As before, I take the Id
operator to originate as a sister of C and move out in order to avoid a type mismatch.
(1) Which girl kissed which boy?
Ann kissed John.
a. Id [λp [which girl [λx [which boy [λy [[C p] [x [kissed y]]]]]]]]
b. Id[λp. ∃x∃y [x∈[[girl]]w0 ∧ y∈[[boy]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x kissedw y]]
Let’s assume for the remainder of this chapter a scenario with three girls, Ann, Mary
and Suzy, and four boys, Bill, Greg, John and Fred. In this scenario, the question will denote
the set of propositions in (2). Recall that since we are dealing with singular which phrases,
each proposition in the answer set will denote a relationship between atomic individuals,
rather than plural individuals (Dayal, 1996).
(2) {Ann kissed John, Ann kissed Fred, Ann kissed Greg, Ann kissed Bill, Mary kissed
John, Mary kissed Fred, Mary kissed Greg, Mary kissed Bill, Suzy kissed John, Suzy
kissed Fred, Suzy kissed Greg, Suzy kissed Bill}
Recall the meaning of the Id operator, repeated below in (3).
(3) [[Id]] = λQ.λw: ∃p ans(Q)(w)= p. Q
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where [[ans]] = λQ.λw. ιp [p(w)=1 ∧ Q(p)=1 ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)]
Applying this operator to the set in (2) will return the same set if and only if this set
contains a unique maximally informative true proposition. For that to be the case, there
can be only one girl who did any kissing and only one boy who was kissed. That is, the
only way the presupposition of Id can be satisfied when applied to this question is if only
one of the propositions in (2) is true. Single pair readings for multiple wh-questions will
thus arise whenever there is a single ordered pair that satisfies the relationship denoted
by the main predicate. Note, however, that if instead of asking the question using singular
which phrases we had asked its more neutral variant in (4a), a possible answer would also
allow for one-to-many pairings, as in (4b), given that who is not restricted to atoms but can
instead range over pluralities as well.
(4) a. Which girl kissed who?
b. Ann kissed John and Fred.
As we did in the case of single wh-questions, we need to see how NPIs behave in these
questions, and namely, if we see a contrast depending on the relative position of the NPI
and the wh-phrases.
(5) a. Who wrote what in their papers?
b. Who wrote what in any of their papers?
(5b) is just as acceptable as (5a), suggesting that NPIs are acceptable even in multiple
wh-questions. We are also interested, however, to see what happens when the NPI occurs
between the two wh-phrases, such as in (6). The problem is that speakers vary on which
they find acceptable making it difficult to agree on what the right empirical facts are. The
problem may easily stem from a more general processing issue in cases involving multiple
wh-phrases and quantifiers and this is a place to amass judgements on a large-scale in
the future. Nonetheless, it does appear to be the case that questions where the NPI is c-
commanded by both wh-phrases, namely (6b), fare better than when it intervenes between
the two, (6a).
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(6) a. Who gave any assignment to which student?
b. Who gave which student any feedback?
Future work should also investigate whether the weak/strong distinction holds as robustly
in multiple wh-questions as it does in regular wh-questions. Prima facie, the prediction seems
to hold that NPIs are indeed more likely to be acceptable in a multiple wh-question em-
bedded under know than in one embedded under surprise.
(7) a. Mary was surprised by which girl sent which greeting card to anybody.
b. John knows which girl sent which greeting card to anybody.
We will return to a discussion of covert only and its contribution at the end of this section.
6.1.2 Pair list readings
In cases where the presupposition of Id is not satisfied, namely when there are multiple
true answers, a question such as (8) can receive a pair-list reading, as in (8a). What char-
acterizes these readings is the fact that the uniqueness presupposition observed for single
pair readings with which phrases is replaced by two distinct requirements: that every girl
kissed some boy, and furthermore, that every girl kissed only one boy, which can be seen
by the awkwardness of (8b) and (8c) when used as responses to this question.
(8) Which girl kissed which boy?
a. Ann kissed Fred, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
b. #Ann kissed Fred and Mary kissed Greg.
c. #Ann kissed Fred and John, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
We will return to a discussion of how these requirements can be derived at the end of this
section. For now, let’s focus on understanding how these pair list readings come about.
6.1.2.1 Families of questions
One position in the literature (cf. Hagstrom 1998, Dayal in progress and Fox 2012), which
I adopt in this paper, is that pair list answers come about by interpreting the question as a
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family of questions. Basically, the idea is that one first creates a question that asks about a
specific girl which boy she saw, and then asks that question for every girl in the domain of
quantification, which in set notation would look as in (9):
(9) {{λw. x kissedw y: y∈ [[boy]]w0}: x∈ [[girl]]w0}
Considering the same scenario as before, the set in (9) will denote a set of three questions,
as there are three girls:
(10)


Which boy did Ann kiss?,
Which boy did Mary kiss?,
Which boy did Suzy kiss?


Each question in (10) is going to contain four propositions, as there are four possible boys
the girls could have kissed:
(11)




Ann kissed John
Ann kissed Fred
Ann kissed Greg
Ann kissed Bill


,


Mary kissed John
Mary kissed Fred
Mary kissed Greg
Mary kissed Bill


,


Suzy kissed John
Suzy kissed Fred
Suzy kissed Greg
Suzy kissed Bill




Each proposition in (11) has the form in (12), where x varies with the girls.
(12) λp. ∃y∈[[boy]]w0 ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y
The next step is figuring out how to get from (12) to the family of questions denotation
compositionally. The idea we will pursue here is that getting from a question to a set/family
of questions is going to proceed via the same mechanism that we used to get from a
proposition to a set of propositions. Recall that in the case of a simple question we had the
C head in (13a) do all of the work by assuming that it starts off its life as the complex head
in (13b) and ends up as in (13c) via the type-driven QR of the Id operator.
(13) a. C〈st,stt〉 = λp〈st〉.λq〈st〉. (p=q)
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b.
C〈st,stt〉 Id
x kissed y
→ c.
Id
λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p〈s,t〉
x kissed y
Deriving a family of questions amounts to proposing a second instantiation of C above
(13c) which would take a question and return a family of questions, similarly to how the
first C takes a proposition and returns a family of propositions. In order to do so, we can
lift the meaning of this second C from (13a) to be as in (14a).
(14) a. C〈stt,sttt〉 = λQ〈st,t〉.λQ’〈st,t〉. (Q = Q’)
How does this all come together however? One implementation, following Fox (2012), who
in turn follows Shimada (2007), is to assume that in these cases we are dealing with a
complex head, as in (15a). Type-theoretical considerations force the embedded complex
head to move out, leaving behind a variable of type 〈s, t〉, as in (15b). The newly moved
head itself faces a type mismatch, which can be rectified by moving out the Id operator
and leaving behind a variable of the appropriate type, 〈st, t〉, as in (15c).
(15) a.
C〈st,stt〉 C〈stt,sttt〉 Id x kissed y
b.
C〈stt,sttt〉 Id λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p〈s,t〉
x kissed y
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c.
Id
λQ
...
C〈stt,sttt〉 Q〈st,t〉 λp
...
C〈st,stt〉 p
x kissed y
Basically, what we want in the end is for the Id operator to end up in the top-most position,
so it can apply to the question denotation, be it a plain question or a family of questions.
However, given that it originates in an doubly-embedded position, it needs to undergo
two separate movements, with each instance of head movement corresponding with the
QR of one of the wh-phrases. Crucially, since we are essentially dealing with an extended
projection of the same head, we assume that the relative order of the moved wh-phrases
needs to respect their base c-command positions (cf. Richards (1997)). Below I go over the
step-by-step derivation of such a family of questions. We first move the lower wh-phrase:
(16) [which boy [λy [C〈st,stt〉 [C〈stt,sttt〉 Id]] [which girl kissed y]]]
Next the internal complex [C Id] moves, leaving behind a trace of type 〈s, t〉:
(17) [[C〈stt,sttt〉 Id ] [λp [which boy [λy [C〈st,stt〉 p] [which girl kissed y]]]]]
The second wh-phrase moves out:
(18) [which girl [λx [[C〈stt,sttt〉 Id] [λp [which boy [λy [C〈st,stt〉 p] [x kissed y]]]]]]]
Finally, we move the Id operator as in (19), leaving behind a trace of type 〈st, t〉.
(19) [Id [λQ [which girl [λx [[C〈stt,sttt〉 Q] [λp [which boy [λy [[C〈st,stt〉 p] [x kissed y
]]]]]]]]]]
We see then how via a combination of successive head movement and wh-movement, a
family of questions is created. Its final denotation is as in (20), a set of questions Q that ask
for each x who is a girl, which boy that girl kissed.
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(20) λQ. ∃x∈[[girl]] ∧ Q=λp. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y
The next step in the analysis is to understand how Id applies to a family of questions. This
part of the analysis will have far-reaching consequences, both for our understanding of
question-embedding, as well as for dealing with the fact that with families of questions,
the presupposition on Id manifests itself not as a uniqueness presupposition, but as a
domain-exhaustivity and point-wise uniqueness constraint.
6.1.2.2 Point-wise uniqueness and domain exhaustivity
Recall the family of questions obtained in our scenario and assume that the true proposi-
tions are those bolded in (21).
(21)




Ann kissed John
Ann kissed Fred
Ann kissed Greg
Ann kissed Bill


,


Mary kissed John
Mary kissed Fred
Mary kissed Greg
Mary kissed Bill


,


Suzy kissed John
Suzy kissed Fred
Suzy kissed Greg
Suzy kissed Bill




Given the set in (21), what must the role of Id be such that for someone to know (22a), they
need to know (22b)?
(22) a. Which girl kissed which boy?
b. Ann kissed Fred, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
A big debate in the literature has been trying to understand why singular wh-questions
impose a uniqueness requirement while multiple wh-questions do not. That is, while the
question in (23a) presupposes that only one girl did any kissing, the multiple wh-question
in (23b) does not. In fact, (23b) requires something else: that all the girls under consideration
engaged in kissing and that no girl kissed more than one boy, which can be seen by the
fact that (23bi-ii) would not count as appropriate answers (c.f. Dayal 1996).
(23) a. Which girl kissed John?
(i) #Mary and Suzy kissed John.
b. Which girl kissed which boy?
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(i) #Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
(ii) #Ann kissed Greg and John, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
These two requirements have been referred to as point-wise uniqueness – that each girl
kissed only one boy – and domain exhaustivity – that each girl kissed a boy. I provide the
following two examples from Fox 2012 to better illustrate the reflex of this presupposition:
(24) Domain exhaustivity
a. Guess which of these 3 kids will sit on which of these 4 chairs.
b. #Guess which of these 4 kids will sit on which of these 3 chairs.
suggests that two kids will sit on the same chair
(25) Point-wise uniqueness
a. I wonder which one of the 3 boys will do which one of the 3 chores.
b. #I wonder which one of the 3 boys will do which one of the 4 chores.
suggests that one of the chores will not be done
So the question now is how to account for the fact that Id delivers a uniqueness re-
quirement when applied to a single wh-question, but point-wise uniqueness and domain
exhaustivity requirements when applied to a multiple wh-question. Under the account of
multiple wh-questions proposed above, I see at least two possible ways of deriving the rela-
tionship between the role of Id in questions and its role in families of questions: one option
would be to have Id apply to a family of questions via plural predication, while a second
option would be to have it apply point-wise.
This relationship will fall out straightforwardly once we assume that Id can apply to a
family of questions via plural predication.1 In the case at hand, I take plural predication
of Id to amount to taking the grand union of the questions obtained by applying Id to
every member of the family, returning an object of type 〈st, t〉, namely another question.
Informally, this would look like in (26), with the formal definition of Id updated as in (27).
1Fox (2012) attributes this observation to Heim (2010). Note, however, that he appeals to the ans operator
to derive these facts. A similarly-minded proposal, albeit pragmatically-based, is given in Hagstrom 1998.
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(26) Id




Which boy did Ann kiss?,
Which boy did Mary kiss?,
Which boy did Suzy kiss?




=
⋃


Id(Which boy did Ann kiss?)
Id(Which boy did Mary kiss?)
Id(Which boy did Suzy kiss?)


(27) [[Id]] =


λQ〈st,t〉.λw: ∃p ans(Q)(w)= p. Q
λK〈stt,t〉.λw: ∀Q∈K [∃p ans(Q)(w)= p]. ∪K
Now, we know that Id imposes the requirement that there be a true proposition in the
question denotation which is maximally informative. For there to be only one such propo-
sition in each question belonging to the family of questions in (26), there must be only one
boy that say, Ann kissed, given that which-phrases quantify over atomic individuals; this
derives the point-wise uniqueness requirement of multiple wh-questions discussed above.
Furthermore, by imposing that there be one such answer, we’re basically requiring each
question to have an answer, namely that each girl kissed somebody, satisfying the domain
exhaustivity requirement of multiple wh-questions.
Yet another option, which seems more appropriate given our claims regarding the con-
tribution of Id, would be to say that Id is what it is, a filter on questions, with no assertive
contribution whatsoever. The proposal would be that when it acts on families of questions
it has the option of applying point wise to each member of the family. Under this view,
Id({Q}) would simply return {Q}, the same family of questions if and only if each member
satisfies the uniqueness presupposition, deriving the point-wise uniqueness requirement.
For each question to satisfy the uniqueness presupposition, each question must have an
answer, which in turn gives the requirement of domain-exhaustivity. I provide the two
versions of Id in (28).
(28) [[Id]] =


λQ〈st,t〉.λw: ∃p ans(Q)(w)= p. Q
λK〈stt,t〉.λw: ∀Q∈K [∃p ans(Q)(w)= p]. K
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6.1.3 Embedding families of questions
Let’s turn now to the question of how predicates embed families of questions, focusing
specifically on the example in (29).
(29) Jeremy knows which girl kissed which boy.
Jeremy knows that Ann kissed Fred, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
Here again we will have two options, depending on which way we choose to interpret Id’s
contribution. By plural predicating Id of a family of questions, (26) basically returns the
same set we obtain from the single-pair reading, (30), with the only difference being that
this set allows, and in fact requires, the existence of multiple maximally informative true
answers by virtue of having had Id apply before taking the union.
(30) {λp. ∃x∈[[girl]]w0 ∧ ∃y∈[[boy]]w0 ∧ p = λw. x kissedw y}
At this point, know would apply to this set as in (31). Given that in this case Q contains
three true propositions, for someone to know this question on its pair list reading, they
need to believe three distinct propositions (and additionally have no false beliefs).
(31) [[know]] = λw.λQ.λx. ∀p∈Q [p(w)→ believe(w)(p)(x)] ∧
[[know]] = λw.λQ.λx. ∀p∈Q [believe(w)(p)(x) → p(w)]
There are a few problems with this approach. First of all, we are no longer taking Id to be
vacuous given that it actually contributes to meaning when it acts on families of questions
by returning not the same family, but a set of propositions. Second, knowQ can no longer
have a meaning in terms of its propositional counterpart, as in (32), since in these cases
to know a question requires knowing more than one proposition, contrary to what Ans in
(32a) would return.
(32) [[knowQ]] = λw.λQ.λx. knowp(w)(Ans(Q)(w))(x)
a. Ans(Q)(w) = ιp[p(w) ∧ Q(p)=1 ∧ ∀p’∈Q (p’(w)→ p⊆p’)]
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And lastly, by taking families of questions to ultimately denote questions, we can no longer
account for the observation in Fox 2012 that pair-list readings exhibit a multiple question
effect, as in (33). Fox appeals to the notion of quantification variability to illustrate that
there is a difference (if ever so slightly) between single wh-questions, the (i) examples, and
multiple wh-questions, the (ii) examples. The idea is that modifiers such as for the most part,
in every case, or with no exceptions can be used with families of questions to indicate what
subset of the families of questions the agent stands in a know relation with.2 This difference
between the (i) and (ii) cases, however, can only hold true if families of questions and reg-
ular questions have different denotations. By taking Id to return a question when applied
to a family of questions, there would no longer be a type difference between families of
questions and regular questions so the contrast in (33) would have to be accounted for
differently.
(33) a. (i) *For the most part, I would like to know who will vote for John in the
upcoming elections.
(ii) ?For the most part, I would like to know who will vote for whom in the
upcoming elections.
b. (i) *In every case I would like to know who voted for Bush (except for Bill).
(ii) ?In every case I would like to know who voted for whom (except for Bill).
c. (i) *With no exceptions, I would like to know who voted for Bush.
(ii) With no exceptions, I would like to know who voted for whom.
Let’s turn now to how embedding works under the assumption that Id is a filter
throughout. What that would mean is that know would have as a sister a set of sets of
propositions, rather than a set of propositions. This should not be an issue since we can
have know apply to this set distributively, as shown in (34). Under this account, we can
maintain a somewhat more uniform denotation for know(Q), provided in (34a).
(34) a. [[know〈stt,t〉]] = λw.λK〈stt,t〉.λx. ∀Q∈K→ know(Q)
2Although, crucially, I take questions to denote sets of propositions, while Fox takes them to denote propo-
sitions. Nonetheless, the idea would still be the same in that families of questions are of a higher type than
regular questions and that this is what accounts for the difference.
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b. [[know〈st,t〉]] = λw.λQ〈st,t〉.λx. knowp(w)(Ans(Q)(w))(x)
This approach will furthermore allow for a better understanding of the multiple question
effect illustrated above.
Concluding the discussion on families of questions, we discussed two options for how
to deal with the point-wise uniqueness and domain-exhaustivity requirements that surface
in multiple wh-questions. One option took Id to act on a family of questions and return a
question, while the second option had it take on its regular filter-like meaning and return
the same family of questions. Depending on which one of these approaches we adopted, I
showed that we end up having to provide different stories for how predicates embed pair
list readings. I outline these two options below.
(35) [John [knows [Id [which girl kissed which boy]]]]
option 1: (step i) plural predication of id([[which girl kissed which boy]])
option 1: (step ii) functional application of know([[Id(which girl kissed which boy)]])
option 2: (step i) point wise application of id([[which girl kissed which boy]])
option 1: (step ii) distributive meaning of know([[Id(which girl kissed which boy)]])
6.1.4 A note on covert only
How does covert only fit into the picture? Given the acceptability of NPIs in multiple wh-
questions, its presence is not up for debate, at least under an analysis such as the one
advanced in this thesis. I propose that there are two possible configurations: either only
associates with both wh-traces, in which case we would only get the single pair reading,
or it associates with the lower wh-trace, which would allow for either the single pair or
the pair list reading. The idea is that by associating with both traces, the contribution of
only is basically that of saying that there is a single pair of kissers, hence disallowing cases
involving multiple kissing partners.3
(36) Which girl kissed which boy?
{it’s only the case that Mary kissed John, it’s only the case that Mary kissed Bill,
3As in the case of single wh-questions, observe that the presence of only makes the contribution of Id
superfluous as there can ever only be one single proposition that is true in a given world.
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it’s only the case that Suzy kissed John, it’s only the case that Suzy kissed Bill}
On the other hand, by taking only to associate only with the lower wh-trace, we allow
for any kissing pairs as long as for every kisser there is only one kissee, which is consistent
with either the single pair reading, (37a), or the pair list reading, (37b).
(37) Which girl kissed which boy?
a. {Mary kissed only John, Mary kissed only Bill, Suzy kissed only John, Suzy
kissed only Bill}
b. {{Mary kissed only John, Mary kissed only Bill},
{Suzy kissed only John, Suzy kissed only Bill}}
The question that remains is the following: what disallows only from associating only
with the higher wh-trace? I claim that this option is not completely ruled out, and in fact
the reading it brings about is consistent with the question in (38), which is the superiority-
violating version of the question we have been discussing up till this point. I have not
discusses issues of superiority in this thesis, but one proposal in the literature is that supe-
riority can be violated whenever the overall meaning conveyed by the question is distinct
from the non-superiority violating structure.
(38) Which boy did which girl kiss?
This issues requires further thought, but what seems to be the case is that only associates
with whatever wh-phrases occupy the innermost specifier of C: both wh-phrases in the case
of a single pair reading, or the lower/higher one in case of a pair list reading, depending
on the meaning tried to get across.
6.2 Questions with quantifiers
On its pair list reading, a wh-question with a universal quantifier, (39a), appears to call
for a similar answer, (39c), as the corresponding multiple wh-question, (39b). It asks for an
exhaustive list of all the girls and their kissing partners, and presupposes that the number
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of boys each girl kissed not exceed one.4,5
(39) a. Which boy did every girl kiss?
b. Which boy did which girl kiss?
c. Ann kissed Fred, Mary kissed Greg and Suzy kissed Bill.
Similarly, a wh-question with an existential quantifier such as two girls in (40a) receives an
equivalent answer as the pair-list reading of the corresponding multiple wh-question in
(40b), under the assumption that which girl quantifies over a set of two girls, the choice of
which is left up to addressee.
(40) a. Which boy did two girls kiss?
b. Which boy did which girl kiss?
c. Ann kissed Fred and Mary kissed Greg.
d. Ann kissed Fred and Suzy kissed Bill.
In a sense, asking something like (40a) amounts to providing the addressee with a number
of questions and letting him choose one of those questions to answer fully (while respecting
domain-exhaustivity and point-wise uniqueness). Put differently, to know a pair list answer
to which boy did two girls kiss, it suffices to know for some group of two girls, which girl
kissed which boy.
The big question faced by any analysis that aspires to unify all these types of ques-
tions is how to compositionally derive the similarity between questions with quantifiers
and multiple wh-questions in terms of the answers they receive, while at the same time
capturing the observation that questions with existential quantifiers involve a choice that
is not available for multiple wh-questions. In other words, taking two girls to be a plain
existential and assuming it can behave like a regular wh-phrase would not be enough to
4All of these questions also allow for single pair readings as well as functional readings. For a discussion
on how the single pair readings can be obtained, I refer the reader to Chapter 3, section 1.
5One needs to be careful in constructing these examples so as to avoid instances where the pair list readings
of questions with quantifiers can be reduced to functional readings (Engdahl, 1986). The goal is to relate pair
list reading readings of questions with quantifiers to pair list readings of multiple wh-questions, so one needs to
argue against an alternative analysis which takes pair list reading readings of questions with quantifiers to be
reducible to functional readings. There are proposals out there that take these readings to be no different from
functional readings, but see arguments in Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984 and Chierchia 1993 that functional
readings pattern with single pair readings rather than with pair list readings.
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capture the fact that questions with existential quantifiers involve a choice among possible
groups of two girls. If we assume that pair list readings can only ever be derived via one
mechanism, the one employed in multiple wh-questions, namely by having two existentials,
each in the scope of a separate Cint head, another dilemma will be how to deal with the
fact that universal quantifiers end up receiving an existential-like interpretation, akin to the
interpretation we ascribe to wh-phrases.
In the remainder of this section I provide answers to these questions and offer an ac-
count of questions with quantifiers that tries to depart as little as possible from indepen-
dently needed assumptions regarding questions. I begin the discussion with an informal
outline of the pieces we seem to need and postpone the formal analysis till a later subsec-
tion.
The proposal that I use as a springboard for my analysis is the one in Chierchia 1993,
itself inspired by the account provided by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), which analyses
the pair list readings of questions with quantifiers as generalized quantifiers over questions,
with the denotation in (41).
(41) λK〈Q,t〉. ∃S∈mws(every girl/two girls) ∧
λK〈Q,t〉 K(λp. ∃x∃y [S(x) ∧ boy(y) ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y])
I will make little reference to the specifics of this account as they are much too involved and
would distract from the flow of the presentation. Suffice it to say, however, that this account
is, to date, one of the better attempts at addressing all the issues I discussed above: the re-
lation between questions with quantifiers and the corresponding multiple wh-question, the
idea of having a choice among possible questions, and a uniform analysis of all quantifiers
as existentials. The account I will end up proposing is nothing more than an update on an
already capable theory of questions with quantifiers.
6.2.1 Deriving the pair-list interpretation
We already know how pair list readings for multiple wh-questions are obtained: two inter-
rogative C heads, each with a separate wh-phrase in its specifier, simplified as in (42).
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(42) pair list readings for multiple wh
wh1
C
wh2
C
t1 kissed t2
In order to derive the fact that questions with quantifiers give rise to similar readings, and
crucially, that pair list readings have only one source (i.e. (42)), I propose we assume that
quantifier phrases (QPs) have the option of “taking on” wh meanings. That is, that they
can move like wh-phrases to the specifier of C heads, and that they can be interpreted like
wh-phrases, namely as existentials.
(43) pair list readings for questions with quantifiers
QP1
C
wh2
C
t1 kissed t2
Getting quantifiers to move like wh-phrases should not be too hard of a task since we
can simply say that they are optionally endowed with a [wh] feature.6 Having them be
interpreted as existentials, across the board and regardless of their quantificational force,
is, however, quite the leap. Nonetheless, let’s take it as a given for now that this option
is actually there in the grammar. What that would mean then is that the universal and
existential quantifiers would be interpreted as in (44a) and (44b), respectively (note that
there would be no change in the meaning of the existential).
(44) a. λP.∀x[girl(x) → P(x)]
every girl
wh
−→ λP.∃x[girl(x) ∧ P(x)]
some girl
b. λP.∃x[girl(x) ∧ |x|=2 ∧ P(x)]
two girls
wh
−→ λP.∃x[girl(x) ∧ P(x)]
some girl
6Crucially, however, this feature would have to be parasitic on the presence of an actual wh-phrase some-
where in the structure or else the system would have the option of over-generating interrogative meanings
even in cases without actual wh-phrases.
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Given these initial assumptions regarding the behavior of QPs in questions and the fact
that wh-phrases are themselves analyzed as existentials, we would predict the following
three questions to have the same denotation on their pair-list reading, namely the set of
questions in (45d). Assume we’re in a situation with three girls.
(45) a. Which girl kissed which boy?
b. Which boy did every girl kiss?
c. Which boy did two girls kiss?
d.


Which boy did Ann kiss?,
Which boy did Mary kiss?,
Which boy did Suzy kiss?


(45d) gives us the right meaning for (45a) and (45b), but crucially not so for (45c). What
this question asks for is not an answer to every question in (45d), but an answer to any two
of those questions. In other words, the addressee is given the option to answer one of the
questions in (46).
(46) a. Which girlAnn,Mary kissed which boy?pl =


Which boy did Ann kiss?,
Which boy did Mary kiss?


b. Which girlAnn,Suzy kissed which boy?pl =


Which boy did Ann kiss?,
Which boy did Suzy kiss?


c. Which girlSuzy,Mary kissed which boy?pl =


Which boy did Mary kiss?,
Which boy did Suzy kiss?


It looks then that interpreting two girls as a regular existential does not give us the right
meaning for the question, while it does by interpreting every girl as an existential.
An easier way to understand what’s going on in the existential cases is by looking at the
meaning of such questions in embedded contexts. For example, if someone tells you that
John knows which boy two girls kissed, you infer that there is a set of two girls for which John
knows which girl kissed which boy. Essentially, what seems to happen in these cases is that
the set of girls under consideration is reduced to 2 membered subsets of the set of girls.
It’s as if we were answering the question which girl kissed which boy in a scenario in which
there are two and not three girls. The closest approximation to the meaning conveyed by
these questions is as follows: we have a multiple wh-question where the restrictor of the wh
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corresponding to the QP, which girl, is allowed to vary in a way that is determined by the
meaning of the QP itself.
(47) John knows which boy two girls kissed.
a. There is a set of two girls such that John knows which of those girls kissed
which boy.
b. ∃S∈[[two girls]] ∧ John knows which S kissed which boy.
Maybe an even more compelling example that these questions involve a choice is that
given the same situation, I would not necessarily assume that Jenny and Will in (48a) share
the same knowledge, while I would take it for granted that Jeremy and Chris share the
same knowledge in (48b).
(48) a. (i) Jenny knows which boy two girls kissed.
(ii) Will knows which boy two girls kissed.
b. (i) Jeremy knows which girls kissed which boy.
(ii) Chris knows which girls kissed which boy.
The conclusion we can draw from this observation is that if we want to maintain that the
pair list reading of questions with quantifiers is obtained the same way as the pair list
reading for multiple wh-questions, something more needs to be said about these choice
readings.
6.2.2 Deriving the quantificational force
Recall the baseline assumption: questions with quantifiers denote families of questions on
their pair list readings similarly to multiple wh-questions. In order to derive this com-
positionally we need to assume that at some level, quantifier phrases denote existentials,
just like wh-phrases. As we saw above, the crucial difference between the existential corre-
sponding to the QP and the existential corresponding to the wh-phrase rests on how the
restriction is chosen. In a regular wh-question, this restriction is assumed to be the entire
domain of discourse. So for a question like (49a), the first wh-phrase would correspond to
an existential quantifier over the set of all girls (in the discourse), while the second one
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to an existential over the set of all boys, as indicated in the denotation of this question
provided in (49b).
(49) a. Which girl kissed which boy?
b. λQ〈st,t〉.∃x∈[[girl]] ∧ Q=λp〈st〉. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y
c. [[girl]] = {Ann, Mary, Suzy}
On the other hand, a question with a quantifier like (50) would still denote a family of
questions, but in this case the restriction of the existential corresponding to two girls would
range over a set S, which has the property of denoting a set containing two girls (no more,
no less), as in (50c).
(50) a. Which boy did two girls kiss?
b. λQ〈st,t〉.∃x∈S ∧ Q=λp〈st〉. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y
c. S∈{{Ann, Mary}, {Ann, Suzy}, {Mary, Suzy}}
It’s precisely the availability of a plurality of such sets (containing exactly two girls) that
gives rise to the choice-like reading for these questions. This is what makes it possible for
Jenny, Will and Chris to know different things in (51); they know the question in (50b) for
different values of S.
(51) a. Jenny knows which boy two girls kissed.
b. Will knows which boy two girls kissed.
c. Chris knows which boy two girls kissed.
We can represent the variability in these questions via existentially quantifying over these
sets S, as in (52), which amounts to the disjunction of three propositions in (52a-c):
(52) ∃S∈{{Ann, Mary}, {Ann, Suzy}, {Mary, Suzy}}
∧ Jenny knows which S kissed which boy.
a. Jenny knows which girlAnn,Mary kissed which boy.
b. Jenny knows which girlAnn,Suzy kissed which boy.
c. Jenny knows which girlMary,Suzy kissed which boy.
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What these sets S denote and how they are selected depends on the meaning of the quan-
tifier phrase. A quantifier phrase, 〈et, t〉, denotes a set of sets. In the case of two girls, it
denotes the set consisting of all sets of individuals containing at least two girls, as in (53a).
These are sometimes referred to as the witness sets of the quantifier (Barwise and Cooper,
1981). The issue is that in the context of questions, we are interested only in a subset of
(53a), namely those sets which don’t have a subset that belongs to the denotation of the
quantifier, i.e. every set that has two girls and no other individual, (53b). This subset is
referred to as the minimal witness set of the quantifier and I will henceforth refer to it as
mws(QP).
(53) a. [[two girls]] = {{Ann, Mary}, {Ann, Suzy}, {Mary, Suzy}, {Ann, Mary, Suzy},
{Ann, Mary, Jim}, {Ann, Suzy, Bill, Chris}, {Mary, Suzy, Chris}, . . . }
b. mws(two girls) = {{Ann, Mary}, {Ann, Suzy}, {Mary, Suzy}}
c. mws(QP) = {S: S∈[[QP]] ∧ ¬∃S’[S’∈[[QP]] ∧ S’⊂S]}
Putting all these pieces together, it looks like we want the final denotation of a question
with a quantifier, on its pair list reading, to be as in (54):
(54) Jenny knows which boy two girls kissed.
∃S∈mws(two girls) ∧ Jenny knows which S kissed which boy.
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(two girls) λS〈e,t〉
John
knows Q〈〈st,t〉,t〉
Which S kissed which boy
Before we try to understand how this can be derived compositionally, note that the same
denotation would be appropriate for a question with the quantifier every girl, provided in
(55a). The only difference would be that here we are quantifying over minimal witness
sets of every girl. Since there is only one set, the set containing all the girls and nobody
else, (55b), the embedded question in (55) can only ever denote one family of questions
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given that there is only one option for the value of S (rather than three possible families of
questions as was the case with two girls).
(55) Jeremy knows which boy every girl kissed.
a. ∃S∈mws(every girl) ∧ Jenny knows which S kissed which boy.
b. mws(every girl) = {{Ann, Mary, Suzy}}
Existentially quantifying over a singleton set is vacuous so this move gets us nothing that
we couldn’t already obtain by assuming universal quantifiers can optionally be interpreted
as existentials.7 While this way of deriving the pair list reading of a wh-question with
a universal quantifier is more involved than possibly necessary, it does point towards a
unified account of quantifiers in questions by taking both existentials and universals to
involve quantification over minimal witness sets. Another advantage to invoking minimal
witness sets in the context of quantifiers in questions is that it allows us to account for the
lack of pair list readings for questions such as (56):
(56) a. Which boy did no girl kiss?
b. Which boy did at most two girls kiss?
The account, due to Chierchia (1993) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) is that these
questions lack pair list readings because the quantifiers are downward entailing and thus
have no minimal witness sets; there is no set of individuals in the denotation of no girl that
contains no girls and is furthermore a subset of every other such set. Similarly for at most
two girls and any other downward entailing quantifier.
There are, of course, some issues with this approach. For example, most, an upward
entailing quantifier that has minimal witness sets, does not appear to allow for pair-list
readings in questions (cf. Chierchia (1993)).
(57) What do most students like?
*Mary likes phonology, John likes syntax, . . . .
7Which was clearly a far-fetched assumption to begin with.
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Dayal (1996) proposes to deal with this problem by minimally changing the account so as
to only only allow quantifiers that have unique minimal witness sets. Since most does not
have a unique such set, she correctly rules it out. The problem is that while this approach
makes the right prediction for most, it also rules out all indefinites as they too lack unique
minimal witness sets. I leave this as an open problem and continue appealing to minimal
witness sets for the remainder of the chapter.
6.2.3 Higher order quantifiers
The main issue in dealing with the quantifier is understanding the compositional mecha-
nisms that drive it to be interpreted in two places in the structure, both times differently
(ignoring the trace which ends up being interpreted as a regular variable). We need to
account not only for this peculiar fact, but also for the fact that, regardless of its quantifi-
cational force, it will systematically give rise to existential interpretations. The only point
where the quantificational power of the QP makes a difference is at the topmost level, when
we decide how to select the quantificational domain of the restriction, which too is done
by existentially quantifying over the QP’s minimal witness sets.
That one quantifier could correspond to two separate instances of quantification could
be understood as follows. Assume that in questions, generalized quantifiers can optionally
start their lives as complex XPs, such as in (58).8
(58)
XP1
∃〈et,ett〉 XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(QP)〈et,t〉
kissed
which boy
First, XP1 leaves behind a trace of type e and subsequently abstracts over it. I argue that
this is wh-movement, meaning that XP1 carries a wh feature, akin to other wh-phrases.9
8What I’m doing here is extending the idea of head movement out of complex heads (cf. Shimada 2007) to
account for phrasal movement.
9Two issues arise in connection to this. Why is it that these guys move covertly, unlike other wh-phrases?
One possible answer would be to say that, at least in English, only phonologically marked wh-phrases can be
spelled out in the specifier position of C. Second of all, note that we need to block these guys from surfacing
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(59)
XP1 [wh]
∃〈et,ett〉 XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(QP)〈et,t〉
λ1e ...
g(1)e kissed y
The second instance of movement, that of XP2, is type-driven since XP2 is type 〈ett, t〉,
the wrong type to combine with the silent existential quantifier that heads XP1, ∃〈et,ett〉.
This QR-type move leaves behind a trace of type 〈e, t〉, a predicate, and once we lambda
abstract over it we give it a sister of the correct type, 〈et, t〉.
(60)
XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(QP) λ2〈e,t〉
...
XP1
∃〈et,ett〉 g(2)〈e,t〉
λ1e ...
g(1)e kissed y
The meaning of these XPs is provided in (61), where mws(QP) is a set of predicates, a
set containing the minimal witness sets of the GQP.
(61) a. [[XP1]] = λP〈e,t〉.∃x [S(x) ∧ P(x)] quantifier over individuals
b. [[XP2]] = λP〈et,t〉.∃S [(mws(QP))(S) ∧ P(S)] quantifier over predicates
Where in the structure do these guys move to? XP1, by virtue of undergoing wh-movement,
will end up in the specifier of a Cint, similarly to what any other wh-phrase would do. This
move is what’s going to give us the family of questions meaning, i.e. create the second-
order question. But what about XP2? This move also needs to take place at a phrasal level,
i.e. a scope site, a type t node. The first such node above XP1 is going to be the topmost
node, corresponding to Jay knows . . . . It all comes together as in (62). There is some set S of
girls for which Jay knows which girl in S kissed which boy.
solo, i.e. in the absence of other wh-phrase, since that would dramatically over-generate; see fn 3.
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(62) Jay knows which boy every girl/two girls kissed.
∃S [S∈(mws(every girl/two girls)) ∧ Jay knows Id[λQ〈Q〉.∃x∈S ∧ Q=λp. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y]]
XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(QP)
λ2〈e,t〉
Jay
knows
Id λQ〈Q〉.∃x∈g(2) ∧
Q=λp. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧
p=λw. x kissedw y
λQ
XP1
∃〈et,ett〉 g(2)〈e,t〉
λ1e Q = λp.∃y∈[[boy]]
∧ p=λw. g(1) kissedw y
C Q
λp
which boy
λ3e p=λw. g(1) kissedw g(3)
C p
g(1) kissed g(3)
1
7
2
6.2.4 Interim conclusion
In this section I focused on the pair list readings of questions with quantifiers and offered
a compositional account that can derive these readings. Given the striking similarity be-
tween pair list readings of multiple wh-questions and pair list readings of questions with
quantifiers, the overarching goal was to deviate as little as possible from the overall archi-
tecture of the system that I presented in section 1.2 for the pair list readings of multiple
wh-questions. Just like with the move from single pair to pair list readings for multiple
wh-questions, questions with quantifiers can go from a simple question denotation to a
family of questions denotation by moving from the complex C head in (63a), which gives
us a regular question, to the even more complex C head in (63b), which gives us a family
of questions.
(63) a. regular question
(single pair)
C〈st,stt〉 Id
x kissed y
b. family of questions
(pair list)
C〈st,stt〉 C〈stt,sttt〉 Id x kissed y
Given a system in which the number of C heads needs to be at most as high as the number
of XPs that bear a wh feature (|Co |≤|XP[wh]|),10 I had to propose that quantifiers in questions
can optionally take on the role of a wh-phrase so as to justify the move from (63a) to (63b),
i.e. to a family of questions. We can think of the switch from a regular quantifier meaning
to a wh-like meaning, repeated in (64), as a possible repair mechanism that allows us to
reinterpret the question on a pair list reading whenever the single pair reading is not
available in the context.
10Recall, this is a stipulation that we need to make in order to avoid over-generating higher-order questions
in the absence of multiple wh-phrases.
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(64) a. regular QP〈et,t〉 → b. QP[wh]
∃〈et,ett〉
∃〈ett,ettt〉 mws(QP)〈et,t〉
Under this wh-meaning, through a combination of wh-movement and QR, a portion of the
complex quantifier will end up quantifying in all the way at the top, the first available
scope position above the question. What this approach amounts to is creating a family
of questions wherein the quantifier is interpreted as an existential over a variable of type
〈e, t〉. This variable ends up bound above the question, and this provides the domain of
quantification of the existential corresponding to the quantifier.
One question that still needs to be addressed is what happens in un-embedded ques-
tions, where there is no embedding-predicate, and for that matter, no scope position for the
quantifier to QR to. On my account, I have tacitly assumed that un-embedded questions
are interpreted as speech acts, as in (65b) for (65a) (cf. Krifka 2001 on this topic). This allows
us the freedom to QR out of the question similarly to the embedded cases.11
(65) a. Who came to the party?
b. I want to know who came to the party.
The careful reader will have noticed that we have disregarded the option where the
quantifier is interpreted on its wh-meaning, as in (64b), and the interrogative C head on its
regular question meaning, (63a). This would amount to interpreting the question in (66) on
its single pair reading, with the denotation in (66b), and would thus allow for an answer
that names a single pair of kissers in a situation in which only one girl did any kissing.
This reading doesn’t seem to be there. That is, there’s an expectation that when asking this
question it is common knowledge that there are at least two girls who kissed somebody.
11An issue that arises related to this is pointed out by Szabolcsi (1997), also following
Moltmann and Szabolcsi (1994), that the availability of pair list readings with root questions with quanti-
fiers is much more restricted than I have actually presented it in this chapter. In particular, Szabolcsi observes
that basically only the universal gives rise to a pair list reading in root questions, while in embedded contexts,
the readings are more liberal. It’s unclear what the reasoning behind this might be, especially on an analysis
such as mine which takes both root and embedded questions to be interpreted as the argument of a (possibly
covert) question-embedding predicate.
174
(66) Which boy did two girls kiss?
a. Ann kissed Fred.
b. ∃S [S∈(mws(two girls)) ∧
I want to know Id[λp. ∃x∈S ∧ ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y]]
Nothing that we have said this far excludes such structures. The issue we encounter here is
reminiscent of what we see with the difference between singular and plural which phrases.
The question in (67a) presupposes that there is only one girl who kissed John, which we
can deal with easily once we assume that singular which phrases can only quantify over
atoms. (67b), on the other hand, comes with the inference that a plurality of girls kissed
Fred, despite the fact that in a situation in which only one girl kissed Fred, the semantics
we give these questions would derive that as a possible answer since plural which phrases
quantify over both pluralities and atoms.
(67) a. Which girl kissed John?
b. Which girls kissed Fred?
It’s unclear to me how to deal with this contrast but I believe that a solution to (67) will
pave the way for an understanding of why (66) disprefers a single pair reading.12
An advantage of this general approach to questions with quantifiers is that we don’t
have to appeal to a special embedding rule since everything we have said about embedding
families of questions carries over smoothly to these cases. In particular, the Id operator will
function similarly to how it does with a family of questions, via point wise application,
and it will require each member of the family of questions to contain one (and only one)
maximally informative true proposition.
6.2.5 Two types of single pair readings
This section dealt specifically with the pair list reading of questions with quantifiers. Before
moving on to mention some questions, it’s worth noting (again) that questions with quanti-
fiers can also receive single pair readings. In fact, on their non pair-list readings, questions
12It could also just be the case that wh-marked quantifiers cannot share a specifier position with another
wh-element.
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with existentials can receive one of the two readings in (i) and (ii).
(68) a. Which boy did some girl kiss?
(i) John, he was kissed by a girl.
(ii) Ann kissed John.
b. Which boy did some girls kiss?
(i) Fred, he was definitely kissed by at least a couple of girls.
(ii) Suzy and Mary kissed Fred.
That these readings are in fact different can be observed more easily when we look at what
happens in embedded contexts. For someone to know which boy some girl(s) kissed, it would
be enough to know the identity of the boy who was kissed by a singularity/plurality of
girls. This reading corresponds to (68a.i)/(68b.i), and is derived by interpreting the quanti-
fier within the nucleus of the question, as in (69).13
(69) Someone knows Id[λp. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. ∃x∈[[girl(s)]] ∧ x kissedw y]
There is also another reading, (68a.ii) and (68b.ii), which corresponds to a case in which
someone knows not only who that boy was, but can also identify the girl(s) who kissed
him. In order to derive this reading we would have to allow the quantifier to receive wide
scope, that is, to QR to a position above the question, as in (70).
(70) ∃x∈[[girl(s)]] ∧ someone knows Id[λp. ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. x kissedw y]
there is a y (an individual or plurality) and someone knows that y kissed Fred
13One issue that came up in Fox 2012 is what predictions do we make in a situation such as the following.
Consider that Ann kissed John but that Jim wrongly believes it to be the case that Suzy kissed John. Would it
still be true that Jim knows which boy some girl kissed.? My intuition is that this would count as true because Jim
correctly believes that there is a girl who kissed John, despite him being wrong about the identity of that girl.
As far as I can tell, the denotation in (69) can account for this reading since we evaluate John’s belief set with
respect to propositions of the form in (i) which make no reference to the identity of the kisser.
(i) ∃y∈[[boy]] ∧ p=λw. ∃x∈[[girl(s)]] ∧ x kissedw y
For people whose judgements don’t coincide with mine, I would have to claim that their only interpretation
of such questions is via wide-scope of the quantifier, as in (70).
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6.3 Mention some questions
Throughout most of the discussion in the previous chapters we have dealt with the issue of
weak versus strong exhaustivity and tacitly assumed that un-embedded questions always
go for a strongly exhaustive interpretation so as to convey the maximally informative true
proposition. This is not always the case, however. There are instances where something less
than the maximally informative answer suffices, and this tends to happen particularly in
the presence of existential quantifiers and existential modals. Consider the questions in (71).
The answers provided seem very appropriate despite the fact that they don’t necessarily
exhaust the list of possibilities. The umbrella term for these questions is mention some
questions.
(71) a. What did some of your students write about in their final papers?
Greg wrote about plurality, Julie wrote about classifiers.
b. Who can finish a whole pizza?
John can finish a whole pizza.
What makes these questions “mention some” is the presence of a particular element that
makes it possible for the question to receive an answer that, on a particular representation,
would still count as a maximally informative answer. Existential quantifiers like some stu-
dents and existential modals like can are precisely such elements. Something about the way
they interact with other elements in the question is responsible for the availability of these
peculiar readings. Observe that the minimally different variants of the questions in (71) do
not exhibit this same variability, see (72).
(72) a. What did your students write about in their final papers?
b. Who finished a whole pizza?
One way to see this “optionality” at work is by comparing the meaning of their embedded
variants. Jill and Jamie can have different belief sets in (73a) and still count as knowing
the question, while the same is not true for (73b) where the only way for them to count as
knowing the question is by sharing the same (relevant) set of beliefs.
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(73) a. (i) Jill knows what some of your students wrote about in their papers.
(ii) Jamie knows what some of your students wrote about in their papers.
b. (i) Jill knows what your students wrote about in their papers.
(ii) Jamie knows what your students wrote about in their papers.
The issue that needs to be addressed at this point is how to account for the availability
of mention some readings for questions with existential quantifiers or existential modals
without weakening the requirement that questions seek the most informative answer.
6.3.1 Existential quantifiers
In the previous section we looked at questions with quantifiers, and in particular at the dif-
ferent readings that arise in the presence of existential quantifiers. I described those read-
ings as choice readings, but for all intents and purposes, a choice reading is equivalent to a
mention some reading. Briefly recapping that discussion, I claimed that the choice/mention
some reading for a question such as (74a) comes about via a reinterpretation of the quanti-
fier as a complex existential quantifier that bears a wh feature. Having it bear a wh feature
allowed us to analyze these questions on par with multiple wh-questions and thus derive
the fact that at some level, they denote families of questions that need to respect the same
restrictions as regular questions: point wise uniqueness and domain exhaustivity (by virtue
of having Id apply to the family of questions). Furthermore, by reinterpreting the quantifier
as a complex existential, we had to invoke quantifying in, an operation which gave us the
option of choosing a subset of the quantifier for which to answer the question fully. Hence
the choice reading in (74b).
(74) a. What did some of your students write?
b. For some subset S of your friends, I want to know what S wrote.
The task ahead of us is to see if and how we can carry over this analysis to account for
the mention some readings of questions with existential modals in a systematic way. Since
modals cannot bear wh features, or be reanalyzed as complex modals, the trick we used for
existential quantifiers will not be of use. And yet, maybe it can . . . .
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6.3.2 Existential modals
Consider the question in (75) and assume that wh-phrases are interpreted distributively, as
if they were the sister of a silent each, following Fox (2012).14 The idea here is that depending
on where you distribute, i.e. below or above the existential modal, you will obtain different
sets of propositions:
(75) Who can chair this committee?
a. LF1: λp [who λX [[C p] λw [X each] λy can y chair this comm]]
{∀y∈atom(X) "[chair(y, comm)]: X∈(people)}
b. LF2: λp [who λX [[C p] λw can [X each] chair this comm]]
{"∀y∈atom(X)[chair(y, comm)]: X∈(people)}
Under a high construal of each, LF1 denotes a set which is closed under conjunction since
it denotes a set of propositions of the form each of Ann and Mary can serve on this committee,
which entail that Ann can serve on the committee and that Mary can serve on the commit-
tee: "A∧"M→ "A, etc. This LF should yield the mention all answer {"A∧"M∧"S}
(76) LF1: {"A, "M, "S, "A∧"M, "A∧"S, "M∧"S, "A∧"M∧"S}
Under a low construal of each, LF2 is going to denote the set of answers in (77), a set of
propositions that is not closed under conjunction since"A∧"M #→"(A∧M); assuming that
more than one person can chair the committee in the world of evaluation, the fact that this
set is not closed under conjunction amounts to saying that there is no unique maximally
informative proposition in this set. In other words, applying Id to this set would result in
a presupposition failure.
(77) LF2: {"A, "M, "S, "(A∧M), "(A∧S), "(M∧S), "(A∧M∧S)}
14This is a harmless assumption that might in fact be necessary in other parts of the system in order to deal
with distributive readings of wh-phrases. This distributive operator is analyzed as in (i):
(i) a. [[each]](Xe) = λP.∀y∈atom(x)(P(y)=1)
b. atom(Xe) = {y: y≤X and y is atomic}
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And yet any of the answers in (78) would count as good answers (under a mention some
reading).
(78) a. Ann can chair this committee.
b. Mary can chair this committee.
c. Suzy can chair this committee
Given the lack of a maximally informative answer, applying Id to the set in (77) is going to
fail. I propose that in such cases, i.e. when there is no maximally informative answer, we
have the option of reinterpreting the question and answering it with respect to a smaller
domain of quantification of the wh-phrase. Basically, in cases where Id gives rise to a pre-
supposition failure, as is the case in (77), a cooperative addressee will still try to answer
the question but do so with respect to a sub-question. An easy way to think about it is as
follows. Suppose the question is Who of Ann, Mary and Suzy can chair this committee? and
that all three of them are good candidates. As shown above, interpreting the question on
LF2will return a set that contains no maximally informative answer. In order to get around
this problem, the addressee has the option of answering a sub-question instead, so one of
questions in (79a); I use subscripts to indicate the domain of the wh.
(79) WhoAnn,Mary,Suzy can chair this committee?
a. WhoAnn,Mary can chair this committee?
b. WhoAnn,Suzy can chair this committee?
c. WhoMary,Suzy can chair this committee?
d. WhoAnn can chair this committee?
e. WhoMary can chair this committee?
f. WhoSuzy can chair this committee?
Of these sub-questions, only (79d-f) will have a maximally informative answer, and thus
the addressee can respond by offering an answer to one of these questions. If Id fails in
(80a), we can reinterpret the question as in (80b):
(80) a. Jay [knows [ fail! Id [λp [∃x∈{A, M, S} [λx [ [C p] [can [x chair]]]]]]]]]
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b. Jay [knows [ Id [λp [∃x∈S [λx [ [C p] [can [x chair]]]]]]]]]
where S is a subset of {A, M, S}
There are a number of ways we could formalize this re-interpretation. My goal is to
depart as little as possible from independently motivated assumptions. One tool at our
disposal is the concept of quantifier phrases having the option of being reinterpreted as
complex quantifiers. So far we have only appealed to this in the context of regular quantifier
phrases, like two girls, some students and every girl. I propose we extend this so as to allow
wh-phrases to have this option as well. Namely, who in (81a) can also surface as the complex
XP in (81b).
(81) a. who
∃〈et,ett〉 people〈e,t〉
→ b. who = XP1
∃〈et,ett〉 XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 XP3
∃〈et,ett〉 people〈e,t〉
As with the case of regular quantifiers, the complex who in (81b) will move in two stages:
first wh-movement will move the entire complex to the specifier of C (as it would have
regardless), followed by a type mismatch driven QR of XP2 outside of the question. I
provide the meaning of each node in (81b) below:
(82) a. XP3 = [[some people]] = {{Ann, Mary, Suzy}, {Ann, Mary}, {Mary, Suzy},
{Ann, Suzy}, {Ann}, {Mary}, {Suzy}}
b. XP2 = ∃S∈[[XP3]] = ∃S∈{some people}
a set of all subsets of XP3
The final derivation will look as in (83):
(83) ∃S∈{some people} ∧ Jay knows Id[λp. ∃x S(x) ∧ p=λw. " x chair]
There is a set of people for which Jay knows who can chair the committee.
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XP2
∃〈ett,ettt〉 XP3
∃〈et,ett〉 people〈e,t〉
λ2
Jay
knows
Id
λp
who
∃〈et,ett〉 g(2)
λ1
C p
can
g(1) chair
Reinterpreting this question as in (83) allows us to understand how it is that mention
some readings arise. Under the representation in (83), there will be three sub-questions for
which Id doesn’t fail, namely those where the domain of the wh-phrase is a singleton. The
idea is not much different than what happens in the case of choice readings with existential
quantifiers. The only difference is what drives this re-interpretation, which in this case I
take to be a repair strategy driven by the failure of Id to find a maximally informative
answer in the question denotation.15
This same mechanism is going to be in place for a question such as (84) where the
situation is such that one or two people can act as chairs. The issue is that neither LF1
nor LF2, as described above, would give us the answer we want, namely (84b), since even
though they are all maximally informative in a sense, logically one is stronger than the
others. I leave this example for future work but I am hopeful that an analysis along the
lines described above is capable of deriving the intuitive answer.
(84) a. Who can chair this committee?
15An issue that I have nothing to say about at this point is why it seems to be the case that you want to “cut”
as little as possible from the initial question. That is, why in a sense it seems to be a requirement that if you
can’t answer the full question, you need to answer a maximal subquestion of the question vis a vis the world:
a question that has a maximally informative true answer and is not a proper subset of any subquestion that
has a maximally informative answer. That this is something we might need to account for is based on Fox’s
observation that a question such as (i), even on its mention some reading, seems to require an answer like (ia)
rather than (ib) in a context in which committees consist of two people. The problem here is that while (ib) is
a true proposition, it isn’t as informative as (ia).
(i) Who can serve on this committee?
a. Ann and Mary can serve on this committee.
b. Ann can serve on this committee.
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b. Mary can chair, or John can chair, or Mary and John can chair.
Before I conclude this section I need to address some potential concerns regarding the
over-generating power of a system in which wh-phrases have the option to be interpreted as
complex quantifiers in case Id gives rise to a presupposition failure. Sometimes we actually
do need Id to fail, as is the case with singular which phrases whenever the question nucleus
holds true of more than one individual. Recall that it was precisely these examples that
drove Dayal (1996) to formulate a uniqueness presupposition on her answer-hood operator,
which I adopted for the Id operator.
If singular which phrases were allowed to undergo the same reinterpretation as who
above, then we would predict a question such as (85), in a context in which Mary and Suzy
kissed John, to receive the mention some answer in (85a) or (85b).
(85) Which girl kissed John?
a. Mary kissed John.
b. Suzy kissed John.
So we need to somehow rule out re-interpretation from taking place in these cases. In the
same vein, a similar observation was made by Fox (2012), building on Spector (2007), that
which phrases do not allow for mention some readings with existential modals. Notice the
contrast between (86a) and (86b). The claim is that only (86b) allows for a mention some
reading.
(86) a. At which gas station can you get gas?
b. Where can you get gas?
Based on these facts, it seems to be the case that which phrases do not have the option of
being reinterpreted as in (87b).
(87) a. which people
∃〈et,ett〉 people〈e,t〉
✗
−→ b. which people
∃〈et,ett〉
∃〈ett,ettt〉
∃〈et,ett〉 people〈e,t〉
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One possibility would be to say that since the restriction on which-phrases is made overtly,
we don’t have the option of tampering with it like we do with monomorphemic wh-
phrases.16 To this constellation of empirical facts also belongs the quantifier each, which,
unlike every, does not exhibit a subject-object asymmetry in pair list readings in questions
with quantifiers. I take this as a welcome result since it’s been a long-standing assumption
that which and each share some commonalities, namely their ‘D-linking’ character. I follow
Dayal and use D-linking to indicate that a quantifier cannot be used in contexts where no
discourse referent has been established. One possible account for the difference between
each and every is to say that unlike every, each does not allow for a reinterpretation as a
complex quantifier, i.e. as a [wh]-bearing element; this is exactly the same proposal I gave
for the difference between which and who above. If we take the subject-object asymmetry we
see in questions with quantifiers to have the same roots as the superiority facts observed
with multiple wh-questions, then one possible direction would be to say that since each
cannot be re-interpreted as a wh-element, unlike every, superiority effects could not be said
to come into play since we would not be dealing with multiple wh-elements. Under this
proposal one would still need to understand how the pair list reading with each can arise
in the absence of re-interpretation.17
16A question that is worth investigating in relation to this observation is whether this restriction is at all
similar to Spector’s observation that which phrases cannot receive higher-order interpretation. For that matter,
one should also try to understand to what extent my proposal for higher-order quantifiers is related to his
intuition that wh-phrases need to have the option of being interpreted as higher-order in order to account
for their behavior in modalized questions. It might ultimately turn out to be the case that my proposal for
higher-order quantifiers finds support in other domains as well.
17For more on the peculiar character of quantifiers in questions see Beghelli 1997, Beghelli and Stowell 1997,
Szabolcsi 1997, Agu¨ero-Bautista 2001, to name just a few.
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Chapter 7
Looking ahead
In this thesis I have argued that a unified account of negative polarity items in questions
is desirable and I offered a new semantics of questions that shows how this is possible. In
order to do so I had to argue that the ambiguity exhibited by questions in terms of their
weakly versus strongly exhaustive interpretations should be encoded at the level of the
question nucleus rather than in different answer-hood operators. This allowed us to make
a number of predictions regarding the behavior of negative polarity items, such as their
distribution in the nucleus and restrictor of the wh-phrase, subject-object asymmetries, and
the varying acceptability of different types of NPIs (weak versus strong). Overall, I hope to
have shown that this new account has far-reaching consequences in the domain of NPIs as
well as questions. We were able to, for example, understand why constituent and alternate
questions exhibit similar restrictions with respect to the distribution of NPIs by assuming
that underlyingly, alternate questions have the same structure as regular wh-questions.
Some open problems inherited from previous proposals remain even with this account
however. For example, we are still unclear as to why certain predicates appear to select
only for weakly exhaustive questions (e.g. surprise) while others appear to impose no such
restrictions (e.g. know). At the end of Chapter 2 I offered some suggestions as to how we
might go about dealing with these issues. One possibility would be a proposal in terms of
Maximize Strength, building on the observation that question-embedding predicates that
select for weak exhaustivity are downward-entailing in their propositional incarnations.
Another issue that I hope to address in future work is why there should be no non-veridical
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predicates that impose similar restrictions as the surprise-class predicates.
Returning to NPIs, some issues that I was unable to touch upon in this dissertation in-
volve their behavior in rhetorical questions. It is a well-documented fact that NPIs can give
rise to rhetorical questions, depending either on the c-command relation of the NPI with
respect to the wh-phrase, or the nature of the NPI, i.e. if it is a minimizer and contributes
an emphatic effect even in declaratives. While these issue are immediately relevant to the
larger picture of how NPIs behave in questions, they were not discussed in this thesis for
reasons that have to do with our limited understanding of what the semantics of rhetori-
cal questions is outside the domain of NPIs. Another point of interest for future research
is to look in closer detail at the behavior of free choice items in questions and see what
predictions the present account makes with respect to their distribution, given the close
resemblance of free choice items and negative polarity items.
The most open-ended chapter in this dissertation is the last chapter, which deals with
higher order questions. Like most ongoing research, there are a lot of moving pieces and
finding a way to fit them all together can, at first, appear to create more problems than
it actually solves. The main goal of that chapter was to show what a possible analysis
that unifies multiple wh-questions, questions with quantifiers and mention some questions
might look like. To the extent that this approach is feasible, one still needs to understand
how functional readings of questions and superiority effects can be captured within such
a system as they are closely related to the fundamental issue of what level of flexibility we
can assume at the level of the wh-phrase. Other issues that I did not touch upon involve
quantificational variability effects and long-distance list readings which too will help us
get a clearer picture of how this system will ultimately come together. One particular point
of interest, however, should be the distribution of negative polarity items in higher-order
questions as no literature has dealt with the weak/strong exhaustivity ambiguity in these
types of questions. Despite its shortcomings, I do believe that this last chapter provides a
window, however small, into the overall architecture of questions, helping us see where the
differences and similarities lie between the basic types of questions discussed in the first
chapters, and these more complex ones.
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